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SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION 
 
THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAW 
 
Kieran St C Bradley1 
 
 
When the organisers invited me to today's event, they suggested that my presentation be 
entitled  "The  European  Court  of  Justice  –  a  View from the  Inside".  It  is  a  great  title,  but  it  
rather gives the idea that I would be revealing the darkest secrets of the Court in Luxembourg. 
However, apart from the duty of discretion which comes with the job, my two months in 
office have not given me access to too many “dark secrets”, presuming for the sake of 
argument, of course, that there are any. 
The title of my talk is taken instead from the very fine volume of that name, published by the 
Office of Official Publications in all then seven Community languages in 1982, celebrating 
the first three decades of Community law. Its subject is essentially an overview of my own 
career in European Community, latterly Union, law, highlighting some of the developments in 
the institutional law, particularly Court cases, which have occurred during the second three 
decades of European Community, now Union, law. 
 
I. 
I have in effect had four different careers in European law, two at the European Parliament, 
two at the Court of Justice, and I would like to say a few words about each. But before I do, I 
want to bring you back briefly to the early 1980s, to an epoch before email and social 
networking, before smartphones and Smart cars, when Germany, and indeed Europe, was still 
divided into two blocs of States following divergent, not to say mutually hostile, political 
ideologies.  Thirty  years  ago,  as  Susan  Vega  put  it  in  another  context,  was  like  the  World  
before  Columbus;  the  Earth  was  flat,  in  the  sense  that  the  Community  was  doing  much the  
same things in much the same way as it had done for the previous thirty, with not much 
change in immediate prospect. 
Yes, there were a few hills and valleys, and even a few legal constructions, on the horizon. 
The Community had overcome its first major political crisis in 1965-1966, at the cost of all 
but abandoning majority voting in the Council as the norm for decision-making, which had 
been one of the most innovative features of the Communities’ original institutional structures. 
It had too opened its arms to Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973, and on 1 
January 1981, to Greece. The Court of Justice had by then established the so-called pillars of 
the new European legal order, direct effect and primacy, and used them to build the four 
freedoms of the then common market.  
The scope of the Community's activities was nonetheless very much narrower than that of the 
Union today. Apart from establishing the objectives of the free movement of persons, goods, 
services and capital, the EEC Treaty had only provided for a handful of common policies, in 
respect of external trade, agriculture and transport, and of those, only the agricultural policy 
could be said to be fully operational within the Community. There was an embryonic regional 
policy, an embryonic social policy, an embryonic development policy, and an environmental 
policy which could barely aspire to being embryonic. In practice, this latter was limited to a 
                                                             
1 Judge  at  the  European Union Civil  Service  Tribunal.  This  is  the  written  version  of  the  keynote  address  that  
Judge Bradley delivered at EU Foundations Student Conference on 8 December 2011. Judge Bradley spoke in 
his personal capacity.  
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directive on the protection of wild birds and a few directives harmonising Member States 
standards for clear air and clean water. 
No foreign policy. No area of freedom, security and justice. No Euro. No European Union 
citizenship, no cultural or industrial policy, no youth or education policies, though a few years 
later the Community did come up with the first Erasmus scheme, which has proven to be a 
fairly spectacular success. 
The institutional landscape was pretty bare compared to what we know now. True, the big 
four were already there: Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Court, while the 
European Council though already extant was outside Community institutional framework and 
changed its part-time President every six months. There was no European Central Bank, no 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs, no Ombudsman, no Committee of the Regions and 
the  Court  of  Auditors,  only  a  few  years  old,  had  not  yet  been  promoted  to  the  rank  of  
‘institution’. The European Parliament had just been directly elected for the first time and was 
still finding its feet in the decision-making process, or rather finding that on many matters it 
didn't  have  a  leg  to  stand  on  when it  came to  influencing  policy  decisively.  There  was  also  
almost no institutional case-law to speak of, other than a handful of exotic judgments on the 
delegation of implementing powers, such as Meroni and Köster, and another handful on the 
proper conduct of consultation, the only legislative procedure then provided for. 
The decision-making process of the Community was thus very different. In those days, as the 
saying went, the Commission proposed, the Council disposed, without co-decision on 
legislation or a right of parliamentary veto on international agreements. Parliament enjoyed 
some budgetary leverage though the lion’s share of annual budgetary expenditure was taken 
up by agricultural spending over which Parliament’s influence was somewhat limited. 
In theory, the national parliaments could have participated in the policy process, at least 
indirectly by seeking to influence the Council, particularly where the national governments 
enjoyed a veto power. For the most part they did not, with the notable exceptions of the 
Danish Folketing (which called their ministers in for a briefing before every Council meeting) 
and the Westminster Parliament, each House of which scrutinised Commission proposals 
more or less closely, and questioned their ministers on what they did in Brussels. 
Of the institutions, it is the Court of Justice which has changed the most since then in terms of 
its structures. In 1982, there was one jurisdiction, with 11 judges and four Advocates General, 
making  15  members  in  all.  Now  there  are  three  courts,  with  a  total  of  61  judges  and  eight  
Advocates General, making 69 members in all, with a proposal to add a further 12 judges for 
the General Court somewhere in the pipeline. 
The most dramatic institutional change of all, however, concerns the attitude to, and practice 
of,  Treaty  reform.  In  the  first  two  and  a  half  decades  of  the  existence  of  the  EEC,  the  
substantive policy provisions of the founding Treaty were not amended even once. A 1965 
Treaty had merged the then three Councils and the three Commissions – one for each 
European Community – but this was really tidying up loose ends which could have been dealt 
with in 1957, while Treaty amendments of 1970 and 1975 had increased the European 
Parliament’s role in the adoption of the annual budget and the supervision of its 
implementation.  But  the  idea  of  substantive  Treaty  reform,  or  even  the  convening  of  an  
intergovernmental conference, was barely thinkable, and the best way to kill a policy initiative 
dead forever was to say, ‘ah yes, but you’d need to amend the Treaty’.  
 
II. 
This is the world I stepped into in the summer of 1981, when I joined the European 
Parliament as a stagiaire,  or  “Robert  Schumann  scholar”  as  we  were  known.  I  was  at  first  
attached to the Directorate General for Research and Documentation, a sort of in-house think 
tank which was ready to come up with answers and/or the necessary documentation in 
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response to queries from individual members or committees. The very first question I dealt 
with was the right of environmental organisations to take legal proceedings; the questioner 
was  preparing  a  possible  own-initiative  report  proposing  such  a  right  as  a  matter  of  
Community law. Remarkably, even after all these years, the issue still has a certain topicality, 
following the Greenpeace judgment of the Court of Justice, the Aarhus Convention and the 
Lisbon Treaty reforms to the Court’s jurisdiction. 
I only worked in Research and Documentation for a week or so before moving on to the 
secretariat of the Committee on Legal Affairs. As you might know, the European Parliament 
meets in plenary session for four or five working days per month, and a significant part of that 
time is spent either on voting on legislative matters, or listening to and debating political 
declarations by major political figures from within or outside the European Union. Debating 
time in plenary is therefore a scarce resource, carefully divided out for every agenda item 
amongst the political groups in function of their size and unattached members of Parliament 
in function of their number.  
This means that for most purposes the real debate takes place, and the decisions are mostly 
adopted, in the parliamentary committees, subject to a possible reversal by the plenary. There 
are twenty committees, covering almost all areas of European Union activity: foreign policy, 
the adoption of the Union budget and control of expenditure, agricultural, transport, 
environment policy etc. etc. The committees, of course, comprise MEPs, with anything from 
about  25  to  65  members,  and  their  political  (and  to  a  lesser  extent  national)  composition  is  
supposed faithfully to reflect the composition of Parliament itself. Each committee has a 
secretariat; when I started working in the Committee on Legal Affairs, we were just three 
administrators (that is, graduate-level officials), one French lawyer, one Italian and yours 
truly. Nowadays every committee secretariat has a minimum of six administrators, and some 
of the larger committees have a dozen or more. Our job in those days was first of all to 
organise the committee meetings – two one-day sessions per month – and secondly to advise 
rapporteurs and draftsmen on the possible content of the reports, opinions and working 
documents they would present at the meetings, or even to prepare a first draft where the topic 
was technical or uncontroversial. I imagine that very few items go through Parliament today 
without intensive lobbying of members by consultants and professional lobbyists, trade 
associations, unions, environmental groups, NGOs and interest groups of all kinds, big 
companies, even national and regional governments, including those of third States which 
happen to be interested.  
The Committee on Legal Affairs was rather special in that it did not just deal with legislative 
proposals, but it also acted, and still does, as the legal advisor to the institution on the political 
level, particularly as regards questions of institutional relations and law. Moreover, at the 
time, the committee secretariat acted as a sort of unofficial legal service for the governing 
bodies and committees. The Committee itself raised and pursued questions of general interest 
which arose in the work in other committees, though only if there was the necessary political 
support  for  doing  so.  One  of  the  first  matters  it  had  dealt  with  after  the  1979 elections  was  
whether Parliament should intervene in annulment proceedings to defend its rights in the 
consultation procedure. At the time, there were reservations within the institution regarding 
the appropriateness of Parliament’s getting involved in litigation at all, particularly where this 
had been initiated by private parties against a fellow institution, or whether Parliament should 
stay out of, and hence “above”, legal disputes. The Committee on Legal Affairs did not share 
those reservations, the institution agreed, and the rest is history.  
It was also largely thanks to this committee that the Court of Justice was prevailed upon to 
open up the possibility for Parliament to take annulment proceedings in order to defend its 
prerogatives in the legislative and budgetary fields. In particular, the committee was 
instrumental in defining Parliament’s defence in Les Verts, where, rather than challenging the 
admissibility of the annulment action on the obvious ground that the Treaty did not allow such 
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an action, Parliament actually argued in favour of an extensive interpretation of the 
jurisdictional clauses. The Court adopted this reasoning, and admitted the action; the 
committee followed up with a report saying that the Court should therefore allow proceedings 
by Parliament in order to preserve the rule of law under the constitutional charter the Court  
had so grandly proclaimed in Les Verts. In time, the Court accepted this reasoning too, in its 
ruling on the admissibility of Parliament's action in the Chernobyl case. 
The committee also initiated the first ever inter-institutional proceedings for illegal failure to 
act, whereby Parliament challenged the absence of a proper transport policy a good 25 years 
after the EEC Treaty had entered into force. The Council did not even argue that such a policy 
existed, but contended instead that Parliament should not be allowed to use legal process to 
pursue its political ends. The Court threw this argument out and sure enough, within about six 
months, the Council itself was using legal process against Parliament to pursue its political 
ends in the budgetary field, and I might add, successfully so on this occasion. 
 
III. 
After  seven  years  on  the  committee  secretariat,  I  joined  Parliament’s  legal  service  in  1988.  
Whereas the Council and Commission have each had a legal service since the dawn of 
Community time, the European Parliament only set up its legal service in 1986, largely as a 
direct response to the Les Verts and budgetary litigation of that year, and in anticipation of 
greater  things  to  come.  In  those  days,  we  were  ten  lawyers,  of  whom  just  two  of  us  were  
based in Brussels. While a certain versatility of function was required, I was especially 
charged with advising the environmental committee. 
By then we had the Single European Act. This introduced a second type of legislative 
procedure, the so-called “cooperation procedure”, which applied for some, but not all, 
legislation, and which had put the question of the choice of legal basis firmly on the map. As 
the legal basis determined both the degree of parliamentary participation and the voting rule 
in the Council for the adoption of legislation, it became overnight a significant matter for all 
of the political institutions and the Member States, and very soon after for the Court of Justice 
too.  
Before the Single Act, and in the absence of a specific Treaty foundation for environmental 
policy measures, the Council had regularly adopted uniform anti-pollution rules as common 
market measures, on the grounds that non-uniform rules would lead to obstacles to trade and 
distortions of competition between the Member States. The Court of Justice had even 
sanctioned this approach in two 1980 judgments. So when the Commission proposed anti-
pollution rules after the SEA, it opted for the internal market legal basis, meaning cooperation 
and qualified majority voting. The Council, on the other hand, argued that this was precisely 
the type of measure the new environmental legal basis had been designed to cope with, 
thereby preserving the unanimity rule which had applied for the adoption of common market 
rules.  
This was the mother of all legal basis battles, which the environment committee was eager to 
pitch into; in quick succession, Parliament intervened in the Titanium dioxide and Waste 
Directive cases  (though  it  considered  the  latter  a  lost  cause  on  the  main  question),  and  
initiated the challenge to the Waste Regulation. I suppose these arcane disputes have long 
since been consigned to the dustbin of legal history, but they were the very lifeblood of 
institutional law in their time. Years later, the same question came round again, in the form of 
a  turf  war  between  environmental  and  commercial  policy,  in  particular  regarding  the  
conclusion of international agreements regulating the trans-boundary movement of genetically 
modified organisms, of goods marked with an 'environmentally friendly' label and of waste, 
where the Court has provided a rather nuanced answer. 
Thirty Years of Community Law 
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The environment committee followed the adoption of implementing legislation in its field of 
competence too; its famous victory in the Pesticides litigation in 1996 left such a mark on the 
Council that some years later it codified the Court’s ruling in the second decision on 
comitology procedures. Though the Court sided with the Commission when Parliament 
challenged a decision allowing for the presence of genetically modified micro-organisms in 
organic foods, this proved to be a Pyrrhic victory of sorts for the Commission, as the Council 
amended the organic foods legislation at the first opportunity in order to ban the presence of 
any GMOs in such foods. Not long after, the Member States, many of whom simply did not 
trust the Commission in this area, adopted a moratorium on the authorisation of further 
deliberate releases of GMOs, which was kept in place for several years. 
Of course it was not all environmental law. Parliament also challenged the 1990 students’ 
residence directive, on the ground that it should have been adopted on the basis of what was 
then  Article  7  EEC,  with  the  benefit  of  the  cooperation  procedure,  rather  than  the  more  
restrictive Article 235 EEC, the legal basis of last resort. A month before the oral hearing in 
the students’ residence case, the Court handed down a judgment providing a new 
interpretation of Article 7 EEC, meaning in effect that the written pleadings were out of date, 
and  that  there  was  everything  to  play  for  at  the  oral  hearing.  This  was  the  first  annulment  
action initiated by Parliament which it won on the merits. 
The great thing about being an agent in Court cases, at least in the legal service of the 
European Parliament, is that you get to handle the case from the beginning right through to 
the end. The legal service lawyer following a particular committee can start the ball rolling by 
drawing the attention of the committee, through the chairman or rapporteur and/or the 
secretariat, to any legal problem. The committee may not be interested for political reasons, 
but if it is, it will ask the legal service to look into it. If the committee then wants to take legal 
proceedings,  it  will  refer  the  question  to  the  legal  affairs  committee,  which  as  noted  above  
acts as a sort of juridico-political filter; the legal service will be invited to make a pitch to that 
committee before the committee adopts its recommendation to the President of Parliament, 
who almost always follows the recommendation. If proceedings are commenced, then the 
same legal service laywer will draft the written pleadings, and argue the case in front of the 
Court of Justice or General Court.  
In disputes between the institutions, the respective positions of the parties are often well 
known, indeed sometimes debated in public, before pen is put to paper, though this is usually 
not so when the litigation is started by a disgruntled Member State or where the question 
arises in a request for a preliminary ruling. Sometimes, however, the Court itself comes up 
with surprises. In Titanium dioxide, for example, all Parliament was looking for in its 
intervention was a ruling that the contested directive was an internal market measure rather 
than falling within environmental policy. Instead the judgment provided was a slightly 
anxious analysis of the legal situation, concluding that the matter was both internal market 
and environmental in character, and that it was impossible to separate the two. The way out of 
this dilemma was to take account of the different procedures which would apply under each 
legal basis, and to opt for the one which best respected the democratic aspirations of the 
European Community, that is, the procedure which gave the European Parliament the greater 
influence in the policy decision. 
All in all, I argued about two dozen cases before the Court of Justice, the last occasion being 
in the proceedings on the proposed agreement setting up a European Patent Court, as well as a 
handful of cases before the General Court. Pleading before the European Courts is probably 
the high point in the life of a member of a legal service, and the experience is one which is of 
inestimable value now that I participate in court hearings in a different capacity.  
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IV. 
My third career in European law starts in 1995, when I joined the cabinet (private office) of 
the first Irish Advocate General appointed to the Court of Justice, Mr (now Justice) Nial 
Fennelly, as référendaire. As you may know, there are eight Advocates General at the Court, 
of whom five are appointed from the traditional Big Five Member States, France, Germany, 
Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain, while the other three posts are occupied in rotation by 
the  other  22  Member  States.  Each  judge  and  Advocate  General  at  the  Court  of  Justice  and  
General Court has a team of three or four référendaires to help out in the preparation of 
judgments  or  opinions,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  other  aspects  of  the  Court's  activities.  The  
official translation in English for this function is ‘legal secretary’ but that is rather misleading; 
if you look at the jobs section of some of the English newspapers, you will see ads for posts as 
a 'legal secretary', being a secretarial post in a firm of solicitors or in barristers’ chambers. The 
American equivalent is ‘law clerk’, but that is also slightly misleading, albeit for a different 
reason. The position of law clerk to an American judge is occupied in the main by those who 
have recently graduated from law school, whereas most référendaires at the Court of Justice 
(including the Civil Service Tribunal) will already have several years’ experience, and often a 
solid track record of practice or teaching in the field of European Union law. The best 
rendition of the term is probably that used in Irish court parlance, “judicial assistant”.   
An  Advocate  General  may  be  asked  to  deal  with  any  matter  of  EU  law  under  the  sun:  the  
admissibility of a request for a preliminary ruling where the factual and legal background of 
the national proceedings provided is almost but not quite non-existent, the free movement of 
generic pharmaceutical products, the customs classification of the hind parts of frozen 
chickens, the charging of VAT on the sale of cannabis resin in so-called 'coffee shops' in a 
certain nearby Member State, the legal character of the Commission's proposed fine on a 
Member State for not complying with a previous Court judgment, the export of fruit from the 
northern part of the island of Cyprus, the legal basis of the first directive on tobacco 
advertising, and so on. This variety did not entirely preclude a certain amount of informal 
specialisation. In the mid- and late 1990s, the Court had to deal with a large number of cases 
concerning the application of the 1979 Directive on the protection of wild birds, and later the 
provisions of the1992 Habitats Directive concerning species protection, matters in which Mr 
Fennelly demonstrated a good deal of expertise. In one case, a French farmer had been 
prosecuted for keeping a domesticated specimen of a 'black Canada goose'. On closer 
inspection, the Advocate General discovered that there was no such subspecies, and that the 
description provided by the national judge was in fact based on a typing error. This allowed 
Mr Fennelly to make the immortal remark that the incorrect information in the request for a 
preliminary ruling had led the parties on a wild-goose chase, but for the fact that the specimen 
was tame….  
In October 2011, I was appointed a judge of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (or 
'CST'), the first and so far only 'specialised court' established under the arrangements 
established under the Nice Treaty. This Tribunal is responsible for ruling at first instance on 
all disputes between the Union institutions and agencies and their staff (and former staff), as 
well as disappointed candidates in EPSO competitions for entry into the European Union civil 
service. If the CST was something of an experiment when it was set up in 2005, it is one 
which was thirty years in the making, the Court of Justice having suggested a European 
Community Administrative Tribunal for staff disputes in 1975. The Court's proposal was 
partly taken up with the creation in 1988 of the Court of First Instance, though this court also 
dealt with competition disputes from its inception, and has subsequently seen its jurisdiction 
expand dramatically.  
The thinking behind the idea of specialist courts is twofold: to relieve the courts of general 
jurisdiction of a discrete category of legal dispute where there already exists a well-
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established body of case law on the interpretation and application of the governing legal 
provisions, and to allow such specialist disputes to be dealt with by specialist judges as well 
as specialist lawyers. While 'specialist' in this respect, the CST is fully part of the institution 
described in Article 19 TEU, 'the Court of Justice of the European Union' and, as such, is 
bound to ensure that 'the law' is observed, including the Treaties, the Statute of the Court and 
the Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as general principles of EU law.  
That said, the CST is 'special' too, in that it differs in a number of significant respects from the 
other two jurisdictions of the Luxembourg court. In particular, it comprises a mere seven 
judges, a number based on a (fairly accurate) assessment of its probable workload and the 
capacity of the judges to process this efficiently. As only a quarter or so of the Member States 
may have a judge in the CST at any one time, a special appointment procedure was also 
required;  the  Treaty  authors  opted  for  a  sort  of  competitive  selection,  whereby  a  panel  of  
senior judges and lawyers (in effect, persons who have been or could have been appointed to 
the  Court  of  Justice  or  General  Court)  sift  through  the  applications  generated  by  a  'call  for  
expression of interest' published in the Official Journal; any Union citizen who feels they 
have the necessary qualifications and personal capacity may apply. The panel then interviews 
the most suitable candidates and proposes to the Council at least twice as many names as 
there are posts available. It falls to the Council to ensure that the composition of the CST is 
'balanced' in terms of the national origin and the 'national legal systems represented'. Judges 
are appointed for a six-year term which is theoretically renewable, though neither of the 
judges who applied in 2011 was in fact reappointed. 
In  form,  the  CST is  an  administrative  court,  similar  in  many ways  to  those  of  the  civil  law 
states; its sole task is to rule on the validity of acts (and omissions) of the administrations of 
the Union institutions. However, its remit is often described as litigation with a human face, in 
that the applicants are all natural persons, not companies, institutions or Member States. The 
CST therefore functions in some respects as a labour court, which may (and frequently does) 
seek to encourage the parties to settle their differences by means an amicable settlement rather 
than via a court judgment. 
The modest size of the CST helps the cultivation of a collegiate spirit and facilitates the 
avoidance of any unwarranted inconsistency, which is particularly important for a court of 
first instance; even if the quasi-totality of the cases are handled by chambers of three judges, 
all but two of the judges of the CST each sit in two of the four such chambers, and all of the 
judges are kept fully informed of the positions proposed by the Tribunal in its various 
formations. One likes to recall that the Court of Justice itself, when it was established in 1952 
was also essentially a specialised administrative court of seven judges.  
 
Well, I may not have revealed any secrets of the European Court, but I hope I've given you a 
few ideas about the practice of European Union law in the institutions and the judiciary which 
is responsible for reviewing their decisions, should you too be considering a career in this 
field. 
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POLITICAL COMPROMISES: INFORMAL DECISION-MAKING IN 
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS – FRIEND OR FOE OF EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION? 
 
Giulia Giardi 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The methods of decision-making used by the Institutions of the European Union, and more 
specifically  by  the  Council  of  Ministers,  are  laid  out  in  the  Treaties.  However,  the  already  
complicated scenario one faces when trying to understand what happens during these 
procedures is rendered more confusing given the existence of informal procedures, which tend 
to dominate the day-to-day practice of the Union bodies.  
In the Council of Ministers, political compromises have shaped the way in which its members 
work and, thus have influenced the policy measures which have emerged from their decisions. 
In this article, I seek to determine whether political compromises, such as the Luxembourg 
Accords and the Ioannina Mechanism, influence the decision-making process in the EU and 
in that case,  if this occurs to the detriment of the integration of the community. 
In order to answer this question, I will firstly look at the matter from a historical perspective. 
In  the  first  section  of  this  paper,  I  will  discuss  the  political  context  that  gave  rise  to  the  
Luxembourg Accords and what their practical effect was. I will then follow the same 
procedure of analysis with regard to the Ioannina Compromise. 
In the second section of my text I will describe the situation as it is today by explaining how 
and why the adoption of the Ioannina-bis mechanism came about, and subsequently how this 
affects  the  current  decision-making  procedure.  In  the  second  part  of  this  section,  I  will  
illustrate the matter of the practice of the Council as it has developed since the Luxembourg 
Accords and as it is today.  
Finally, in order to understand exactly what the results of political compromises and 
consensus-seeking behaviour are, we must look at the effect these have within a particular 
context. I have chosen to take a historical perspective and analyse the effects of these 
phenomena  on  European  integration.  This  is  what  I  will  discuss  in  the  third  section  of  my  
paper. 
 
 
2. Political Compromises – A Historical Perspective 
 
2.1 The Luxembourg Accords 
 
The  Rome  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic  Community  had  set  in  motion  a  
process of European integration, which was to be carried out in three stages. During the final 
of these, it was envisaged that there would be closer political union also, and to do so 
provisions for a change in voting rules had been set out. This transition entailed the use of 
qualified majority voting instead of unanimity from January 1966 onwards in certain policy 
areas.1 One such area was that of agricultural policy which was of great interest to the French. 
What  was  of  concern  to  them  was  not  only  the  subject-matter,  but  also  the  measures  to  be  
adopted in this field and their mode of adoption. The proposals made by the Commission 
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were of a more ‘federalist’ nature than previous ones, something that the French President 
Charles De Gaulle very much objected to.2  
The disagreement between the French and the other five Member States, mainly based on the 
move to qualified majority voting, led to a disruption of the Communities for several months 
known as the ‘empty chair’ crisis.3 From June 1965 until January 1966, De Gaulle refused to 
attend meetings in the Council; furthermore, he obliged France’s Ministers to boycott all 
Community activities. This boycott led to a paralysis within the Community and pushed the 
other Member States to come to a compromise with the French President.4  
In substance, the other five Member States tried to appease De Gaulle by stating that in cases 
where vital interests pertaining to one or more Member States were at stake, when discussing 
a  certain  proposal  that  should  have  been  voted  on  according  to  the  rules  of  QMV,  the  
members of the Council should do all that is possible to ensure that a solution could be found 
that would accommodate all members’ interests. However, the French argued that in these 
situations there should be a reversion to the system of unanimity voting. The other Member 
States rejected the French position, however no agreement was reached between the five and 
De Gaulle regarding situations where no consensus could be found. 5  
Regardless of the fact that the Accord was strictly a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with no legal 
foundation, its effect was immense. Because there was no strict rule as to its applicability, any 
Member  State  could  invoke  it  at  any  time  with  reference  to  any  subject  matter.6 Its  formal  
invocation was quite rare, but the mere fact that it could be used led to the creation of a static 
atmosphere, where the fact that a member of the Council disliked a proposal would lead to the 
discontinuation of further discussions on it.7 In practice, the Accord consisted in an agreement 
to disagree and its result was that of making voting the exception rather than the rule within 
the Council.8 
For many years Community decision-making was immobilised by the threat of the invocation 
of  the  Accord,  it  was  never  formally  repealed,  but  after  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Single  
European Act in 1987, the use of QMV was extended in theory and in practice. A general 
intolerance for the paralysis that this compromise had given way to, and the urge to push 
forward integration, caused the Member States to move towards the opposite direction. 
Presumptions in favour of integration emerged substituting the previous preference for 
inaction.9 
 
2.2  The Ioannina Compromise 
 
Almost thirty years after the French imposition of unanimity voting, QMV began to stir up 
some controversy. Following the extension of qualified majority voting through the 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993, and the widening of the 
Union to include more and smaller members, tension began to build. Larger Member States 
felt that they risked losing their power to smaller ones, while having to face the greatest part 
of the economic brunt.10 Therefore, during the Ioannina Summit of 1994 the alteration of 
QMV rules, to accommodate the States due to become members, became the centre of a 
heated dispute between the EU 12. 
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6 Teasdale, 67 The Political Quarterly 2 (1996), p. 103. 
7 Ibid. 
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The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, meant that some States would see a reduction 
of their vote shares. The main objectors to this change were Spain and the United Kingdom; 
they argued that the vote shares should not be altered and that the blocking minority 
conditions should remain the same even after enlargement.11 If such a condition had been 
accepted, the votes needed for a blocking minority would have fallen from 30.3% to 25.6%, 
thus making it very difficult for a qualified majority to be reached.12 
Following a series of meetings among the foreign ministers of each of the Member States, the 
United Kingdom’s objection gradually lost most of its support from other countries. Finally, a 
compromise was reached which accommodated in part both the United Kingdom’s view, but 
also that of the other Member States. The conditions for a blocking minority were altered in 
view of the accession of the new members (the threshold was shifted from twenty-three votes 
to twenty-six), but, in order to appease the British, two concessions were allowed.13 The first 
was that of concluding that the matter should be left open and returned to during the 
upcoming intergovernmental conference in 1996. Secondly, the Member States came to an 
informal agreement known as the Ioannina Compromise.14 
This Compromise meant that where a decision was to be taken by a qualified majority, it 
would be sufficient for the blocking minority to fall between twenty-three and twenty-five 
votes for further discussions to take place on the matter.15 In  practice,  the  possibility  of  
invoking this compromise gave way to momentary pauses during the decision-making 
procedures where a Member State signalled its opposition to the adoption of a measure.16 
However, differently to the Luxembourg Accords, its effect was less damaging to the policy-
making process: time constraints were made explicit in the agreement and the wording of the 
compromise implied a rule of consensus rather than unanimity.  
The agreement was later formalised within Council Declaration 5017 contained in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam in 1999, because the Member States continued to struggle to concur on the 
topic of blocking minorities.18 After the entry into force of the Nice Treaty in 2003, Ioannina 
was abandoned given the new rules of QMV.19 
 
 
3. Political Compromises – The Situation Today 
 
3.1 The Ioannina-bis Mechanism 
 
Many years after the Luxembourg Accords and the Ioannina Compromise, qualified majority 
voting rules create tension within the Council. Further extension of membership in 2004 and 
2007 has given way to a Union of twenty-seven States, and consequently of twenty-seven 
different sets of interests, needs and ideas. Furthermore, the Union is the competent legislator 
in many more fields compared to the past, with many more powers being conferred to the 
community level rather than the national ones. It can therefore be predicted that difficulties in 
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Giulia Giardi 
18 
‘deciding who decides’ have increased, especially considering that problems already arose 
when there were only six members.  
Currently, the rules on QMV are to be found in Articles 16 TEU and 238 TFEU, which 
officially make QMV the main method of action within the Council. Due to the controversies 
that have arisen regarding these rules, many Member States’ requests have been combined in 
a way that is satisfactory for all. First of all, the use of the new rules introduced by the Treaty 
of Lisbon, which came into force at the end of 2009, has been postponed to 2014 at the 
earliest and 2017 at the latest.20 The new system of QMV substantially departs from the 
system of weighting votes and the requirement of a triple majority established under Nice.21 
Until the end of October 2014, the rules will remain those established by the Nice Treaty in 
2003, and voting will be governed by the procedure set out in Protocol 36 on Transitional 
Provisions (Art. 16 (5) TEU and Art. 3 (3) and (4) of Protocol 36 on Transitional Provisions). 
Between November 2014 and April 2017 the new rules adopted under the Reform Treaty will 
normally apply (Art. 16 (4) and (5) TEU and Art. 3 (2) of Protocol 36 on Transitional 
Provisions), however where a Member State makes a request for the rules established under 
the  Nice  Treaty  to  be  used,  this  will  be  allowed  (Art.  3  (2)  of  Protocol  36  on  Transitional  
Provisions). From April 2017 onwards the new rules will be in force (Art. 16 (4) TEU). 
The discussions leading up to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty were often dominated by a 
divergence of views regarding the votes necessary to constitute a blocking minority. Among 
the most stubborn States was Poland, which pushed for the reintroduction of the 1994 
Ioannina Compromise in its entirety in the text of the Treaty.22 One of the results of the Polish 
opposition was, in fact, the adoption of the transitional provisions contained in Protocol 36, 
delaying the use of the new Lisbon formula for QMV.23 The greatest achievement of the 
Polish opposition was that of a new form of the Ioannina Compromise being adopted 
officially through a Council Decision.24 This new version of Ioannina was, contrary to Polish 
request, not introduced in the Treaty’s main text, but it was agreed that any modification to it 
would only occur by a unanimous Council agreement, thus appeasing Poland by giving it the 
possibility to veto any modifications made to the Decision.25 
The Decision creates the possibility for Member States, which reach a number close to, but 
not equal to a blocking minority, to stall the decision-making procedure where the new Lisbon 
QMV formula applies.26Until the end of March 2017, where the Council members opposing a 
decision  represent  a  minimum of  75% of  the  population  or  75% of  the  number  of  Member  
States necessary to constitute a blocking minority, further discussions will take place until an 
agreement is reached in due time (Articles 1 and 2 of Council Decision (2009/857/EC)). From 
April 2017 onwards, the number of members of the Council necessary to push for continued 
discussions must represent at least 55% of the population or 55% of the Member States 
(Articles 4 and 5 of Council Decision (2009/857/EC)). Articles 2 and 5 of the Decision imply 
that the members of the Council will try to reach a consensus on the matter at hand. 
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3.2  The Consequences – Decision-making Based on ‘Consensus’ 
 
The Treaties provide us with a framework of decision-making procedures and we presume 
that the Union Institutions follow these texts to the letter. Often, we are confronted with 
hypothetical  situations  where  we  try  to  estimate  the  outcome  of  a  legislative  process  by  
relying on what is found in the theory of the legal texts on which the Union is based. 
However,  after  having  seen  how  different  interests  and  fears  can  prompt  Member  States  to  
call for political solutions, which do not correspond to the wording of the Treaties, we should 
wonder whether in practice the workings of the EU Institutions really resemble the theory. 
Qualified majority voting has been at the centre of disputes between members of the Council 
since its introduction in the EEC Treaty. At the end of the last century, members of the 
Council haggled to have their requests met concerning vote shares and blocking minorities, 
and this discussion has persisted to this day. What is striking though is that what has resulted 
from these constant disagreements has less to do with voting explicitly than one would 
imagine. In fact, the result has been that of avoiding going to a vote altogether in the day-to-
day practice of the Council.27  
In order to understand why this occurs, we must turn to the decision-making procedure within 
the Council itself and its effect on the members’ behaviour. When analysing the dynamics of 
Council action, many authors speak of a ‘culture of consensus’ and also use terms like 
reciprocity, bargaining, mutual responsiveness and compromise to describe the atmosphere 
and workings of the meetings of the Council and COREPER.28 This is clearly a consequence 
of political agreements such as the Luxembourg Accords and the Ioannina Compromise, 
which  have  given  way  to  a  preference  of  accommodating  everybody’s  interests  rather  than  
forcefully outvoting each other. No outright veto is actually given to the members of the 
Council, but rather further discussion is encouraged in order to reach a consensus.29 This is 
true particularly of Ioannina and the current Ioannina-bis mechanisms.  
It has been argued that a ‘cooperative bargaining model’ can describe the policy-making 
approach within the Council, where deals take place among the members. The result is that 
many are prone to abandoning strict national interests to come to a conclusion that considers 
all diverging opinions.30There are many reasons why this method of decision-making is 
preferred. These reasons go beyond the mere fact that, historically, political compromises 
have shaped the process in this way.  
Firstly, consensus-seeking practice is more efficient than QMV in the Council. One can 
imagine  that  where  a  vote  is  taken  on  a  particular  issue,  usually  the  result  of  that  vote  
indicates the conclusion of the matter. In a situation where the parties bargain to find a 
solution, any one matter is never actually permanently set aside; but rather once something 
has been agreed, other interests which will have been momentarily postponed will be the topic 
of discussion in a later meeting.31 Behind this approach lies a rather neo-functionalist sort of 
reasoning, in that the coming to a compromise on one issue leads the way to a compromise on 
a later issue. In a system where QMV is used strictly, the fact that a qualified majority is 
reached means that often the interests of those members that have opposed the adoption of a 
certain policy will remain completely ignored.32 Secondly, the making of new policies may 
actually be easier when using a rule of consensus rather than one of QMV. This is because 
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abstentions do not lead to a negative outcome where the members of the Council try to reach a 
compromise.33 
However, there are also negative aspects to be considered with regard to the practice of 
searching for consensus when making decisions in the Council. First of all, there is a clear 
problem as to transparency, a principle enshrined in the Treaties by virtue of Article 15 (3) 
TFEU. Where the procedure used by the Council is different to that prescribed by law, this 
creates a problem for the citizens of the Union who are not aware of how decisions that affect 
them are being made and exactly who supports which ideas.34 This then leads us to the second 
problem, that of democratic accountability, whereby the citizens should have a right to know 
what proposals and bargains are brought forward by their representatives in the Council so as 
to make a fully informed decision when they subsequently exercise their voting rights.35 
 
 
4. Political Compromises – The Effect on Integration 
 
The progress of European integration needs to be analysed from a theoretical point of view 
and through the observation of what has happened in practice. Both perspectives will be 
discussed in turn. 
If we turn back to the origins of the European Union, to the coming together of six States 
following the disasters of two of the most tragic events of the history of our planet, we see at 
its origin a brilliant idea, that of Jean Monnet. Monnet’s plan, aimed at avoiding any future 
conflicts among nation-states of the old continent, did not have a self-proclaimed functionalist 
approach, but it is apparent from the words used by him to describe it, that functionalism is 
the best framework in which to insert what then became the Schuman Plan.36  
According to this theory of integration, developed by David Mitrany, the only way to ensure 
peace throughout time would be to encourage continuous social cohesion that would take 
place gradually over time and would do so by accommodating the changing needs and 
adapting to the mutating conditions of the community. Having as a goal the satisfaction of the 
common needs of society, the leaders of the nations would be able to coordinate their policies 
in determinate areas with specific interventions. This method would be accepted because of 
its minimal intrusion into the constitutional identities of the various nations, and also because 
little of the political power yielded by their leaders would be threatened.37 This technocratic 
approach can clearly describe what happened in practice with the establishment of the ECSC 
in 1952. 
However,  the  evolution  of  the  union  that  existed  among  the  six  Member  States  from  the  
ECSC to the EEC and EURATOM could not sufficiently be explained by the functionalist 
theory of Mitrany. According to neo-functionalism, as theorized by Ernst Haas and Leon 
Lindberg,  individual  States  are  pushed  to  cooperate  amongst  each  other  because  of  the  
benefits this cooperation provides for all. In their view of integration, the concept of spill-over 
effect is central, according to which integration in one sector brings about integration in 
another and, in turn, integration in another sector still. Supporters of neo-functionalism 
believed this could ultimately lead to political integration also.38 
Unfortunately, the Luxembourg Accords blocked the ideal course of events envisaged by 
Monnet and the hopes of the supporters of the neo-functionalist theory. The push for the 
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recognition  of  national  interests,  imposed  by  De  Gaulle  in  1966,  gave  way  to  a  form  of  
negative intergovernmentalism. The Council’s approach became one where national interests 
were dominant and where areas that were politically sensitive would not be touched. The 
main goal of intergovernmentalism as envisaged by Stanley Hoffman is that of allowing for 
integration only in policy fields of less importance, while strictly maintaining sovereignty 
within the nation.39 The  reason  that  the  compromise  reached  in  Luxembourg  lead  to  a  
negative  form  of  intergovernmentalism  is  that  the  reluctance  of  the  Council  to  vote  almost  
stopped integration altogether.  
Following the introduction of the Single European Act, the form of intergovernmentalism that 
had developed due to the Luxembourg Accords, changed from negative to positive. Not only 
this,  but  it  transformed to  an  extent  that  political  theorists  like  Andrew Moravcsik  came up  
with a new form of it. He described the process of integration through an idea of liberal 
intergovernmentalism.  This  theory  best  explains  the  effects  of  the  choice  of  the  Council  to  
continue to make decisions by consensus rather than voting and thus also of the introduction 
of the Ioannina mechanism in 1994 and its subsequent confirmation in the Lisbon Treaty. 
According  to  Moravcsik,  it  is  states  that  drive  integration  forward;  however,  they  do  so  by  
making choices that can appeal collectively rather than individually. This is done through a 
process of negotiation, which leads to agreements that can generate gain for those who 
participate in the negotiations. This form of intergovernmentalism, which reflects the ‘culture 
of consensus’ adhered to by the Council, has greatly encouraged the process of integration in 
the EU.40 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The  rules  on  decision-making  in  the  European  Union  are  central  to  its  growth  and  
development, which is why it is so important to determine what factors can affect these 
procedures positively or negatively.  
In the first part of this paper, it is shown how this delicate topic can give rise to similar 
solutions with different consequences. Even though both the Luxembourg Accords and the 
Ioannina Compromise were political agreements that substantially called for decisions to be 
made in view of a common opinion, their effects were opposite. The Luxembourg Accords 
led to a rule of unanimity being adopted and later a negative no-voting policy. The Ioannina 
compromise, even though it was based on specific rules of QMV, substantially reinforced a 
positive no-voting policy in the Council. 
In the second section it was evidenced that old habits die hard in the Union and that, the 
Council, regardless of disputes regarding the technicalities of QMV, still opts for a method 
that  makes  voting  an  anomaly.  This  was  made  very  clear  in  the  second part  of  this  section  
where I explained how political compromises have altered the decision-making process in the 
Council by encouraging a ‘culture of consensus’. 
Finally, I considered the implications of this ‘culture of consensus’ which is so strongly part 
of the Council’s modus operandi. To do this I turned back to the origins of its use, namely the 
Luxembourg Accords. We see that since De Gaulle’s imposition of his anti-supranational 
views, voting has become the exception rather than the rule in the practice of the Council of 
Ministers. Initially, the search for consensus was equal to that for unanimity. This meant that 
integration was stalled for many years to the detriment of the community at large and in 
favour of the stubborn protection of national interests. Thus, the neo-functionalist hopes, 
which were the foundations of the Union, were destroyed by De Gaulle’s negative 
intergovernmentalism.  
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This habit of consensus searching then transformed from each member shielding its interests, 
to the members bargaining with each other in order to accommodate over time everybody’s 
needs and desires within the limits of reasonability. Therefore, the effect that political 
compromises have had on decision-making and, in turn, on integration, has varied over time. 
The Union has witnessed moments of paralysis where politics and national interests 
dominated, but also moments of great integration where politics have actually facilitated the 
promotion of community interests. 
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THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION: TRUE PRESIDENT OR 
JUST FIRST AMONG EQUALS?  
 
Finja Draxler 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Commission President, as established by the Treaty of Rome in 19571, plays a major role 
in the functioning of the European Union, as he is formally the head of the main executive 
body. Within the Commission, the President is often said to be the primus inter pares (first 
among equals) among his fellow Commissioners. However, in practice he has gained a lot of 
power and depending on the integration cycle some scholars would even go as far as calling 
him the face of the European Union.2 Moreover  it  is  to  be  said,  that  in  order  for  the  
Commission to be successful, a strong leader is needed because he is to represent the 
institution as a whole.3 Furthermore,  personality  and  skill  of  a  president  are  a  major  factor  
regarding how influential he and the Commission as a group will be.4 Looking at history, this 
role has varied considerably over the years through the different presidencies. 
In  this  paper  the  role  of  the  president  of  the  Commission  will  be  critically  examined.  The  
focus is  on the question of how the President has gained power in his position over the last  
decades in comparison to the individual Commissioners. This is done by firstly analyzing the 
history and looking at how the office was established. Following this, a closer look will be 
taken as to how the Commission is set up, how the President is appointed and which duties 
and powers he has compared to the other Commissioners. The major treaty amendments will 
then be taken into consideration. This includes the Treaties of Rome, Nice and Amsterdam as 
well as the latest Lisbon Treaty, which changed the appointment procedure of the President.  
Finally, the position of the previous Presidents will be assessed; this is of importance in order 
to understand how the various people had different impacts on the Commission and moreover 
how the Union became what it is today. Particularly important to mention here are Jaques 
Delors, who arguably was the strongest and most influential president of the Commission so 
far  and  Jacques  Santer,  under  whom  the  Commission  went  through  a  crisis  and  in  the  end  
resigned as a body. Lastly, the current Barroso Commission will be examined.  
 
 
2. The Establishment of the European Commission and its first President- The Treaty of 
Rome 
 
´Determined to establish an ever closer union among the European peoples…` these are the 
introductory  words  of  the  preamble  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  which  called  for  further  
integration of the already existing six member states in 1957. Thus, the treaty was the basis 
for the European Economic Community, the free trade area and inter alia created institutions, 
which were similar to those of the previous European Coal and Steel Community. The ECSC 
already  included  a  High  Authority,  which  by  virtue  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  became  the  
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European Commission. 5 The newly established Commission was given the exclusive power 
to grant legislation by the same treaty.6  
The German national Walter Hallstein was elected to become its first President and he was to 
influence the Union greatly. As Hallstein was one of the drafters of the Treaty of Rome, Jean 
Monnet became his main supporter to be elected as President of the newly founded 
Commission.7 Due to the fact that the Commission was considered to be above the national 
level, the President-elect was seen more as a European candidate, rather than a German one.8 
During his presidency, Hallstein was known for his activism and his commitment for the 
Commission to act independently.9 Indeed, Hallstein is often referred to as the most powerful 
president in history next to Jaques Delors because he was said to be the driving force behind 
the European integration process.10 Additionally, it is important to mention that the Hallstein 
Commission was arguably very single-minded as it acted more like `a political party or highly 
organized pressure group rather than…an administrative organization.`11 This stems from the 
fact that Hallstein as a president was very authoritative within the Commission.12  
Only due to Hallstein`s hard work, his successors in the 1970s played a role in the political 
projects of the Union. 13 Following his presidency, the Belgian Jean Rey succeeded the post in 
1967.  However, he never became as popular and powerful as Walter Hallstein was. It can 
usually be said that after the presidency of a high-profile Commission President, governments 
tend to elect a weaker, less powerful figure; and as aforementioned, this can be observed in 
the example of Rey`s succession to Hallstein.14 
 
 
3. Composition of the Commission  
 
Since the Treaty of Nice, the European Commission consists of 27 Commissioners, more 
precisely one Commissioner from each member state. In this number the President of the 
Commission is also included. Moreover, all of them together form the College of 
Commissioners. They are elected on the basis of suggestions from the national governments, 
the Council and the President-elect.15 From 2014 onwards, the number of Commissioners 
should be corresponding to two-thirds of the number of Member States.16 The Commissioners 
are further divided into 24 Directorates- General (DG), which are each headed by one of 
them.17  Furthermore, the Commission has one General Secretariat, which can be seen as the 
personal DG of the president.18  
At the time of establishment of the Commission, Commissioners were only allowed to have 
two cabinet members. Solely the President was entitled to four people. 19 However, it is now 
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common to have 12 cabinet members.20  All Commissioners are elected for a five year term, 
which is renewable.21 In addition, all of them must be chosen from people whose 
`independence is beyond doubt`.22 This means that they may not take any instruction from a 
body, such as the Member States.23 Furthermore, when in office, they may not engage in any 
other form of occupation.24 In case of failure to observe these rules, a Commissioner may be 
forced to retire compulsory if the Court of Justice so orders. For this procedure, application 
must be brought by the Council or the Commission.25 However, the independence principle 
must be seen in relative terms because the Commissioners usually are high-ranked politicians 
in their respective Member States and usually continue to stay in contact with their national 
governments.26 
 
 
4. The Commission President 
 
4.1  The Appointment Procedure of the Commission President  
 
Article 17 (7) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)  lays down that the Commission 
President is to be proposed by the European Council to the European Parliament, by qualified 
majority voting (QMV). He is finally elected by the majority of the component members of 
the European Parliament.27  If no majority is reached, then a new candidate must be put 
forward by the European Council and the same procedure is to be followed again.28 After the 
entering into force of the Amsterdam treaty in 1999, the elections to the European Parliament 
must also be taken into account, when choosing a new president. 29 
Thus,  in  order  to  become  President,  a  candidate  must  make  sure  to  have  the  support  of  a  
dominant party within the European Parliament.30 When looking at the previous Presidents, it 
can be said that the post seems to rotate between the Conservative and Socialist parties of the 
Member States.31 The  European  Parliament  also  decides  over  the  appointment  of  all  27  
commissioners;  however  the  EP  may  only  dismiss  the  Commission  as  a  body  and  not  one  
Commissioner individually.32 However, this has never happened so far.  
There are various criteria, to determine whether a candidate is suitable for the position of the 
Commission President. These include his competences, political loyalties and a “European 
attitude”. 33 Most former Presidents, have been leading politicians in their national countries 
prior to their appointment in the European Commission. Furthermore, if a President would 
like  to  be  re-elected,  he  will  have  to  make  sure  that  no  one,  possessing  power  to  reappoint  
him, more precisely national governments and Parliament, is offended by him, as this can 
have major consequences on his re-election.34 So far there were only Presidents from the six 
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founding member states plus the United Kingdom and Portugal.35 Some people claim that 
direct elections for the Commission President are needed, as this would support the principle 
of  sovereignty  of  the  citizens  of  Europe,  which  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  European  Union.36 
However, counter arguments draw on the fact that this would rather politicize the post of the 
Commission President and therefore the indirect election modus was kept. 37 
 
4.2  The Current Powers and Duties of the President of the Commission 
 
The Commission as an institution has major executive and administrative powers. Within the 
Commission framework, the President has a central post, as the leader of the institution. The 
Commission President`s powers are laid down in Article 17(6) TEU. The current President is 
José Manuel Barroso from Portugal. He has five important roles, which will be described 
below.  
Firstly, the President of the Commission, together with the heads of the government, 
nominates the other Commissioners, who are then to be approved by the EP and appointed by 
the European Council by QMV. 38 Since the appointment of Romano Prodi as President of the 
Commission in 1999, it has been accepted that the President can reject candidates from certain 
Member  States.  However,  that  does  not  mean  that  he  is  free  to  choose  his  own  College  of  
Commissioners. 39  
Secondly, he is responsible for the internal organisation of the Commission, as he is the one 
who allocates the portfolios to the individual commissioners. If for some reason there is a 
problem with the allocation, he is also able to shift the portfolios during his term of office.40 
Hence,  he  also  has  the  power  to  isolate  an  individual  Commissioner.  41  Each individual 
Commissioner is then responsible for the work, which falls within his policy area.42  
Thirdly, by virtue of Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), the President can request the individual Commissioners to resign. Hence, all 
Commissioners are responsible to him individually. 
Fourthly, the political guidance of the Commission is up to him. More specifically this means 
that he is to chair and set the agenda for the weekly Commission meetings.43 Moreover, he 
can  lay  down  the  political  aims  of  the  Commission  by  choosing  which  proposal  he  pushes  
forward for adoption by the Commission. This is also seen by the fact that the stronger the 
President, the more powerful is the Commission as a whole.44  
Lastly, he also has a roving policy brief, which entails the fact that, although it sometimes 
creates tensions among the individual Commissioners, the President is allowed to take over a 
certain issue and make Commission policy on that topic.45 
Next to these five main powers, he also has representative functions; he follows the meetings 
of the European Council, the G8 meetings and the major debates of the Council of Ministers 
and the European Parliament. 46 He also holds further powers, such as the task to appoint the 
                                                             
35 Nedergaard, European Union Administration: Legitimacy and Efficiency, p. 99. 
36 B. Markesinis, The British Contribution to the Europe of the 21st century, (Hart Publishing, 2002) p. 209. 
37 P. Graig and G. De Burca, The evolution of EU law, (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 80. 
38 Article 17(7) TEU 
39 Nedergaard, European Union Administration: Legitimacy and Efficiency,  p. 99. 
40 Chalmers; European Union Public Law, p. 56. 
41 Nedergaard, European Union Administration: Legitimacy and Efficiency , p. 99. 
42 Chalmers; European Union Public Law, p. 54. 
43 Ibid, p. 56. 
44 Cini, The European Commission: Leadership, organisation and culture in the EU administration, p. 38. 
45 Chalmers; European Union Public Law, p. 56. 
46 President of the European Commission- José Manuel Barroso: available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/index_en.htm (last visited, 06.12.2011). 
The President of the Commission: True President or Just First Among Equals? 
27 
six Vice-Presidents from his fellow Commissioners.47 Furthermore,  he  is,  together  with  the  
European Council, responsible for the appointment of the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security. 48 However,  this  new  relationship  with  the  High  
Representative challenges the authority of the President`s position as the first among equals 
within the Commission because he cannot ask the High Representative to resign on his own.49 
The consent of the European Council is also needed. 
Furthermore,  the  Commission  President,  in  corporation  with  the  President  of  the  European  
Council, prepares the Council meetings in order to ensure the correct working of the 
Council.50 However, the President`s most important task overall is to push for forward 
movement  of  the  European  Union.  51 Nevertheless, and no matter who is President, the 
Commission can only be successful when national preferences are taken into consideration. 52 
 
4.3 Treaty Amendments after Maastricht: The Treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon  
 
The President has gained important powers in recent times due to various treaty amendments. 
Professor Damian Chalmers claims that the President has become a more central figure within 
the commission during the past years. 53 More specifically, since the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
which entered into force in 1999, he really is to be seen as the leader of the Commission. The 
Treaty provides that `the members of the Commission shall carry out the duties devolved 
upon them by the President under his authority`54 It was also pointed out in the treaty that it is 
the President`s responsibility to guide the Commission so that the collective responsibilities 
are strengthened.55  
The following Treaty of Nice in 2001 laid down a limit of one instead of two Commissioners 
per country. Concerning the Commission President, it further enhanced his position by 
making a clear distinction between him and his fellow commissioners with regard to the 
appointment procedure. 56 Under this treaty it was also firstly possible for him to fire 
individual ministers, a power which makes him stand out in the Commission.57 Furthermore, 
it changed from the unanimous vote requirement in the Council to merely qualified majority 
voting.  
The Lisbon Treaty was important for the Commission as it laid down that the Commission 
President is to be elected indirectly. Moreover, the latest Lisbon Treaty now states that the 
President is to be elected by the European Parliament, rather than accepted.58  However, as the 
requirement that the outcome of the European elections must be taken into consideration 
already existed, this new treaty provision was not a real change.59 According to Professor 
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Damian Chalmers, the Commission is now moving more towards a presidential system, rather 
than keeping the British style system with the notion of first among equals.60 The  British  
Minister for Europe said about the Lisbon Treaty, that the formal powers of the Commission 
President have not really changed, but the Commission itself has become more influential and 
therefore its President will also be more powerful in the future. 61 
 
 
5. Presidents who Shaped the Union  
 
5.1 The Delors Commission  
 
This section will consider the great European, Jacques Delors, without whom the Commission 
would not be as influential as it is nowadays. The French politician became President of the 
Commission in 1985 and was re-elected twice, which makes him the only person, who was 
President for three terms. His presidency is known to be one of the most successful ones and 
he shaped the integration process of the European Union greatly.62 One can say, that his name 
was to a great extend synonymous with the Commission.63 For the first time, the personality 
of a President also became of importance; this was new for the Union, which is based on a 
supranational level and never really took an individual into account.64  
Many of Delors` predecessors did not stand out as strong leaders because they did not want to 
offend national governments.65 Furthermore, it is to be said that in 1985 he did not have the 
significant powers a Commission President enjoys now. However, this did not pose any 
problems to Mr. Delors, who gradually turned the position of the Commission President into a 
position of leadership and strength. 66   
Jacques Delors was President during a time that could be regarded as a positive integration 
cycle. Many important achievements such as the establishment of the Treaty on the European 
Union and the Single European Act fell within his time of presidency. Moreover, it is 
important to note that when the Commission has a strong leader, such as Jaques Delors, the 
whole Union makes progress. 67 Additionally, J. Peterson claims that much of Delors` success 
was in connection with the fact that a significant part of the Single European Act was written 
by one of his cabinet members and personal advisor, François  Lamoureux. 68 This shows, that 
individual Commissioners may also have influence on the functioning of the Commission as a 
whole. 
 
5.2 The Santer Crisis  
 
Considering the pattern, that often shows a weaker candidate after a strong leadership; the 
Luxembourger Jacques Santer had a rough start from the beginning following Jacques Delors. 
69 He knew from his inauguration that he would not be able to live up to the famous Mr. 
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Delors. This can be seen in the fact that nobody chose him to be his first choice for replacing 
Jacques Delors. 70  
When Santer came into power in 1995, he was faced with a group of high-ranked national 
politicians, consisting of former Prime -Ministers and Foreign Affairs Ministers.71 His fellow 
Commissioners often undermined his authority by making statements that did not follow the 
agreed line of the Commission. 72 One  clear  example  is  when  Ritt  Bjerregaard,  the  Danish  
Commissioner, published diaries filled with portrayals of Mr. Santer and which violated the 
internal rules of procedure of the Commission. 73 However, it was harder for him to exercise 
authority like Delors did, as the College of Commissioners became bigger after the 
enlargement in 1995 and therefore became harder to lead.74 A further problem, which Santer 
experienced from the start was that he lacked new ideas concerning European integration.  
At  the  end  of  1998  the  crisis  of  the  Santer  Commission  was  breaking  out,  as  one  of  the  
Commission officials from the financial control unit informed the European Parliament of the 
mismanagement in the financial sector of the Union.75 To demonstrate the gravity of the crisis 
the EP then considered a motion of censure against the Commission. 76 A  committee  of  
independent experts was assigned to investigate on the matter and found that the institution 
lacked transparency and accountability.77 In response to the report the EP chose to lay down 
an ultimatum for the Commission to react to the report and accept a plan created by the EP or 
to resign as a body. The Santer Commission chose to do the latter and resigned en masse on 
March 16, 1999. This demonstrates how important the European Parliament became as an 
institution and clearly shows the Commission’s respect concerning the EP´s budgetary and 
supervisory powers.78  
After  the  fall  of  the  Santer  Commission,  the  whole  institution  lacked  legitimacy and  it  was  
difficult for the following president, Romano Prodi, to face the weak image of the institution, 
which he chaired, had. 79 Furthermore, it can now also be seen, that during the Santer crisis 
the MEPs really fulfilled their tasks of fighting fraud and pushing for accountability.80 
 
5.3 The Barosso Commission – 2004 until Today 
 
José Manuel Barroso got elected as Commission President in 2004 and still serves the post. In 
2004, a consequence of the Santer crisis was seen in the fact that during the hearing for the 
Barroso Commisison, the EP had an increasing role in choosing the Commissioners. Due to 
the fact that several MEPs were against certain nominees because of grounds such as conflicts 
of interests and insufficient qualifications, Mr. Barroso had to shuffle the portfolios and take 
account of new nominations for Commissioners.81 Furthermore, some Member States had to 
accept the rejection of their nominees.82 This was the case with Italy because their candidate, 
Rocco Buttiglione, made conservative comments concerning homosexuals and women.83  
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During Mr. Barrosso´s first term in office, there were two major failures on part of the 
Commission. The first one is in relation with the economic crisis, which the Commission 
failed to predict.84 What is more is that it seemed that prior to the crisis, the institution was 
reluctant to regulate the financial markets.85 Also, the Commission failed to act after the crisis 
has already broken out.86 Secondly, the Commission was criticized as lacking political 
leadership.87 Critics claim that the Commission has been influenced by the Member States to 
a large extent. What can also be said is, that during the treaty ratification process of the 
Constitutional Treaty and later on the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission rather stayed out and 
preferred to be a non-actor.  
In 2009, Mr. Barroso was re-elected as Commission President. After its election, the current 
Commission claimed that it is one of their main objectives during their time in office to 
enhance accountability.88 They are planning on doing so by moving towards a positive 
statement of assurances. José Manuel Barosso, even though he has fundamentally more 
powers, than for example Jaques Delors did, does not use it as much as he could. It is to be 
said that Barroso is not one of the strongest Presidents the Commission has seen, even though 
he has considerably more powers laid down in the legal base. It will remain open how he 
leads the Commission in the upcoming years.  
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Over  the  last  years,  the  Commission  President  has  gained  important  powers  by  treaty  
amendments, in comparison to his fellow Commissioners. This can be seen by the fact that he 
is to give political guidance to the Commission. Furthermore, he is involved in choosing his 
College of Commissioners and in the end every Commissioner is responsible to the President, 
as he can force him/her to resign. It is also the President`s duty to allocate the portfolios to the 
commissioners; however if his allocation does not work out he can also reshuffle them and 
isolate an individual Commissioner. Even though the more recent Presidents had significantly 
more powers than the earlier ones, it can be said that the success of a commission depends 
mostly on his personality and skill as a leader.  
This could be seen in the presidencies of Walter Hallstein and Jacques Delors, who are still 
remembered as the most successful Commission Presidents since the existence of the 
Commission. A factor that also plays a major role in the successfulness of a President and in 
his authority is whether the Union is undergoing a positive or negative integration cycle. 
During a positive integration cycle, the Presidents tend to be stronger leaders. What can also 
be seen from history is that after a strong President, a weaker one tends to be elected. This can 
be seen by the fact that after the great Jacques Delors, Jacques Santer followed him in the 
position of the Commission President but never became as influential as Delors was. The 
Santer Commission will always be remembered as it had to resign nine months early in 1999. 
The current President, Mr. Barroso, is a rather weak leader, who had major difficulties during 
the financial crisis.  
All in all, the President of the Commission nowadays has significantly more powers than the 
individual Commissioners; however it depends on how he uses these on whether he stands out 
of the group. It is commonly agreed that factors other than the legal basis determine the 
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degree of influence a President has. Thus it is up to the individual person, whether he will be 
remembered as a primus inter pares or a true president.  

 33 
THE IMPACT OF THE SANTER CRISIS ON THE FUNCTIONING OF 
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
 
Christina Siaw 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Of the institutions of the European Union the European Commission is the one, which has the 
monopoly over the right of initiative while also being charged with the responsibility of 
implementing or overseeing implementation of the legislation once it is made. This means 
that it stands at the beginning of the European legislative machinery as well as at its end. The 
Commission has always viewed its function as policy initiator as its primary role and has thus 
neglected its other functions. This has led to inefficiency and unaccountability. After many 
years of remaining unchanged the Santer crisis of 1999 finally provided the necessary 
political will in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament for comprehensive 
change of the workings of the Commission. This paper aims to discover how these reforms 
have changed the way in which the Commission functions. It does so by focusing on the 
changes made by the introduction of Activity-Based Management, as here the reactions to the 
main criticism of lack of responsibility made in the first report of the Committee of 
Independent Experts are most easily visible. As the issue at hand regards the factual 
occurrence of events (i.e. the effects of the reform measures) this article is based on secondary 
academic literature that accounts for these events academically but also some based on 
empirical findings. First this article will look at the changes the Commission was to under go, 
after which it will look at the way they were implemented. Finally it will make a judgment on 
how these implemented changes have affected the functioning of the Commission by looking 
at how they affected the function of the Head of Units and how the effect influences the 
functioning of the Commission as a whole.  
 
 
2. What did the Reforms Following the Santer Crisis Entail? 
 
The Santer crisis originated from allegations of mismanagement and culminated in the first 
report by the Committee of Independent Experts (CIE) stating that it is becoming difficult to 
find anyone [in the Commission] who has even the slightest sense of responsibility'.1 The 
Council and the European Parliament charged the new Commission under Romano Prodi with 
the task of remedying the situation and to do so it was given an extensive reform mandate by 
them.2 He then in turn delegated the task to his new second in command Vice-President Neil 
Kinnock, Commissioner for Administrative Reform, who skilfully designed the White Paper3 
outlining all the changes that would be made and the timeframes by which they should be 
made.4 Due to this the subsequent reforms from 2000 up to 2004 are also called the Kinnock 
reforms. The White Paper was divided into three parts, the first of which contained the 
‘strategic guidelines’ of the reform while the latter set out the ‘action plan’.5 This action plan 
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contained 98 courses of action (divided into four headings) that needed to be put into practice, 
who was to do this and by what time.6 The four headings these 98 actions were divided into 
were:  ‘culture  based  on  service’;  ‘priority  setting,  allocation  and  the  efficient  use  of  
resources’; ‘human resources development’; and ‘organization of financial management’.7 
The heading of ‘culture based on service’ was put into the White Paper because though the 
entire reform strived towards the creation of such a culture the idea was that it  could not be 
realized without specific and comprehensive action directed at its creation.8 To  do  this  the  
measures under this heading (e.g. a code of good behaviour) were to engrain the following 
five principles into the administration of the Commission: ‘independence, responsibility, 
accountability, efficiency and transparency’.9  
The second heading of ‘priority setting, allocation and the efficient use of resources’ was to 
tackle the problem that the Commission has limited resources and used them inefficiently.10 
To do so the reform introduced the new method of Activity-Bases Management (ABM), 
which was supposed to lead to a better allocation of resources according to set priorities and a 
better way of monitoring activities of the entire Commission from a central point and better 
facilitating management and evaluation.11 To accomplish this the Strategic Planning and 
Programming cycle (SPP) among other things was introduced. It commenced with an Annual 
Policy Strategy (ASP), which is finalized by the Collage12 on the basis of negotiations that are 
to take place on de facto all levels of the Commission administration ‘in a huge 
communication and coordination exercise’.13 This ASP is then translated by each Directorate 
General (DG) into an Annual Management Plan (AMP),14 stating which exact objectives they 
would be following in the coming year and the resources needed.15 Finally  to  complete  the  
cycle the DGs prepare an Annual Activity Report (AAR), in which they evaluate all activities 
they have pursued and the money they have used for them during the year.16 This can then be 
used for the ASP for the year to follow.17 
The third heading is ‘human resources development’. The idea was that staff should be used 
in the most efficient way allowing the Commission to fulfil all of its potential with the limited 
resources that it had.18 This reform like the others covered many aspects of human resources 
such as career development and mobility of the workforce.19 Promotions in the Commission 
were based too much on seniority, which is why the Kinnock reforms introduced a system 
based more on merit. The old career structure is replaced with a one that consists of two 
interlinking function groups (that of the administrators and that of the assistants).20 The 
location of an individual in either group or whether he/she passes from one to the next 
depends on the grade he/she is in (16 span across the two groups), which depends on the 
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number of points he/she has accumulated, but in case of the latter he/she would also have to 
pass an examination.21  
Finally there is the heading of ‘organization of financial management’, which more or less 
originated from the second report of the CIE.22 Many things were changed under this heading 
such as ‘a separation of authorisation, financial control and auditing functions’23 among other 
things due to the creation of three new bodies ‘the Internal Audit Service, the Audit Progress 
Committee and the Central Financial Service [as well as the introduction of] internal audit 
capabilities created in each DG, and internal control standards’.24 In addition the AAR 
implemented under the heading of ‘priority setting, allocation and the efficient use of 
resources’ also plays a role as it insures financial accountability of the Directors General for 
the financial transactions they authorize. This is because it also contains a signed declaration 
stating that the Director vouches ‘for the correct use of all budgetary resources for which the 
DG has been responsible’. If the Director does not vouch for something he/she must justify 
this.25 This meant that the financial controls, which before were exercised ex ante by requiring 
three different people to sign off on any one transaction,26 were to be replaced by this form of 
ex post controls, which are decentralized.27  
The first APS was finalised in February 2002 setting the priorities for the following year.28 
The first AARs were finished in 2001. The SPP was up and running in 2003. This allowed the 
budget setting for 2004 to be the first utilizing a fully functional SPP cycle and abiding by the 
concept of Activity Based Budgeting.29 At the onset of the year 2004 the Commission 
announced that 95 out of the 98 actions of the White Paper had been implemented.30 So one 
can  say  that  enough  time  has  gone  by  that  one  should  be  able  to  see  some  effects  of  the  
reforms. To examine these this article will look at the effects of the implementation of ABM 
and SPP and its effects on how the way the Commission functions now differs from before 
the reforms. 
 
 
3. How AMB and the SPP Cycle Impact on the Functioning of the Commission 
 
This question is a difficult one to answer, as the Commission is a large and complex body. To 
answer this question this paper will first look at how the implementation of the SPP affects 
the  functions  of  the  Commission  staff.  How  it  changed  their  day-to-day  work.  Then  it  will  
look at how this change affects the functioning of the Commission as a whole.  
 
3.1 The effects of AMB and the SPP cycle on the staff of the Commission 
 
Naturally it makes sense that such a measure, which is implemented Commission wide has 
effects on all staff members. It would however go far beyond the frameworks of this paper to 
examine the effects it has on all of them. For this reason this paper will focus on how it affects 
the  Heads  of  the  units  (HoU)  within  the  Commission,  examining  what  their  role  or  main  
function used to be before the Kinnock reforms and what it has become. 
Bauer, the HoU, was the key individual when it came to the development of legislative 
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proposals the Commission College should make. He described their position within the 
Commission as a ‘pivotal’ one. He bases this claim on the argument that as a so-called middle 
manager the HoU possesses the necessary in-depth and first hand experience and knowledge 
of all the elements of the mechanisms of the Commission that are required to draft and guide a 
proposal into realisation. He lists these elements as including not only the official channels 
and methods. He, however, also knows his way around the informal hierarchy of the 
Commission as well as the workings of the ‘crucial policy pundits’ of the other institution of 
the Union as well as those of the national governments and the lobby groups that play a role 
in the issues his unit is working on. In addition to this the fragmentation and lack of 
communication and the resulting lack of coordination within the Commission structure means 
that HoU occupies one of the few positions (if not the only one) where all the facets and 
different aspects of proposal development come together. This fragmentation of the 
Commission is supported by Christianses, who paints a picture of a Commission, which is not 
only divided horizontally between DGs for example but also vertically between the College 
and the staff.31 His argumentation is accepted as sound by this paper and it takes for granted 
that the HoU occupies this important position within the Commission. 
In addition the HoU is the connection between the team of experts that  work under him/her 
and the ‘politicized’ players occupying the hierarchical space above him/her all the while 
maintaining contact with relevant expert communities outside the Commission framework. 
Once again Bauer indicates that the HoU occupies an important focal point. Bauer assesses 
that it is more often than not the HoU who is charged (by his position) with the task of 
drafting policies and shepherding them through to realisation (which would make him a 
rapporteur), which is a time-consuming one at that.32 This  paper  agrees  with  this  position,  
which is also supported by the fact that the higher individuals are in the hierarchy the more 
politicized their position becomes.33 The  relative  position  of  the  HoU  in  the  middle  of  the  
Commission hierarchy would imply that it does indeed function as a connection between the 
level consisting of experts who did the research and grunt work to devise a proposal and those 
in more politicized positions that have the necessary authority and clout required to help a 
proposal through the Commission mechanisms. 
So much for the role they had previously occupied, but what has the introduction of the ABM 
and the SPP cycle turned them into? Bauer answers this question quite gloomily. He argues 
that  the  decentralisation  of  management  tasks  has  hit  the  HoU the  hardest  as  he  argues  that  
they are the ones that play a major role in the implementation of this managerial change. As a 
result he found that the day-to-day life of the HoU has changed significantly from main 
rapporteur of the Commission to manager. 34 
 
“Writing proposals for policy objectives, conceiving (measurable) progress and quality 
indicators, conducting impact assessment exercises, suggesting priorities, drafting respective 
reports, evaluating and communicating decisions to the rank and file have become the bread 
and butter of the HoU’s daily job.”35 
 
As was mentioned above the task of acting as a rapporteur is very time consuming and 
extensive, but now with the implementation of the ABM method and the SPP cycle so are the 
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tasks of a manager, which in contrast to the prior is one the HoU is now officially charged 
with. This would mean that the HoU’s former main activity of policy development must now 
take a step back and make room for the HoU’s new managerial priorities. Bauer illustrates 
this change through one statement made in his survey of HoUs in 2007 when asked to 
generally comment on the reforms. He says: ‘Before the HoU were experts in their fields, now 
they are "managers"’.36 It has now become evident that the de facto function of the HoU has 
shifted or rather that the HoU’s role in the Commission mechanism has changed. This leaves 
one to wonder what effects this has on the functioning of the Commission as a whole as the 
HoU had occupied such an important position in the policy development process. 
 
3.2  The Effect of the Changed Functions of the HoU on the Functioning of the Commission 
as a Whole 
 
Bauer argues that this change in the role of the HoU results in managerial duties that dominate 
his/her workload to the extent that it constrains their ability to devote time and energy to 
policy development.37 He  thus  draws  the  conclusion  that  due  to  the  fact  that  this  important  
player in the policy development process has now been taken out of the game, the result will 
be a void which will weaken said process.38  
On the other hand the findings of Schön-Quinlivan, who examined the application of the 
reforms  in  the  different  DGs,  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  reforms  are  not  necessarily  as  
confining for the staff as Bauer makes it looks.39 Her  findings  show that  the  different  DGs 
implemented and approached the reforms differently depending on three essential factors. 
First the organizational context of the individual DG, which consists mainly of two important 
hallmarks: the way it is governed internally and the way its financial system is set up. The 
second factor is the power struggles the different DGs are finding themselves fighting. The 
final factor is the leadership the different Director-Generals display.40 From her findings she 
concludes that, whilst acknowledging that the new reforms have resulted in time-consuming 
procedures that impose a substantial additional amount of work on the HoUs, the difference in 
application of the reforms in the different DGs in her opinion means that there is wiggle room 
for  the  different  DGs  to  apply  the  reforms  to  suit  them.41 She  does  not  elaborate  how  this  
would decrease the work load, but judging from the gist of her article this paper assumes that 
she is implying that if it was a need of those DGs charged with policy making that their HoUs 
not be too overloaded with management tasks they would find a way of remedying this. For 
example by introducing electronic help mechanism as she found the DG REGIO has done to 
improve efficiency and thus decreases the workload.42  
Bauer  uses  the  critical  comments  of  the  people  he  has  surveyed  to  back  his  claim.  It  is  the  
objectiveness and value of this foundation that Schön-Quinlivan questions, when she states 
that the first reaction to change is fear culminated by the fact that one now would have to bear 
the additional burden of accountability and financial responsibility.43 It is thus to be assumed 
that she attributes the many dramatic comments made in Bauer’s survey to this fear. One of 
these dramatic statements refers to the reform as a ‘castration’.44 After this initial fear has 
subsided, she claims, the staff would use the reforms to their advantage namely as proof of the 
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legitimacy of their workings and projects, even addressing the possibility that the new reforms 
could in fact increase the quality of the policies the Commission develops.45 
Leaving the field wide open Schön-Quinlivan also addresses the possibility that the reforms 
change the role of the Commission into one avert to engaging in policy-making and the 
Council filling the void it leaves.46 The desirability of such a development is questionable. As 
so far the Commission has brought the element of supranationality to the policy-making 
process, the loss of which to the more intergovernmental Council would be a sad one. 
However a lot would have to change first in the Commission before such an outcome would 
occur on the basis of inability or interest by the Commission to engage in policy-making. 
(Note that this statement is restricted to the Commission causing this outcome, it carries no 
judgment  on  how the  other  institutions  informally  encroach  in  the  position  the  Commission  
occupies in the policy-making process.) This statement is based on the simple fact that the 
Commission’s role in the policy-making process has since its creation been regarded by its 
members as its most important task.47 Thus  all  possibilities  to  fulfil  this  task  itself  would  
probably first have to be exhausted before it surrenders this responsibility to any other 
institution. 
This paper agrees with both Bauer and Schön-Quinlivan to certain extents. It agrees with 
Bauer in that the new reforms have shifted attention more towards the efficient management 
of the projects the Commission has been running at the expense of its capacity to develop new 
ones. Thus it agrees that the HoUs now have much less time compared to before the reforms 
to engage in the policy-making process. However the extent of this effect is arguable. It is at 
this juncture at which this paper follows Schön-Quinlivan’s line of reasoning in that it agrees 
with her conclusion that the DGs have the possibility of applying the reforms in a way that is 
best suited for them. Thus this paper argues that if it is the need of a policy-making DG to not 
have the reforms infringe on its ability to make said policies then it will strive to apply them 
accordingly, which according to Schön-Quinlivan’s study is possible to some extents. This 
paper thus argues that, whilst assuming the HoU of the policy-making DGs have had this 
pivotal  role  in  the  policy-making  process,  the  respective  DGs  have  the  ability  to  apply  the  
reforms in a way that the HoU’s policy-making capacity is least infringed or find ways in 
which they can develop new policies despite the HoU’s limited ability to contribute. 
Schön-Quinlivan also calls into question the extent to which Bauer’s surveyed HoUs claim 
they are being constrained by this reform as mentioned above, attributing their reactions to 
fear and not considering them objective factual statements of which one could draw an 
accurate assessment of the reform effects. This point is arguable. Though this paper agrees 
with the assessment that it is human nature to react negatively and to extents irrationally 
fearful to change, as the Commission staff has done many times in the past thus squashing 
previous reforms together with the unions.48 However  she  describes  this  and  this  paper  
believes  this  to  be  an  initial  reaction,  which  after  time  will  give  way  to  a  more  accurate  
assessment,  which  begs  the  question  how  much  time  needs  to  pass  before  this  accurate  
assessment can be made? The interviews were conducted in 2007, which means that about 
three years had gone by since the ABM method and the SPP cycle had been implemented. So 
one could conclude that experience had been gathered and arguably by the time the survey 
had been made the HoUs had already reached this point where they could make accurate 
accounts of the effects of the reform. This paper finds that the amount of time that has passed 
is sufficient to make such an assessment.  
However this paper also finds that the way the survey was conducted also puts into question 
the value of its outcome. Out of the 800 HoUs that were identified by Bauer as ‘exclusively 
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[dealing with] policy tasks’, he interviewed 116, yet he mentions no criteria or attributes of 
them that would allow one to assess the value of each statement.49 An informative attribute 
would have been how long they had been HoU as one would expect those who had been in 
this position longer would be more prone to morn the loss of the prestigious role of 
rapporteur, and those recently or not so long in the position would be expected to adapt 
quicker to the change. In addition it would have been informative to see whether the surveyed 
HoUs had been part of the 500 middle managers that had taken management classes in 
2003,50 or  had  taken  them  subsequently.  Perhaps  this  would  have  shed  some  light  on  how  
much  they  resisted  becoming  a  manager  or  how  efficient  one  could  assume  they  were  
working and applying the new managerial reforms. Without such criteria or idea of who the 
surveyed were and what their motivations for giving the responses that they gave, one is left 
clueless as to whether the ones, who chose to respond to this survey assessing the effects of 
the  reform  were  those  that  wanted  to  vent  or  let  their  frustration  be  heard  or  whether  they  
were a balanced and diverse mix of individuals capable of representing the remaining seven-
eighths of policy tasked HoUs. 
With all of the before mentioned aspects and considerations in mind this paper finds the 
bottom line of the whole discussion to be inconclusive. Yes, the focus of the Commission 
staff was forced to shift more towards the responsible and efficient administration of the tasks 
and project at hand at the expense of the Commission’s capacity to develop new policies and 
projects. How one evaluates this shift of focus depends on how one values the different 
functions of the Commission. If one prioritizes its function as policy initiator over its function 
as the overseer of the implementation and proper administration of the policies and projects it 
has already successfully initiated, one would think the reforms were damaging and 
incapacitating  the  main  function  of  the  Commission.  In  contrast,  if  one  would  prioritize  the  
latter  over  the  former  one  would  find  that  the  reforms  had  been  overdue  and  enhanced  the  
Commissions ability to fulfil its function effectively.  
This paper finds that both functions are of substantial value, though the prior admittedly more 
important, as the Commission if not alone responsible for the implementation of projects and 
policy as these responsibilities are also carried by the Member States. It is of the opinion that 
in the past not sufficient value had been accredited to the latter function, as a successful 
proposal for a new project is worth little if the project is not implemented and managed 
properly. What it boils down to is striking the right balance between the two functions of the 
Commission, which the reforms have attempted to do by attempting to remedy the lack of 
efficient management. This means that the appropriate question to ask is whether the reforms 
have managed to strike the right balance. This would in this paper’s opinion only be definitely 
answered by another Santer-like crisis, which would point at either a lack in management of 
qualitative/quantitative policy output of the Commission. Another way could be to define 
indicators and then examine the output of the Commission since 2004, looking for any kind of 
change, be it deficiencies of improvements. However, defining such indicators is a very 
difficult task as they would have to be able to distinguish between the influences of the reform 
and those brought about by the added complexity the latest enlargement of the union 
contributed to the policy-making process, which could also account for a lack of out-put.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper has come to the conclusion that the Kinnock reforms, and more specifically the 
introduction of ABM and SPP, influenced functioning of the Commission in that they shifted 
their focus more towards the Commission’s function as the administrator of the Union and the 
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managerial duties that come with such a function. Using the HoU’s change in function as an 
indicator one can see this shift. However it has come at the cost of the HoU’s capacity to act 
as rapporteur thus an important actor has to some degree been taken out of this process 
leaving a void. How much or if at all this void will actually affect the quantity or quality of 
policies of the Commission that have since or will be developed is still to be seen. How one 
would  assess  the  reforms at  this  point  would  depend on  how much weight  one  gives  to  the  
two functions  of  the  Commission.  The  change  was  however  overdue  as  the  function  of  the  
Commission as policy implementer and overseer has been unjustifiably neglected in the past. 
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THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE: USEFUL DEFENDER 
OF CIVIL SOCIETY?  
 
Marvin Hennes 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In  2007,  fifty-seven  members  of  the  European  Parliament  called  for  an  abolition  of  the  
European Economic and Social Committee, stating that it has outlived its usefulness in the 
European institutional set up – by strengthening corporatism and duplicating the Parliament’s 
work without a democratic mandate.1 
Set up as an advisory body within the institutional structure of the European Union – 
representing socio-economic interest groups and civil society – the Economic and Social 
Committee, since its creation, sought for a definition of its proper role. Whereas it was 
believed  in  early  days  of  the  EEC  that  the  Committee  would  serve  as  a  representative  of  
interest groups in the decision-making process, those expectations turned out to be unrealistic 
because of its mere advisory role and diffuse position in the institutional set-up. In recent 
years however, the Committee was able to increase its visibility and influence, using the 
discourse on civil society.  
In the following, I will address the search for a proper role of the Economic and Social 
Committee, by analysing the Committee’s change of role in the history of the European Union 
and the influence of the discourse on civil  society.  In order to do so,  I  will  first  give a brief 
introductory  description  of  the  present  role  of  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee,  its  
composition  and  competences.  I  will  continue  by  analysing  the  initial  role  of  the  Economic  
and  Social  Committee  set  out  in  the  Rome Treaty  and  its  subsequent  development  until  the  
early 1990’s. Then, I will place the role of the Committee in the context of the discourse on 
civil society, analysing its origin and influence on the role and working methods of the 
Committee. Finally, I will conceptualize the new role of the European Economic and Social 
Committee as a forum of civil society within the institutional set-up. 
 
 
2. Composition and Competences of the European Economic and Social Committee 
 
The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)2 is an advisory body of the European 
Union, representing organizations of employers, the employed and other parties representative 
of civil society, particularly in socio-economic, civic, professional and cultural areas. 3 
Composed of 344 members, who are appointed for a five-year renewable term, it is divided 
into three groups of various economic and social activities:  
(1) Employers organisations, comprising representatives from both the private and public 
sector; (2) trade unions and associations; (3) ‘various interests’, comprising representatives of 
small and medium businesses, socio-economic organizations, consumer and environmental 
organizations, professions, crafts and agricultural organizations.4 Members of the Committee 
are proposed by the Member States, which decide by various means which candidate 
members are to be appointed, e.g. by socio-economic interests (France and Greece), through 
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national  social  and  economic  councils  (Belgium and the  Netherlands)  or  by  appointment  of  
government departments, such as the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology in 
Germany or the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the United Kingdom.5  
Members of the EESC do not act as delegates of their Member State, but are to represent an 
abstract socio-economic category, independent in performance and not bound by any 
mandatory instruction.6 
Competences are defined in Article 304 TFEU, stating that the Committee shall be consulted 
by the European Parliament, the Council or by the Commission in cases where the Treaties 
provide  so.   The  Compulsory  consultation  amounts  to  about  50  articles  in  the  Treaties,  
involving a wide range of policy areas, inter alia the free movement of goods, industrial, 
environmental and agricultural policy, education and public health.7 The Commission, the 
Council and the European Parliament may also ask the Committee for an opinion whenever 
they consider it appropriate. Moreover, the Committee may under the provision issue its own-
initiative opinions, i.e. to influence the Commission when drafting a proposal.  
 
 
3. Inception and Initial Role of the Economic and Social Committee  
 
The roots of the Economic and Social Committee can be traced back to the neo-functionalist 
theory of integration, build upon the works of Ernst B. Haas and Leon Lindberg. In their 
pluralist  perception  of  international  politics,  greater  emphasis  was  given  to  the  role  of  non-
state actors in the policy-making process. 8 In their view, interest groups concerned would 
organize across national boundaries, making contact with similar groups in other countries (a 
term later called transnationalism), in order to be able to influence the policy-making process. 
This group pressure would eventually spill over into the federal sphere, stimulating the 
process of integration.9  
Whereas the creation of an institution representing socio-economic interests seemed self-
evident  in  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community,  a  proposal  to  create  a  socio-economic  
committee within the institutional set-up of the upcoming, more wide-ranging European 
Economic Community was only made at the final stages of the Intergovernmental Conference 
on the Common Market and EURATOM in September 1956.10 The proposal received 
resistance from Germany, particularly because of their experience with the 
Reichswirtschaftsrat and corporatism in the Weimar Republic, still the creation of an advisory 
socio-economic committee was advocated by the other five founding members who already 
had similar bodies at a national level.11 Following the creation of the European Economic 
Community, the Economic and Social Committee was formally established under Article 193 
of the EEC Treaty.  
Yet, the Treaty of Rome was the corollary for the Committee’s obscure role. While it was first 
expected that the ESC would serve as a representative body acting on behalf of interest 
groups, contributing to a closer cooperation between the institutions of the EEC and the 
various economic sectors, the Committee proved to be ineffectual and in its role not 
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comparable to other economic and social committees on a national level.12 The Treaty of 
Rome curbed the power of the Committee,  making it  impossible to exert  influence over the 
decision-making process. Article 198 (1) of the Treaty restricted the Committee’s advisory 
power to compulsory and optional consultations after the actual drafting of proposals.13 
Consequently, the Committee’s opinion was mostly sought when amending draft proposals 
and questions on highly technical subjects.14 There was no mechanism provided in the 
Treaties that would ensure that the Committee’s opinions would be respected, as most of the 
times the opinions would face disinterest of the EEC institutions because of their individual, 
rather than delegated nature.15 
After several unsuccessful attempts to gain a right of legislative initiative in the late 1960’s, 
the  Committee,  in  1972,  eventually  obtained  the  right  to  advise  on  its  own  initiative  on  all  
matters on all policy areas affecting the EEC.16 The German government, which formerly 
resisted the creation of the Committee and an extension of its powers, now under Chancellor 
Willy Brandt, supported the Committee’s desire to become a forum of dialogue between 
interest groups and EEC institutions.17 Ultimately, the Committee gained the power to 
influence draft regulations, directives and decisions, once curbed by Article 198(1). Yet from 
a practical viewpoint, the influence of the Committee in policy-making remained minimal. 
Between 1978 and 1990, own-initiative opinions only amounted to 15 per cent of all three 
types  of  consultation,  while  compulsory  consultation  amounted  to  36  per  cent  and  optional  
consultation to 49 per cent.18 Moreover, the Committee still faced the same problems prior to 
gaining the power of an own-initiative opinion. No mechanism ensuring the respect for 
opinions stated by the Committee existed, neither did a change of its appointment procedure 
occur.  
 
 
4. The Discourse on Civil Society and an Appropriate Role for the Committee 
 
The term ‘civil society’ within the context of the European Union originated in the beginning 
of the 1990’s, when debates arose about transparency of the European Union and its 
institutions, initiated by the Birmingham declaration.19 The first approach was taken by the 
European Commission, which in its policy paper ‘An open and structured dialogue between 
the Commission and interest groups’20 proposed to strengthen the ties with interest groups, by 
introducing inter alia a directory and a code of conduct for special interest groups. These 
interest groups were not only of professional nature, but also included welfare associations, 
whose importance was already stressed in Declaration 23 of the Maastricht Treaty.21 At the 
same time, the Economic and Social Committee was facing the risk of marginalization with 
                                                             
12 Ibid, p. 269. 
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17 Lodge and Herman, 34 International Organisation 2 (1980), p. 275. 
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19 European Council, ‘Birmingham 16 October 1992 Presidency Conclusions’, DOC/92/6. 
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the  creation  of  the  Committee  of  Regions  and  the  shift  of  emphasis  on  the  social  dialogue  
independent from the Committee.22 Inspired by the debates about transparency and 
democratic deficit in the early 1990’s, it changed its focus from socio-economic interest 
representation to the representation of the European citizen. The attempt to reposition itself 
vis-à-vis the European citizen scarcely succeeded, mainly because of its bad organized, broad 
and top-down focused method of work.23 
In 1998, a new approach was taken by the incoming Secretary General and President of the 
Committee, Patrick Venturini and Beatrice Machiavelli. By acknowledging the problem of 
marginalization the Committee was facing – even after an attempt to redefine itself vis-à-vis 
the European citizen  – they saw their chance in redefining the role of the Economic and 
Social Committee as a forum of civil society, shifting the focus from individual to organized 
citizen.24 The Committee’s own-initiative opinion ‘The role and contribution of civil society 
organizations in the building of Europe’25 served as the starting point of this initiative. In its 
opinion, the Committee discusses the notion of civil society throughout the history, from 
Aristotle and Cicero over Hegel and Marx to modern interpretation of civil society by 
Tocqueville, Durkheim and Weber, who based civil society on four principles: (1) Civil 
society is typified by more or less formalized institutions; (2) Individuals are free to choose 
whether to belong to civil society institutions; (3) The framework of civil society is the rule of 
law; (4) Civil society is the place where collective goals are set and citizens are represented.26 
The Committee defines civil society as ‘a collective term for all types of social action, by 
individuals or groups, that do not emanate from the state and are not run by it’. Civil society 
organizations are defined as ‘the sum of all organisational structures whose members have 
objectives and responsibilities that are of general interest and who also act as mediators 
between the public authorities and citizens.’ The Committee uses an inclusive definition of 
civil society, including social partners, organizations representing social and economic 
players; community based organizations (CBOs), e.g. youth organizations and family 
associations;  religious communities; non-governmental organizations (NGOs), e.g. 
environmental organizations, human rights organizations, consumer associations etc. Arguing 
that in its role as forum of civil dialogue, the Committee guarantees the implementation of the 
participatory model of civil society, enabling the latter to participate in the decision-making 
process and reduce the democratic deficit. 27 
It is no surprise that the Committee sought to legitimize its institutional position and combat 
marginalization using the discourse on civil society and civil dialogue, given the emergence 
of a debate on the participation of civil society in the decision-making process.28 The debate 
was initiated by several factors, inter alia, larger  protest  movements  (in  particular  anti-
globalization movements)29, decisions of the ECJ relating to the funding of social projects30 
and the resignation of the Santer Commission after a scandal of financial mismanagement and 
fraud. The entire   debate culminated in the White Paper on European Governance, published 
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by the European Commission in 2001.31 In  its  commitment  for  better  involvement,  greater  
consultation, transparency and stronger mobilization of civil society, it follows the reasoning 
of the Committee given in the 1999 opinion ‘The role and contribution of civil society 
organizations in the building of Europe’, placing emphasis on the participatory model of civil 
society in the decision-making process in order to legitimize European policy and combat the 
democratic deficit.32  The  Nice  Treaty  took  into  account  the  new role  of  the  Economic  and  
Social Committee, changing the Treaty provision on the composition of the Committee to: 
‘The Committee shall consist of representatives of the various economic and social 
components of organized civil society’.33 
 
 
5. A Proactive Forum of Civil Society? 
 
With its new role defined in the Nice Treaty, the Committee changed its Rules of Procedure in 
2002 and adopted a Members’ Statute of the European Economic and Social Committee in 
2003. In 2004, the Big Bang enlargement resulted in an increase of seats in the Committee. 
122 new seats were allocated to representatives from the new Member States, an increase of 
more than 50 per cent. Whereas it was argued that decision-making after the enlargement 
became less smooth, the enlargement proved to be an added value in the legitimization of its 
institutional role.34 In most of the new Member states, civil society was still considerably 
weak. Low levels of organizational membership, participation in associational life and trust in 
organized civil society organizations resulting from their communist past proved to be a 
challenge both for the Committee and the New Member States to foster civil dialogue and the 
awareness of civil society.35 
Not only did the Committee try to combat marginalization and increase its visibility by virtue 
of giving itself a new role, it also endeavoured to play a more proactive role in the decision-
making process — particularly in its early stages — and enhance its external relations. The 
Committee hence adopted several vertical and horizontal instruments since the early 1990’s to 
achieve this goal.  
 
5.1  Single Market Observatory  
 
The Single Market Observatory (SMO), set up in 1994 at request of the European Parliament, 
the Commission and the Council, is an instrument of the Committee to evaluate and assess the 
state of affairs of the single market. Recently, it also promotes smart regulation within the EU, 
i.e.  the  setting  up  of  databases  and  endorsement  of  new  ways  of  regulation.  By  organizing  
hearings, it serves as an important instrument when drafting own-initiative opinions relating 
to the single market. 36 37 
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5.2  Exploratory Opinions 
 
In 2001, the Committee introduced the instrument of the so-called ‘exploratory opinion’ to 
further influence the European Commission in early stages of the decision-making process. 
While technically they can be own-initiative opinions, they Committee uses informal ways to 
prevail upon the Commission to ask for exploratory opinions. 38 
 
5.3  Joint Consultative Committees  
 
Joint Consultative Committees (JCC) are the Committee’s most important instrument in 
enhancing external relations with third countries and applicant states, by fostering awareness 
of civil society within the country and strengthen the links with civil society organizations 
before the accession of the future EU member.39 This is done by the setting up of a joint body 
of civil society representatives, composed from the equal number of European Economic and 
Social Committee delegates and civil society organization delegates from the applicant state. 
Initiatives of the JCC are inter alia fact-finding missions to candidate countries, training 
seminars and hearings.40  
 
5.4 Consultative Commission on Industrial Change 
 
The Consultative Commission on Industrial Change (CCMI) was created in 2002 within the 
framework of the Committee, when it was decided to continue the work of the European Steel 
and Coal Community’s Consultative Committee – facing the expiry of the ECSC treaty.41 A 
continuation of its work would not only permit the retention of expertise build up in the past 
50 years, but would also cover all issues relating to industrial change – a challenge faced by 
many of the New Member States. Consequently, the CCMI is widely used by the Committee 
to draw up opinions and play a proactive role in this area. 42 
Within the ambit of its role as forum of civil society, the Committee increasingly committed 
itself  to  play  a  more  proactive  role  in  its  advisory  function  through  the  use  of  vertical  
instruments, such as exploratory opinions and the Single Market Observatory. Comparing the 
usage of own-initiative opinions between 1979 – 1990 and 2005 – 2006, an increase of 10 per 
cent can be noted. Whereas in the former time period, own-initiative opinions amounted to 15 
per cent of all issued opinions43, the figure rose to 25,94 per cent in the latter.44 Horizontal 
instruments such as the Joint Consultative Committees and the Consultative Commission on 
Industrial Change complemented these vertical instruments by widening the area of activities 
and influence of the Committee, enhancing external relations and fostering awareness of civil 
society and civil dialogue, benefitting from the accession of 10 new Member States in 2004. 
With its more proactive role, the Committee shifted its focus from an output method of work 
– providing expertise to legislative bodies of the EU – to an input method of work – 
emphasizing its deliberative character and enhancing links with civil society.45 
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6. The Concept of a Forum of Civil Society within the Institutional Set-Up 
 
A certain tension exists between the notion of civil society and the institutional role of the 
European Economic and Social Committee, which has several reasons. Firstly, governments 
of the Member States still appoint the members of the Committee. While they act 
independently from their Member State, the diffuse appointment procedure lacks the 
representation and influence of civil society organizations. Secondly, compulsory and 
optional consultation still take the majority of the Committee’s agenda, considering the fact 
that own-initiative and exploratory opinions only amount to 26 per cent of all issued 
opinions.46 Although the Committee’s proactive role increased with the use of new vertical 
and horizontal instruments, it can be argued whether the Committee could achieve the 
required level of proactivity that civil society would require. 47  Thirdly, representation of civil 
society within the European Union is still highly fragmented and scattered across the whole 
system of EU governance, reaching from ad-hoc lobby groups to highly organized 
associations. Moreover, inherent difficulties lie in the own nature of civil society at a 
transnational level. By organizing itself in larger, transnational structures; by developing 
strategies within these structures autonomously from its constituent members, thus by 
jumping instead of bridging the gap between society and transnational structures of 
governance,  lies  the  risk  that  voices  of  national  civil  society  actors  rest  unheard  or  become 
lost in the process.48 In terms of conceptualizing the role of civil society within the complex 
structure of European governance and multi-level polity, the Committee failed (or only did so 
inadequately) to recognize the role of civil society in intergovernmental policy areas, i.e. 
justice and home affairs. While it uses the discourse on civil society to legitimize Community 
governance with the European Commission as the main player in drafting proposals, it fails to 
value the role of civil society where participation could compensate the lack of parliamentary 
involvement.49 
Hence, even after redefining the role of the Committee in new rules of procedure and 
amendments in the Nice Treaty, ambiguity about the role of the Committee as a forum of civil 
society still exists and not all factors completely adapted to the new role of the Committee as 
forum of civil society. Yet, these issues did not hinder the Committee to increase its influence 
and gain a firm foothold within the EU institutional set-up. Using the discourse on civil 
society to legitimize its institutional role, the other institutions acknowledged the Committees 
role in the decision-making process, i.e. the European Commission in the White Paper on 
European Governance50 and the European Parliament in its resolution on the White Paper, 
calling the Committee ‘an important mouthpiece for civil society’, whose ‘early consultation 
[…] by the Commission can be seen as a way of increasing participatory democracy at Union 
level’.51  
 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
In its initial role, the Economic and Social Committee was considered to be a representative 
body, acting on behalf of socio-economic interest groups in the institutional set-up of the 
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EEC. Soon after its inception, it was clear that the Committee couldn’t fulfil the expectations 
of such a body – mere advisory powers, unsatisfactory appointment procedures and no 
mechanism ensuring the respect of the Committee’s opinion in the decision-making process 
curbed the influence of the Committee. By granting it the power of an own-initiative opinion 
in 1972, it was believed that the situation could be remedied if the Committee could exert 
influence over the Commission in earlier stages of the decision-making process. Yet, its 
impact  remained  minimal  until  the  end  of  the  1990’s,  when a  debate  about  participation  of  
civil society emerged in European polity. The Economic and Social Committee saw its chance 
in legitimizing its institutional role by redefining itself as a forum of civil society. Unlike 
previous, merely ‘window-dressing’ attempts, it endeavoured to become more proactive 
within  the  ambit  of  its  redefined  role.  Therefore,  an  increased  emphasis  was  put  on  vertical  
and horizontal instruments independent from its initial powers; such as the SMO, exploratory 
opinions, JCCs and the CCMI. Among others, the Nice Treaty, the European Commission and 
European  Parliament  acknowledged  the  new  role  of  the  Committee  –  in  an  amended  treaty  
provision and a call for participation of civil society in the Commission’s White Paper and its 
subsequent EP resolution. 
Nevertheless, there are several concerns over the new role as a forum of civil society. 
Appointment procedures are still the same as in 1956, compulsory and optional initiatives still 
make  out  the  majority  of  the  Committee’s  agenda,  representation  of  civil  society  is  still  
scattered  across  the  whole  system  of  EU  governance  and  Europeanization  of  civil  society  
faces the danger of losing voices of national civil society actors by jumping instead of 
bridging the gap. By lifting the limitations within the institutional framework once imposed 
by  the  Rome  Treaty,  the  Committee  could  further  enhance  its  new  role  as  a  forum  of  civil  
dialogue and finally abandon its reputation as an obsolete institution.   
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THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
SECURITY POLICY: A SUPRANATIONAL OR AN 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL POST? 
 
Seyda Uyar 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – that is  a post  created by 
the Amsterdam Treaty and extremely enriched in competences by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. 
The title of this position already suggests that it must be an influential personality on the 
international scene with difficult tasks and duties to fulfil. 
The High Representative was intended to have a bridging function between the 
intergovernmental  part  of  the  European  Union,  namely  the  Council  of  Ministers,  and  the  
supranational institution, the European Commission. Thus, he or she enjoys competences and 
privileges in both institutions and thereby obtains an unique position which is referred to be 
“double-hatted”.  
My paper aims at answering the question if the post of the High Representative is more 
intergovernmental or more supranational in nature, thus this would also be an indication of the 
direction  of  the  European  Union  in  foreign  and  security  policy  after  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  
Intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, being two opposing European integration 
concepts, are both firmly anchored in the different institutions of the European Union system.  
Firstly,  I  will  examine the role of the High Representative under the Amsterdam Treaty and 
then compare his competences with those of the High Representative under the Lisbon Treaty 
by taking a historical perspective. My second step will consist of defining the formal function 
of this officeholder by pointing out his appointment procedure and his competences and 
powers under the Treaty.  
Thirdly, I will assess the legal-political role of the High Representative and thereby highlight 
his significance within and outside the European Union. In doing so, I will make a reference 
to the possible rivalry between the President of the Commission, the President of the 
European Council and the High Representative, who are all three responsible for the 
representation of the EU in external affairs.  
Fourthly, I will discuss the intergovernmental and supranational elements of this new post and 
question  if  these  are  compatible  with  each  other  or  not.  Hereby,  I  will  also  emphasize  the  
mixed fears and scepticisms towards the neutrality of the new High Representative.  
Lastly, I will refer to the achievements of the first High Representative under the Lisbon 
Treaty, Catherine Ashton, and by scrutinizing them I will draw my conclusion and answer my 
research question stated above.  
 
  
2. History 
 
2.1 Pre-Lisbon 
 
The office of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
was initially created by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and was occupied by the former 
Spanish Foreign Minister and Secretary General of NATO Javier Solana until 2009.1 This 
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position was created in order to improve the coordination, coherence and efectiveness of the 
CFSP and therefore appoint one single person who represents and speaks for the whole 
Community concerning international issues.2  
The High Representative was at the same time holding the post of the Secretary-General of 
the Council whereby his main task was to assist the rotating Presidency of the Council3 and 
moreover he took part in policy formulation and implementation.4 However, Solana’s 
authority was shadowed since he was dependant on the foreign ministers of the EU and 
furthermore he had to share the function of his post of being the contact person for the EU’s 
foreign policy with the head of the rotating EU Council presidency.5  
 
2.2 Post-Lisbon 
 
The Lisbon Treaty that came into force in 2009 significantly extended the powers of the High 
Representative and increased his or her prominence.6 The Treaty combines the office of the 
High Representative with that of the EU Commissioner for External Relations and thus this 
unique position is often referred to be “double-hatted”.7 As a result, among other tasks, the 
High Representative represents the European Council, he presides over the Foreign Affairs 
Council and he is a full member of the Commission and one of its Vice-Presidents.8  
The allocation of many new tasks and duties that have been administered to this position in 
Lisbon should ensure greater coordination and coherence between the Union areas of external 
action  and  the  intergovernmental  policy  of  the  CFSP  and  thus  create  a  more  unified  and  
consistent EU external policy.9 The combination of a supranational post, namely the one 
exercised within the Commission and an intergovernmental post, the one exercised within the 
Council, aims basically at unifying the Unions’ and Member States’ interests in one 
representative.10 
 
 
3. Function 
 
3.1 Appointment 
 
Art. 18(1) TEU gives the European Council the power to appoint the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (FASP) by qualified majority voting and 
with the endorsement of the president of the Commission for five years. The same procedure 
can be used to end the mandate of the High Representative. One crucial factor in this new 
appointment procedure is that the European Parliament (EP) has indirectly a say in this 
process, since according to Art. 17(7) TEU the Commission is subject to a vote of consent by 
the EP and as previously stated the High Representative enjoys “a hat” in the Commission. 
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This indicates that the EP may vote a censure motion on the Commission which would lead to 
its resignation as a body and pursuant to Art. 17(8) TEU, also the High Representative would 
be compelled to resign from his or her duties carried out in the Commission.11 
 
3.2 Competences 
 
The Lisbon Treaty has established a wide range of powers and tasks for the officeholder of 
this unique position. Art. 18(2) TEU gives the High Representative the power to make 
proposals for the development of the CFSP and in addition to this Art. 22(2) TEU provides 
that he or she may submit joint proposals together with the Commission concerning Council 
decisions.  
Another significant power is laid down in Art. 27(1) which states that the High Representative 
shall chair the Foreign Affairs Council which indicates that he or she is the person who sets 
the  agenda  of  the  meetings  and  therefore  this  power  can  be  regarded  as  being  of  major  
importance. Additionally, Art. 24(1) TEU provides that the CFSP shall be put into effect by 
the High Representative together with the Member States. Art. 27(1) TEU prescribes that he 
or she shall  also ensure the implementation of the decisions adopted by the Council  and the 
European Council.  
A further important duty for the High Representative is included in Art. 18(4) TEU that states 
that he or she shall ensure consistency in the EU’s external action and which is a second time 
reinforced in Art. 21(3) TEU. Lastly, one has to mention Art. 27(2) TEU conferring him or 
her the power to represent the European Union on CFSP issues and to conduct political 
dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and to declare the Union’s position in 
international organizations and at international conferences.12 For  the  execution  of  all  these  
tasks and duties, the High Representative will be assisted by the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), as provided in Art. 27(3) TEU.13  
 
 
4. Legal-Political Role 
 
4.1 Within the European Union 
 
The legal-political role of the High Representative within the European Union is one of major 
significance, especially since the changes made in the Lisbon Treaty concerning the Union’s 
foreign and security policy. The allocation of many important powers in this field on one 
single person has also created a debate about the roles of leading personalities of the Union 
institutions, namely the role of the President of the Commission and of the President of the 
European Council.14  
The post of the High Representative and the creation of the EEAS should initially constitute 
an institutional bridge between the CFSP of the Council and external policies of the 
Commission.15 However,  Art.  15(6)  TEU  states  that  the  President  of  the  European  Council  
shall ensure the external representation of the Union, without prejudice to the powers of the 
High Representative and thereby this provision restricts the former’s scope of powers enjoyed 
before Lisbon. The High Representative has also to compete with the President of the 
                                                             
11 Griller, The Lisbon Treaty: EU constitutionalism without a constitutional treaty?, (Springer-Verlag, 2008), p. 
151. 
12 Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, p. 492-494. 
13 Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: law, politics and treaty reform, p. 412. 
14 J. Howorth, The ‘new faces’ of Lisbon: assessing the performance of Catherine Ashton and Herman van 
Rompuy on the global stage, (European Union Studies Association Twelfth Biennial International Conference, 
2011), p. 3. 
15 P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law , p. 492. 
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Commission, since the latter is also responsible for the external representation of the EU, 
except in CFSP matters.16  
It  seems  to  be  hard  to  distinguish  between  the  responsibilities  of  these  three  officeholders,  
also called “the Troika”, with regard to external representation. As a result, this unclear 
division of powers and duties could also lead to political incoherence, which would be 
opposed to the main goal of this new set-up and also effectiveness could only be achieved by 
agreement between these personalities.17 This was highly debated and academics even stated 
the opinion that this new system could easily lead to rivalry in the foreign affairs between the 
three EU institutions.18 
 
4.2 Outside the European Union 
 
The new role of the High Representative has also great influence on the international 
platform. Henry Kissinger, the U.S. Secretary of State, asked for a “phone number” for 
Europe already in the early 1970s and expressed thereby his desire to have one single contact 
person who could give him account on the EU’s external affairs.19 Due to the unclear 
distribution of tasks between the Commission, European Council President and the High 
Representative as discussed above, one can conclude that Kissinger’s wish is still not fully 
realized. 
The major goal of the Lisbon Treaty that the international audience shall perceive the 
European Union as one unit, that speaks with one mouth and implements consistent policies 
in external matters is clearly revealed by the enhanced role of the High Representative.20 A 
further competence that the new EU “foreign minister” gained for this goal is laid down in 
Art. 34 TEU. This provision grants him or her the power to organise the Member States’ 
coordination of their actions in international organizations and at international conferences 
where they shall uphold the EU’s position. Furthermore, Art. 34(2) TFEU prescribes that 
when the EU has defined a clear position on a particular subject matter which is on the UN 
Security Council agenda, not the Member States but the High Representative shall present the 
Union’s position.21 
The last point that I mentioned could create some conflicts between the national prerogatives 
of the Member States and the new face for external actions. Declaration no. 14 attached to the 
Lisbon Treaty at the insistance of the British government22 points out that the new provisions 
concerning the CFSP and the powers of the High Representative will not affect the existing 
legal basis and powers of the Member States regarding, among others, their foreign policy and 
their participation in international organizations.23 This  is  very  crucial  since  with  the  
introduction of Art. 34 TEU the Treaty aimed at ensuring greater coherence among the 
Member States which had an important influence in the UN Security Council but when one 
looks at the wording of Declaration no. 14, one can observe that they tried to reverse Art. 34 
TEU by assuring that there will not be any limitation to the autonomous determination of 
foreign policy positions of the Member States. 24 Concludingly, the national prerogatives 
                                                             
16 C. Gegout, European Foreign and Security Policy: States, Power, Institutions and American Hegemony, 
(University of Toronto Press, 2010), p. 51. 
17 Koehler, European Foreign Policy After Lisbon: Strengthening the EU as an International Actor,  p. 69. 
18 Griller, The Lisbon Treaty: EU constitutionalism without a constitutional treaty, p. 153-154. 
19 Gegout, European Foreign and Security Policy: States, Power, Institutions and American Hegemony, p. 50. 
20 Koehler, European Foreign Policy After Lisbon: Strengthening the EU as an International Actor,   p. 67. 
21W. Wessels, The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty – Constitutional breakthrough or 
challenges ahead?, (CHALLENGE, 2008), p. 21. 
22 G. Avery, Challenge Europe - The People’s project? The new EU Treaty and the prospects for future 
integration, (European Policy Centre, 2007), p. 18. 
23 Bindi, The foreign policy of the European Union: assessing Europe’s role in the world, p. 43. 
24 Ibid., p. 43-44. 
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continue being in the foreground, whereas the supranational element in Art. 34 TEU resides 
into the background.  
 
 
5. Intergovernmentalism versus Supranationalism? 
 
5.1 Incompatibility? 
 
In order to find an answer to the question if the post of the High Representative is 
intergovernmental or supranational in nature, one has to clarify the meanings of these two 
concepts of European integration that were developed to describe the nature of the EU and its 
institutions. Furthermore, having examined in the previous parts that the High Representative 
inherits elements of both concepts, one should ask if these concepts are compatible with each 
other.  
Intergovernmentalism on the one hand, basically argues that nation states cooperate in 
situations and conditions they can control with each other on matters of common interest and 
that also these states decide the nature and extent of this cooperation. Thus, this would mean 
that national sovereignty cannot be undermined and that State actors and their national 
interests are in the centre of the negotiations.25 This concept can easily be found for example 
in the composition of the Council of Ministers of the European Union, since it is made up of 
ministers of each EU Member State who represent their own country and national interests.26 
Supranationalism on the other hand, is based on the idea that states do not have complete 
control over the developments that occur during their cooperation with each other and that it 
is therefore possible that nation states may be obliged to do things which are against their 
national prerogatives and their will. In such a system, Member States do not have the power 
to  stop  decisions  and  concludingly  there  is  a  loss  of  national  sovereignty  in  those  kind  of  
assemblies.27 The EU has established also supranationalist institutions, such as the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice28 in which European 
and common interests are in the foreground, whereas national interests reside into the 
background.  
With the major amendments made to the field of competences of the High Representative, 
these two opposing concepts were merged in one single person and exactly this is the reason 
why the post is often referred to be exceptionally difficult29, too demanding30 or extremely 
difficult to execute.31 This merging has also led to a lot of criticism and scepticism about the 
neutrality and loyalty of the coming High Representative, since it was alleged that a balance 
between the intergovernmentalist Council and the supranationalist Commission would be 
extremely difficult to achieve.32 
As a matter of fact, the High Representative is strongly linked to the Council of Ministers and 
the European Council and as a result to the Member States, the latter mirroring the 
intergovernmental dimension of the coin. In addition to this, it is well known that the CFSP is 
                                                             
25 Nugent, The government and politics of the European Union, p. 558. 
26 J. Hunter, Environmental regimes in the European Union: A comparison of effectiveness by regime level, 
(Northern Arizona University, 2008), p. 66. 
27 Nugent, The government and politics of the European Union, p. 558. 
28 Hunter, Environmental regimes in the European Union: A comparison of effectiveness by regime level, p. 66. 
29 Avery, Challenge Europe - The People’s project? The new EU Treaty and the prospects for future integration, 
p.19. 
30 Griller, The Lisbon Treaty: EU constitutionalism without a constitutional treaty?, p. 155. 
31 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty, Third  Report of 
Session 2007-2008, p. 52. 
32 Avery, Challenge Europe - The People’s project? The new EU Treaty and the prospects for future integration, 
p. 22. 
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based on a purely intergovernmentalist nature and therefore criticism deriving from 
supranationalist thinkers was preprogrammed.33 Furthermore, this fear of increased 
intergovernmentalism in the Union’s institutions was reinforced by the decision to upheld the 
unanimity voting procedure as opposed to qualified majority voting in the sphere of CFSP, 
whereas the new ordinary legislative procedure was extensively widened to many fields of the 
EU under the Lisbon Treaty.34 On top of this, it is alleged that the change of title of this office 
from being “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” into the “High Representative of the Union 
for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy”  illustrates  the  fear  of  Member  States  of  losing  
national sovereignty. This change of title in the Lisbon Treaty signifies that the Union is not 
willing to develop in the direction of a superstate that has its own ministers.35 
On  the  contrary,  there  are  also  supporters  of  the  view  that  the  arrival  of  the  new  High  
Representative, who is now granted influential competences within the Commission, will 
diminish intergovernmentalism and further the centralization of EU powers and institutions 
and thus reinforce supranationalism.36 As one can observe, opinions about the impact that this 
new officeholder will have in the distinct EU institutions were diverse - and after about two 
years  still  are,  to  some  extent.  Perhaps  this  explains  why  the  work  of  the  first  High  
Representative under the Lisbon Treaty, Catherine Ashton, was highly scrutinized and opened 
many debates about this new post. 
On the one hand, the fact that such an office was created and is also executed since December 
2009 shows that the two concepts of European integration cannot be fully incompatible, but 
on the other hand, it cannot be denied that it is quite difficult to balance the responsibilities 
and to execute them properly considering the several hats the High Representative holds.37 
The best person who could enlighten the public about the real effectiveness of this post and 
the compatibility of supranational and intergovernmentalist elements in one single mandate is 
without any doubt Catherine Ashton, who will be discussed below in order to exemplify the 
achievements and failures of the first and single person who has executed this post. 
 
5.2 A High Representative on Probation 
 
Baroness Catherine Ashton was appointed by the European Council and with the endorsement 
of the President of the Commission as the first High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy on November 19, 2009.38 Between 1998 and 2001, Ashton was chairing a 
county health authority and in 1999 she became Labour life peer in the House of Lords. 
Moreover, from October 2008 until her appointment as High Representative, she has worked 
as Commissioner for Trade.39 
Ashton, a quite unknown personality, gained a lot of criticism from all over Europe as soon as 
she started executing the role of High Representative. She has been described as a weak and 
incompetent figure, who had little or even no diplomatic experience before being appointed as 
a High Representative. Furthermore, it is argued that this job was too challenging for someone 
who lacks foreign policy experience, political authority and moreover is inable to speak any 
foreign languages fluently.40  
                                                             
33 Griller, The Lisbon Treaty: EU constitutionalism without a constitutional treaty?, p. 155. 
34 Tosiek, The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon – Still an Intergovernmental System, p. 9. 
35 Avery, Challenge Europe - The People’s project? The new EU Treaty and the prospects for future integration, 
p. 17. 
36 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty, Third  Report of 
Session 2007-2008, p. 52. 
37 Wessels, The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty – Constitutional breakthrough or 
challenges ahead?, p. 23. 
38 Koehler, European Foreign Policy After Lisbon: Strengthening the EU as an International Actor,   p. 67. 
39 Telegraph, ‘Profile: Baroness Ashton, EUs new foreign minister’, 20 Nov 2009.  
40 Telegraph, ‘Baroness Ashton  ‘not experienced enough’, government document states’, 19 Jul 2011.  
The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
55 
It is even alleged that Ashton’s appointment by unanimity mirrors the unwillingness of the 
EU  Member  States  to  elect  someone  with  a  strong  personality  and  with  a  greater  authority  
who could dominate the international scene.41 However, it is remarkable that most criticism 
comes from countries that favour a strong and more supranational EU foreign policy, such as 
France and less criticism on Ashton derives from countries that fear loss of their national 
sovereignty, such as the British.42 However, in contrast to these quite harsh critiques, it was 
also hoped that Ashton could perhaps change the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP a 
little in favour of more European interests, since she has worked in the Commission prior to 
her current office.43  
Considering these various opinions about this important new political figure on the 
international scene, one should look at the beginning of her appointment procedure, which 
already raises a few questions. The uncertainty about the impact of this newly created post 
confused many European leaders and led to the experimental election of Mrs Ashton. 
European leaders agreed that the former British Prime-Minister Gordon Brown shall find 
someone appropriate for this post and therefore Brown started looking for some well-known 
candidates.44 As he could not find anyone, José Manuel Barroso suggested the quite unknown 
British lady Catherine Ashton, who had never underwent an election procedure before, but 
with whom he was acquainted.45 She was satisfying all requirements; Ashton had a centre-left 
political affiliation, she was a woman and she was British and would therefore satisfy 
Brown’s wish to have a British top officeholder.46 If one takes into account that the office of 
the High Representative is one of the most influential ones as described in the Lisbon Treaty, 
this election procedure seems to be highly untransparent and undemocratic.  
Ashton’s appointment was thus spreading in the media the message that the Union will not 
appear on the international stage with a strong and influential voice, hence the German media 
even created the word “Selbstverzwergung”, which indicated the Union’s determination to 
remain a dwarf. As a result, this was regarded as a commitment to national sovereignty in the 
field of foreign and security policy and a further intergovernmental dominance by Member 
States in this area.47 
Having considered Ashton’s occupations prior to 2009, the criticism she faced immediately 
after being elected and her dubious appointment procedure, one should examine what she has 
really achieved – or failed to achieve – since holding this post. The first wrong decision was 
made in January 2010, when she preferred to spend the weekend with her family in London 
instead of flying to Haiti where a tremendous earthquake took place.48 The second failure 
followed  in  February,  when  she  did  not  attend  a  meeting  of  defence  ministers  in  Mallorca,  
which also led to criticisms from all sides.49  
In  March  2010,  Ashton  presented  a  proposal  on  her  most  difficult  task,  the  creation  of  the  
European External Action Service (EEAS) and started negotiating with the several EU 
institutions and the Member States for months on it.50 Finally, the EEAS was successfully set 
                                                             
41 Koehler, European Foreign Policy After Lisbon: Strengthening the EU as an International Actor,   p. 67. 
42 Telegraph, ‘Baroness Ashton  ‘not experienced enough’, government document states’, 19 Jul 2011. 
43 Koehler, European Foreign Policy After Lisbon: Strengthening the EU as an International Actor,   p. 67. 
44 Howorth, The ‘new faces’ of Lisbon: assessing the performance of Catherine Ashton and Herman van Rompuy 
on the global stage, p. 8. 
45 Ibid., p. 9. 
46 C. Rüger, From an Assistant to a Manager – The High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy after 
the Treaty of Lisbon, (Dalhousie University, 2010), p. 16. 
47 Ibid., p. 9. 
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on the global stage , p. 18. 
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up and hence it counts as one of her major achievements. Another major task for her was to 
show some leadership in the Middle East, South Asia, Balkans etc., which she did by visiting 
these countries.51 The unexpected uprisings in the Middle East from December 2010 onwards 
created a big disharmony between the Member States, since several European leaders 
proclaimed own statements on this topic and it was impossible for Ashton to make a common 
EU statement, which again led to criticism from all over the world.52  
These were some of the major problems and achievements that Catherine Ashton faced within 
the  first  two  years  of  her  office  and  this  shows  once  again  that  the  post  of  the  High  
Representative bears heavy burdens and too many responsibilities to be exercised by one 
single person. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The analysis above shows that the Lisbon Treaty created a very important post that could be 
highly influential on the international scene in foreign and security policy issues. 
Unfortunately, the numerous tasks and duties of the High Representative might have an 
overwhelming effect which would hinder reaching effectiveness and consistency in this policy 
field. 
The “double-hatted” office soon turned out to be “triple-hatted”, since the High 
Representative needs to cooperate - and to some extent compete - with the President of the 
Commission and the President of the European Council. Vaguely defined competences and 
powers, as well as concurrent duties of these three personalities could easily give rise to 
tensions between them and this would probably cause inefficiency and rivalry in this area and 
concludingly, the bridging function of the High Representative would miss its target. In order 
to prevent this from happening, the “Troika” should work closely together, define more clear 
and precise responsibilities and agree upon the external representation of the EU, which 
theoretically can be executed by all three of them pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty. 
The merging of a supranational and an intergovernmental hat in one person can be regarded as 
a big step forward, since it aims at strengthening the cooperation and weakining the 
antagonism between the Council and the Commission. However, it is also remarkable, that 
many people think that a healthy balance of tendencies to one institution or another and 
neutrality is very difficult to achieve, since the office of the High Representative is biased and 
believed to be more intergovernmental than supranational. 
Considering the achievements of Catherine Ashton on the one hand and the criticisms on the 
execution of her job on the other hand, one can observe that opinions about her role still differ 
extremely and that there is also no consensus about the influence she should have on the 
international scene. Countries that fear loss of national sovereignty, such as Britain, favour a 
more non-influential and non-popular personality as High Representative and are therefore 
rather satisfied with Ashton’s personal weaknesses, whereas countries like France, which 
would like to have a strong and united foreign and security policy, are quite dissappointed of 
Ashton.  
Consequently, one can conclude that the post of the High Representative is supranational in 
nature, but it is not clearly executed as such, since an affinity to the Council is estimated and 
moreover Catherine Ashton is not accepted as the “public face” of the CFSP representing the 
views of all 27 Member States. However, I am convinced that personalities can change a lot 
and this could be the case in 2014. 
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THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE: WILL IT 
CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE CONSISTENT FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
SECURITY POLICY? 
 
Harry Sanders 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
European Foreign Policy has developed rapidly over the last decades and is probably one of 
the fields where the European Union (EU) has most advanced in recent years.1 With the start 
of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970’s, the Union’s foreign policy has 
most  notably  been  enhanced  over  the  Treaty  of  Maastricht  with  the  introduction  of  the  
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and has further developed in the years 
following the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. The EU remained a rather fragmented actor in 
the field of diplomacy, the leverage and influence the EU had was mainly based on its 
considerable influence in trade and development, due to an inconsistent and incoherent 
representation  of  the  Union.  These  shortcomings  became  more  visible  over  time  and  
European leaders were aware of the changing role for the Union in a more globalized world. 
The European Union had therefore to be stronger in its pursuit of realizing their essential 
objectives by means of becoming more present in the world as a political player. With this 
objective in mind the adoption of the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European 
Union took place in the 2001 Council summit. In order to address these fundamental 
institutional problems the Lisbon Treaty merged the posts of the High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy2 and the European Commissioner for External 
Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy and created the position of a High 
Representative  of  the  Union  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy3 (HR), which is 
supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS). The goal of this paper is to 
assess which implications the establishment of the EEAS had and if it is a genuine 
contribution to a more consistent foreign affairs and security policy. In order to do this the 
paper first identifies the core institutional shortcomings with regard to EU external action. 
Secondly, an assessment of the institutional foundations of EU external action after Lisbon is 
made and more in particular the competences of the HR and the organizational structure of the 
EEAS are assessed. Thirdly, the European response to the Libyan crisiswill be analysed and 
evaluated in order to determine if the new institutional structure contributed to a more 
consistent response. 
First a terminological issue should be addressed in order to narrow down what is exactly 
meant by a ‘more consistent foreign policy’ and which indicators we should look at in order 
to assess whether the EEAS contributes to more consistency or not. A number of authors have 
pointed to a terminological problem with coherence, as opposed to consistency.4 The problem 
is worsened by the linguistic complications arising from the use of the word consistency in the 
English version of the treaties, while in other versions such as the French the term coherence 
appears.5 In this paper the definition of consistency suggested by Horst-Günter Krenzler and 
                                                             
1 CAP p. 8. 
2 This post was created with the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
3 Catherine Ashton currently holds this post. 
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Henning C. Schneider will be used: ‘Co-ordinated6, coherent behaviour based on agreement 
among the Union and its member states, where comparable and compatible methods are used 
in pursuit of a single objective and result in an uncontradictory foreign policy’.7 
 
 
2. The Need for Reform in European External Action 
 
Coherence has a long history8 in EU external relations, with the Laeken Declaration the issue 
got specifically addressed which eventually led to the Convention on the Future of Europe 
and what became the Treaty of Lisbon. The working group assessed three variants of 
coherence that had to be improved. First, the coherence of EU’s external actions with regard 
to the strategic aims and objectives pursued.9 Second, the coherence and efficiency between 
the institutions and its actors has to be improved.10And third, the coherence and efficiency at 
the level of services needs to be addressed. These three forms of coherence are relevant for 
the research in this paper to assess whether the EEAS has improved these or not. 
 
2.1 Institutional Shortcomings of EU External Action Pre-Lisbon 
 
The institutional shortcomings can be dived into two categories.11 On the one hand, they 
relate to weak internal structures and on the other hand to a diffuse external representation.  
 
2.1.1 Weak Internal Structures 
 
Problems with regard to weak internal structures include a struggle with consistency, as the 
Commission takes the lead in Community matters and the Council and its Secretariat do so in 
CFSP matters12 this can result to a so called ‘rival partnership’, which is most likely to happen 
in areas of overlapping competence. This in advance will cause inconsistencies between 
policies pursued by the Council and the Commission. This is a problem of ‘inter-institutional 
inconsistency’, but ‘horizontal inconsistencies’ between different policies are likely to emerge 
as well, since the policies might be dealt with by the same institution but follow different 
objectives.13Even if inconsistency between policies is avoided, the split of foreign policy 
resources between the different pillars works in favour of the Commission.14 This simply 
                                                             
6 Koutrakos suggests that the term cooperation should be preferred instead of co-ordinated, the latter merely 
refers to the process by which ‘a coherent policy outcome is attained and the term cooperation appears in the 
treaties’ such as in Article 32 and 35 TEU with regard to the implementation of common positions in third 
countries. See P. Koutrakos, European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives, p. 18-19. 
7 Krenzler, H.-G and Scheinder, H.C., ‚The question of Consistency’,  in E. Regelsbergers, P. de Schoutheete de 
Tervarent and W. Wessels (e.d), Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond 
(Lynne Rienners, 1997), p. 134. 
8 Its origins can be traced back to the EPC in the 1970’s since the idea of the EPC was to ‘pave the way for a 
coherent role for Europe in the world’. With the Single European Act coherence was giving a more explicit role 
with the encouragement that ‘the external policies of the European Communities and the policies adopted by the 
EPC must be more consistent’. After that the Maastricht Treaty elaborated on the idea to introduce a ‘single 
institutional framework’, and with the Amsterdam treaty the High Representative was introduced. For a brief 
historical overview in this regard see Duke 2011/1, p. 2-5. 
9 This should be measured by the result coming from objectives pursued and the aim of certain actions. 
10 Relating to horizontal- and inter-institutional coherence. 
11 Paul, ‘EU foreign Policy after Lisbon: Will the new High Representative and the External Action Service 
make a difference?’ 2 C.A.P. Policy Analysis: Research group on European Affairs (2008), p. 7-12. 
12 This remains an exclusive Council competence: Article 24 TEU. 
13 Paul,  2 C.A.P. Policy Analysis: Research group on European Affairs (2008), p. 9. 
14 The Commission has around 2260 staff in charge of external action in Brussels and 4755 personnel and 123 
delegations abroad. This in contrast with the Council’s Secretariat which has no more than 390 staff members 
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because the Council’s Secretariat lacks most of the resources which are at the disposal of the 
Commission, they will eventually lead to inconsistency while implementing foreign policy or 
negotiating agreements with third countries. Additionally, weak decision making procedures 
obstruct a stronger role of the EU in foreign affairs especially in the field of CFSP since this is 
solely up to the Council to decide by unanimity.15 Another problem in this regard is the 
exclusion  of  decisions  made  in  CFSP from jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  EU16. 
The issues identified above will as a result cause a lack of leadership, there is no factor which 
stimulates overall strategic thinking and steer EU foreign policy in a proactive and coherent 
way. 
 
2.1.2 Diffuse Representation 
 
With a rotating Council presidency the face and voice of Europe in CFSP matters changes 
every  6  months,  even  though  the  High  Representative  stays  at  its  post  he  is  only  tasked  to  
assist the presidency, so the creation of this office has not solved the issue of the Union 
lacking stable external representation but rather made it less discontinuing17. This also 
influences representation on the ‘ground’, since it is the embassies and missions of Member 
States that are charged with representing the EU in third countries or at international 
organizations in CFSP matters. The situation worsens if the Member State who holds the 
Council’s Presidency does not have representation in a particular third country, then another 
Member State’s representation takes over which leads to an even more diffuse representation, 
even coordination through three different organs has its limits and will therefore contribute to 
a consistent lack of continuity in representation. Furthermore, due to an overabundance of 
actors18 who are supposed to represent the Union in external representation it might not be 
always  clear  for  partner  countries  who  to  address.  At  top  level  the  Union’s  interests  are  
represented by the President of the Commission or in case of CFSP matters, he will act along 
with the head of state or government of the Member State who holds the Council’s 
presidency. On ministerial level the Union acts through the Commissioner for External Action 
and it’s the foreign minister of the presidency along with the High Representative in case of 
CFSP matters. When dealing with areas with an overlapping competence the situation is even 
worse, it’s either the Commission or the Council and its High Representative who can 
represent the Union in third countries.19 Another option is a representation in form of the 
Troika, this is usually done when it comes to comprehensive political talks or issues. There is 
no  legal  regulation,  with  regard  to  situations  with  an  overlapping  competence,  on  how  and  
when the different actors should act.20 The different actors who are charged with external 
representation  differ  significantly  in  their  capacity  to  represent  on  the  ground,  it’s  only  the  
Commission who is internationally and permanently represented in third countries. Thus, all 
of these problems are to be considered as ‘vertical inconsistency’. This leads us to the third 
problem, since it is mainly the Commission who takes care of EU external representation in 
third countries and most of their staff are no trained diplomats21, EU external representation 
has a serious lack of diplomatic professionalism. Thus, weak internal structures and a diffuse 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
working on international affairs. In practise, even in the field of CFSP, it is the Commission which put at least 
parts of CFSP decisions into effect. See Paul 2008, p. 9.  
15 Article 24(1) TEU. 
16 Article 275 TFEU. 
17 Paul, 2 C.A.P. Policy Analysis: Research group on European Affairs (2008), p. 10. 
18 Paul, 2 C.A.P. Policy Analysis: Research group on European Affairs (2008), p.11. 
19 Ibid. 
20 This derives from Council decision 11665/1/10 REV 1 on implementing the organization and functioning of 
the EEAS, where in Article 3(2) is stated that ‘The EEAS and the services of the Commission shall consult each 
other on all matters relating to the external action of the Union in the exercise of their respective functions’.    
21 Paul, 2 C.A.P. Policy Analysis: Research group on European Affairs (2008), p. 12. 
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representation will cause horizontal, inter-institutional and vertical inconsistency in EU 
external action. Also, due to weak decision making procedures, a lack of continuity in 
representation, diplomatic professionalism and an overabundance of actors representing the 
Union in third countries or international organizations, the authority, visibility and the status 
of the EU as an important political player is undermined. 
 
2.2 EU External Representation and Key Initiatives from the Lisbon Treaty 
 
To begin with the fundamental legal architecture, the new treaty has abolished the pillar 
structure and provided the Union with a single and express legal personality22, this will 
remove the remaining doubt about the capacity of the Union to act under international law and 
if it should be represented in international bodies. By abandoning the pillar structure, 
Community external action and CFSP will come closer together; namely by merging Treaty 
provisions23 and establishing Union delegations.24 With regard to the latter the Commission 
delegations will be transformed into Union delegations and they are to be put under authority 
of the HR25, this will represent the Union as a whole instead of just the Commission. 
Also, the rotating presidency of the Council has been abandoned and a permanent presidency 
has been put in place, he shall be tasked with the representation of the Union in CFSP on his 
level26 without prejudge to the powers of the HR.27 
 
2.3 Consistency and EU External Action 
 
A fair starting point regarding consistency to EU external action would be to look at the 
Treaties, Article 21(3) Treaty on European Union (TEU) says that: ‘The Union shall ensure 
consistency between different areas of its external action and between these and its other 
policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to 
that effect’. Article 7 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states 
that:  ‘The Union shall  ensure consistency between its  politics and activities,  taking all  of its  
objectives into account and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers’. The 
principle of conferral of powers indicates that this obligation also stretches out to inter-
institutional consistency. The use of ‘shall’ implies that ‘consistency’ is an obligation. Thus, 
the treaties establish a clear obligation regarding ‘horizontal consistency’ and ‘inter-
institutional consistency’ in EU external action but also extends this to ‘vertical 
consistency’28, by stating in Article 4(3) TEU that: ‘The Member States shall take any 
appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out 
of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union’.  
 
 
 
                                                             
22 Article 47 TEU. 
23 The Lisbon Treaty merges all general treaty provisions on external action into one title namely Title V TEU. 
Henceforth, all external action, be it CFSP, trade or development shall be governed by the same general 
principles and objectives. See Paul 2008, p.13. 
24 Paul, 2 C.A.P. Policy Analysis: Research group on European Affairs (2008), p. 13. 
25 Article 221(2) TFEU. 
26 He is tasked to represent the Union on the level of heads of state or government, but not at ministerial level. 
See Article 15(5) TEU. 
27 Article 15(6) TEU. 
28 Duke, ‘A difficult birth: the early days of the European External Action Service’ in P. Koutrakos (ed.), The 
European Union’s external relations a year after Lisbon, (Centre for the Law of EU External Relations, 2011), 
p. 70. 
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2.4 The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
 
The HR is entrusted a substantial amount of tasks which will put an end to the current 
situation of ‘split of responsibilities and resources’, this might well be the basis for a strong 
and influential policy tycoon who also tackles the problem of ‘weak leadership’ of the Union 
in external action. The HR will have the general responsibility to ‘ensure the consistency of 
the Union’s external action’29 and  shall  in  this  regard  be  assisted  by  the  EEAS,  this  has  to  
include both ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ consistency since the EEAS “shall work in 
cooperation  with  the  diplomatic  services  of  the  Member  States  and  shall  comprise  officials  
from relevant departs of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well 
as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of Member States”.30 The HR basically 
wears ‘three hats’31: 
 
- As the President of the Foreign Affairs Council32 (FAC),  she  performs  the  functions  
attributed to the Presidency of the Council. She can take the initiative in EU foreign 
policy and shape the Union’s agenda in international affairs by preparing the Council 
meetings33 which  means  that  she  also  chairs  joint  Councils  with  third  States.  With  
regard to CFSP she will share the right of initiative with any Member State.34 
- As Vice-President of the Commission (VP) the HR performs functions of the External 
Affairs Commissioner35, and is therefore within the Commission accountable for 
responsibilities on external relations and coordinating other aspects of external action. 
Even though in non-CFSP matters, the Commission will still have an exclusive right to 
initiative36, the HR shall contribute to consistency. 
- As  HR  she  conducts  the  CFSP  and  CSDP  policy  in  accordance  with  Article  18(2),  
27(1), 30(1) and 42(4) TEU.  
 
Due to the triple headed function the HR can assure greater coherence both horizontal; by 
chairing the FAC and acting as the VP of the Commission which will shall also influence 
inter-institutional coherence and vertical, by conducting the CFSP and CSDP.37 
 
2.5 The European External Action Service 
 
In all these areas she is assisted by the EEAS, the organization and functioning is according to 
Article 27(3) TEU worked out in a Council Decision.38 The Decision sets a broad mandate for 
the EEAS, it shall assist the President of the European Council, the President of the 
Commission and the Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of 
external relations.39 The Council Decision emphasizes the ‘triple hatted’ role of the HR and 
                                                             
29 Article 18(4) TEU. 
30 Article 27(3) TEU. 
31 Bono, ‘The organization of the external relations of the European Union in the Treaty of Lisbon’, in P. 
Koutrakos (ed.), The European Union’s external relations a year after Lisbon,  (Centre  for  the  Law  of  EU  
External Relations, 2011),  p. 22-23.  
32 Article 18(3) TEU. 
33 She won’t be a member of the Council, see Article 15(2) TEU. 
34 Paul, 2 C.A.P. Policy Analysis: Research group on European Affairs (2008), p. 17. 
35 Article 18(4) TEU.  
36 Article 17(2) TEU. 
37 This is the policy field with special rules and wherein Member States are usually not too keen on letting the 
Union act, as we shall see with the assessment of the EU’s response to the Libyan crisis.   
38 Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organization and functioning of the European 
External Action Service, OJ 2010 L 201/30. 
39 Article 2(2) of Council Decision 2010/427. 
Harry Sanders 
62 
the supportive function of the EEAS in this regard40, which from a coherence perspective is 
desirable to limit inter-institutional and horizontal inconsistency. The EEAS operates as a 
functionally autonomous body41 and drawing on the triple headed function of the HR it is thus 
situated  amidst  the  Commission  and  the  Council.  In  order  to  facilitate  coordination  and  
consistency, the EEAS and the Commission shall consult each other on all matters relating to 
external action of the Union and the EEAS shall take part in the preparatory work and 
procedures relating to acts to be prepared by the Commission.42 Since in non-CFSP the right 
on initiative lies solely with the Commission it can be the EEAS who can contribute to 
consistency and has an indirect influence on the substance of the proposals. Furthermore shall 
the EEAS extend appropriate support and coordination to the other institutions and bodies of 
the Union43, in particular to the European Parliament. Most of the preparatory bodies of the 
FAC are therefore chaired by a representative of the HR coming from the EEAS, this gives 
the EEAS a great role in the field of policy making, and for example they prepare decisions 
submitted for Commission approval such as country allocations of financial aid or country 
and strategic papers.44 
 
2.6 Organizational Structure and the Efficiency of the European External Action Service 
 
In day-to-day terms efficiency within the EEAS is ensured by the Corporate Board, which 
includes the HR the Executive Secretary-General, the Chief Operating Officer and two 
Deputy Secretaries-General. They are responsible for the smooth functioning of the EEAS as 
a  whole.  The  Policy  Board  will  ensure  general  coherence  and  make  sure  ‘that  multi-lateral  
issues are reflected in the geographical and regional concerns and vice versa’.45 The 
Corporate  Board  gives  guidance  to  the  Policy  Board,  this  is  the  task  of  one  of  the  Deputy  
Secretary General. Institutionally speaking the Policy Board is likely to become ‘the essential 
bridge between the EEAS and the FAC and the General Affairs Council and the Council 
Secretariat and, at senior level, with the relevant Commission Directorates-General via the 
other Deputy Secretary-General’.46 The creation of unified Union delegations abroad, and 
abandoning the separate Council and Commission representation in third countries will lead 
to an optimal deployment of resources and avoid a split of resources wasted on the ground.47 
Staff for these delegations abroad will come from several offices that previously served under 
the Council or the Commission. The staff from the Policy Unit ´CSDP and crisis management 
structure´ of the General Secretariat of the Council is merged into the EEAS, as well as the 
Directorate/General E.  From the Commission the Directorate-general for External Relations 
(DG RELEX), the External Service and the Directorate-General for Development (DG DEV) 
are merged into the EEAS. In total this will be a transfer of 3645 staff members (1611 in 
headquarters and 2034 in delegations)48, most of the staff will come from DG RELEX which 
for the most part were serving in geographical desks as well as in the External Service. 
 
                                                             
40 Preamble paragraph 3 of Council Decision 2010/427. 
41 Paasivirta, ‘The EU’s external representation after Lisbon: New rules, a new era?’ in P. Koutrakos (ed.), The 
European Union’s external relations a year after Lisbon, (Centre for the Law of EU External Relations, 2011), 
p. 43. 
42 Article 3(2) of Council Decision 2010/427. 
43 Article 3(4) of Council Decision 2010/427. 
44 Paasivirta in P. Koutrakos (ed.), The European Union’s external relations a year after Lisbon, p. 43. 
45 Duke, in P. Koutrakos (ed.), The European Union’s external relations a year after Lisbon, p. 77. 
46 Duke, in P. Koutrakos (ed.), The European Union’s external relations a year after Lisbon, p. 77; for a full 
overview of the organizational structure see Annex I attached to this paper. 
47 Smyth, ‘EU external action after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty: Coherence at last?’ in P. Koutrakos 
(ed.), The European Union’s external relations a year after Lisbon, (Centre for the Law of EU External 
Relations, 2011), p. 64. 
48 Duke, in P. Koutrakos (ed.), The European Union’s external relations a year after Lisbon, p. 78. 
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3. A Practical Survey: Europe’s Response to the Libya Crisis 
 
The response to the Libya crisis was a first test for the HR and its EEAS since it was the first 
major  issue  with  regard  to  crisis  management  of  EU  after  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  The  EU  
possesses a lot of crisis management instruments including diplomatic measures, 
humanitarian aid and civil protection, military and civilian operations and migration- and 
trade-related activities.49 In response to the Libya crisis a lot of these instruments have been 
deployed in order to react to the events unfolding in Libya from February 2011 onwards. As 
we have identified and distinguished between three types of consistency we will assess the 
coherence of EU crisis management to the Libya crisis along these lines. 
 
3.1 The Deployment and Coherence of EU Crisis Management Instruments 
 
The first response came on February the 20th from the HR she issued a declaration expressing 
that the EU was ‘extremely concerned by the events unfolding in Libya’50, the declaration 
urged the Libyan government to refrain from violence against its civilians. On March the 11th, 
during an extraordinary European Council meeting the Heads of State declared that Gaddafi 
has  lost  all  legitimacy  and  urged  him  to  step  down.  Furthermore,  they  welcomed  and  
recognised the TNC, while not as the sole representative of Libya, as ‘a political 
interlocutor’.51 On May the 22nd, Ashton opened a liaison office in Benghazi for support of 
the civilian population and helps the TNC with security reform, the economy, health and 
education issues. The Commission reacted to the Libya Crisis with two of its emergency 
instruments; the civil protection mechanism and with humanitarian assistance.52 With regard 
to  the  former,  it  was  activated  on  February  the  23rd to facilitate Member States consular 
operations and evacuate roughly 5800 EU citizens. On May the 30th, the Commission and 
Member States had provided over €144,8 million for humanitarian aid and civil protection.53 
The enormous influx of refugees from North Africa had activated Frontex Joint Operation 
Hermes 2011 protection mechanism on February the 20th to assist Southern European 
Member States in coping with these migration flows.54 Also, the EU implemented sanctions 
imposed by UNSC resolutions 197055 and 197356 on 2157, 2358 and 2559 March and on April 
12.60 All in all, several crisis management measures have been deployed over time.       
 
 
 
 
                                                             
49 Koenig, ‘The EU and the Libyan Crisis: In Quest of Coherence?’, 1119 Instituto Affari Internazionali (2011), 
p. 4. 
50 Council on the European Union, Declaration by the High Representative, on behalf of the European Union on 
events in Libya (6795/1/11 Presse 33), Brussels 20 February 2011.  
51 Council on the European Union, Declaration of the Extraordinary European Council, 11 March 2011 (EUCO 
7/1/11 REV 1), Brussels, 20 April 2011. 
52 Koenig, 1119 Instituto Affari Internazionali (2011), p. 4. 
53 European Commission – ECHO, Libyan Crisis, Factsheet, 21 June 2011. Available on  
http://ec.europe.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/libya_factsheet.pdf 
54 Frontex, ‘Hermes 2011 running’, in News Releases, 22 February 2011. Available on 
http://www.frontex.europe.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art96.html 
55 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, S/RES/1970 (2011) adopted on 26 February 2011. 
56 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, S/RES/1973 (2011) adopted on 17 March 2011. 
57 See Council Implementing Regulation No 272/2011, [2011] OJ 2011 L 76/54. 
58 Council Implementing Regulation No 288/2011, [2011] OJ 2011 L 78/54. 
59 Council Implementing Regulation No 296/2011, [2011] OJ 2011 L 80/54. 
60 Council Implementing Regulation No 360/2011, [2011] OJ 2011 L 100/54. 
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3.2 Horizontal Coherence 
 
The goals pursued through the different mechanism of crisis management do not seem to 
contradict each other: diplomatic measures aim for peaceful conflict resolution this combined 
with humanitarian aid and restrictive measures were all intended to deprive Gaddafi’s regime 
of means of repression, the activation of Frontex was there to secure mainly the Italian and 
Maltese  borders  from  an  enormous  influx  of  migrants.  Only  the  latter  is  open  to  criticism  
since failing to rescue refugees from Libya could be seen as a Human Rights abuse which is 
in contradiction of the general aims of the Treaties. But all in all, there was great horizontal 
coherence. 
 
3.3 Inter-institutional Coherence 
 
The HR and the EEAS were the most notable institutional innovations brought about by the 
Lisbon Treaty and were meant to enhance the EU’s ability to speak with one voice and tackle 
the issues of diffuse representation and to ensure coherence and consistent EU’s external 
action.  With  regard  to  the  first  statement  made  by  the  HR  on  February  the  20th similar 
statements were made by other EU institutions.61 Even though these statements were similar 
and  generally  consistent  with  each  other  it  still  undermines  the  authority  of  the  HR  as  the  
spokesperson for EU external affairs. This is worsened when the President of the Council and 
the HR issued completely divergent statements on the goal of the military intervention in 
Libya.62 Thus, this has led to a huge inter-institutional inconsistency. With regard to the 
EEAS and its role in strategic guidance and coordination, the organization has barely been 
visible since most of the former DG RELEX staff still acts in a ‘Commission-spirit’ and 
EEAS officials have raised complaints about the bureaucratization of the exchange of 
information.63 Senior  diplomats  described  the  role  of  the  Policy  Board  consisting  of  former  
DG RELEX staff merely as ‘an extra-layer between the Commission and the EEAS’.64 Thus, 
the cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission has been far from smooth and is has 
already raised criticism from the European Parliament. This all leads us to the conclusion that 
inter-institutional consistency has not increased and perhaps even decreased, since before 
Lisbon there were no real obligations on the Union with regard to consistency. 
 
3.4 Vertical Coherence 
 
This is perhaps the field of coherence which is far from perfect. Notably on the same day the 
HR issued the first declaration on behalf of the Union Berlusconi told the press that ‘he had 
not called Gaddafi because he did not want to disturb him’.65 The statement was clearly not 
even close to be consistent with the agreed diplomatic statement in the Council. Also with the 
‘recognition’ of the TNC as a ‘political interlocutor’ different statements came out. Before the 
meeting of the Council on the 11th of March, the French government for instance recognised 
the TNC as the sole legitimate representative of the Libyan people66 and announced the 
exchange of ambassadors, which was clearly inconsistent with the statement issued by the 
Union. It appears that the Member States act in a way which is in their own national interest 
instead of sticking to the agreed statement in the Council. This will result in a lack of ‘respect’ 
                                                             
61 Koenig, 1119 Instituto Affari Internazionali (2011), p. 8. 
62 Koenig, 1119 Instituto Affari Internazionali (2011), p. 8 
63 Koenig, 1119 Instituto Affari Internazionali (2011), p. 9. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Deepa Babington, “Berlusconi under fire for not ‘disturbing’ Ghaddafi”, in Reuters, 20 February 2011,  
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/02/20/uk-italy-libya-berlusconi-idUKTRE71J2CI20110220. 
66 Koenig, 1119 Instituto Affari Internazionali (2011), p. 10. 
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for the HR and her authority. Most notably was the vertical inconsistency with regard to the 
military intervention, Germany broke ranks with the Union and its NATO partners by 
abstaining to vote on the UNSC resolution 197367. All in all, vertical coherence seems far 
from present in the Libyan response and there is a clear lack of ‘respect’ for the authority of 
the HR from several Member States of the EU. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The  European  Union  and  the  EEAS  clearly  failed  in  practice  to  contribute  to  more  
consistency with regard to EU external action. The attempt to address the need for reform 
with the major institutional changes introduced in the Lisbon Treaty have not lead to the EU 
being more coherent, visible and effective. The struggle with consistency still remains in 
particular in the field of vertical consistency, since there is an apparent lack of ‘respect’ for 
joint statements on EU foreign policy and Member States rather try to pursue their national 
interests. A clear lack of leadership by the HR is therefore a direct consequence of this lack of 
respect by Member States.  The Institutional framework is there to serve and contribute to a 
more consistent EU foreign policy, especially the role of the EEAS in this regard will be of 
great importance since the Union now enjoys one institution which is responsible for 
representation abroad. The diffuse representation which existed before Lisbon has been 
abandoned, as well as the lack of continent representation on state and government level. 
Even though the innovative institutional changes introduced by Lisbon have a high potential 
for the EU becoming an important player on the global political stage it seems that much will 
depend on the Member States’ future political will.  
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THE ECONOMIC CRISES AND THE NEED TO AMEND THE TREATY  
 
Armin Lambertz 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Amending the Treaties of the European Union can be an exhausting undertaking. Many 
tedious steps need to be taken until a final conclusion is eventually reached. It is all the more 
surprising with what virtually incredible pace European leaders are currently heading towards 
exactly this direction – incredible pace at least in comparison to the speed Brussels usually 
displays when it comes tofar-reaching decision-making in serious matters. This ‘pulling 
oneself  together’  is  owed  to  the  turmoil  caused  by  the  economic  and  sovereign  debt  crisis  
which is far from being solved. Having departed from Greece, still constituting the biggest 
problem child, formerly deemed stable states such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain have been 
affected (or infected) nevertheless, bringing the Monetary Union as a whole under 
considerable pressure.1 
And yet, a long-term solution to prevent economic mayhem and perhaps even the utter ruin of 
the Euro as shared currency has still not been put in place by the Member States. The already 
existing European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) - both set up last year - have been proven insufficient in this regard.2 
The latest attempt to antagonise the crisis has been the adoption of a Treaty amendment by 
means  of  the  ‘simplified  revision  procedure’  to  Article  136  TFEU  which  aims  to  allow  for  
thecoming into operation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).3 Whilst the ESM itself 
is governed by an independent agreement between the euro Member States, subject to the 
rules of International law, it will be demonstrated that EU institutions are going to be involved 
in sensitive fiscal policy fields under this mechanism, nonetheless. In this context, the paper at 
hand especially seeks to analyse whether the envisaged introduction of collective action 
clauses (CACs) under the ESM in national government bonds via EU legislation will bring 
about an increase in Union competences, which would render the use of the simplified 
revision procedure illegal; for this procedure must not be applied should the Treaty 
amendment result in an alteration of EU powers. 
As regards the structure of this paper, I will start out by explaining the different amendment 
procedures provided for in the Treaty of the European Union (Section 2), followed by an 
outline of what the ESM entails and how the European Council has attempted to incorporate it 
in the legal order of the Union (Section 3).Thereafter, I will turn to a thorough legal 
assessment on the validity of the amendment at hand by scrutinising in particular the question 
of whether the amendment adopted, and the procedure applied to this end, fulfil the aspiration 
to neatly integrate the ESM into Union law(Section 4). In my conclusion (Section 5), I will 
state why I am reluctant to accept the legality of the adopted amendment but alsowhy a final 
analysis of the legal issue at hand proves to be difficult at the moment due to insufficient 
information on the eventual shape of the contested collective action clauses. 
 
 
                                                             
1 M.Hallerberg, ‘Fiscal federalism reforms in the European Union and the Greek crisis’, 12 European Union 
Politics 1 (2010), p. 128. 
2 V. Miller, Amending the EU Treaty: the European Stability Mechanism [Working Paper], House of Commons 
(Standard Note: SN/IA/5812) (2010), p. 2. 
3 EuropeanCouncil (24-15 March 2011) Conclusion; EUCO 10/1/11. [Retrieved via 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/120296.pdf, last visited 5th December 
2011]. 
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2. The Procedures of Treaty Amendments 
 
The entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 brought about changes regarding the 
manner in which Treaty Articles may be amended. Whilst prior to its adoption only one 
procedure was more or lessavailable coming close to what is now the ‘ordinary revision 
procedure’, Article 48 TEU now also provides for two additional ‘simplified’ procedures,4 
being the ‘simplified revision procedure’ as well as the passerelle clause.  The  name  of  the  
‘ordinary revision procedure’ is somehow misleading, for it is unlikely to be the most 
commonly used procedure.Rather, this is the procedure to be taken when the requirements for 
the other procedures are not met.5 
It requires a proposal to be presented to the Council which, thereupon, submits it to the 
European Council while notifying National Parliaments thereof.6 After  consulting  the  
Commission and the European Parliament as well as the ECB, provided the proposal affects 
monetary policies, the European Council votes on the proposal. Should it receive a simple 
majority, a Convention is convened during which, besides the heads of the national 
governments, delegations from Commission, national parliaments and the European 
Parliament examine the proposal with the aim to finally adopt a recommendation.7 
Alternatively, the European Council may decide not to convene such a Convention when it 
deems this unnecessary. In this case the European Council itself determines the terms of the 
recommendation. Such a decision can, however, not be taken without having consulted the 
European Parliament first.8 The  terms  of  the  recommendation  define  the  mandate  based  on  
which a following intergovernmental conference (IGC), comprising of representatives of the 
national governments, may agree upon the final version of the amendment to the Treaty.9 
Thereafter, the adopted proposal is submitted to the Member States which need to ratify it 
according to national constitutional requirements.10 
The two available ‘simplified’ procedures are distinct in the purpose they serve. Whilst as 
regards the question of who may propose amendments they do not differ from the ‘ordinary 
revision procedure’, the passerelle clause, contained in Article 48(7) TEU, merely provides 
for  the  possibility  to  alter  the  voting  procedure  from  unanimous  to  QMV  or  a  legislative  
procedure from special to the ordinary legislative procedure in a certain clause and is thus 
very  restricted  in  application.  There  is  neither  a  need  for  a  convention  nor  an  IGC;  an  
unanimous vote by the European Council, after having received the consent of the European 
Parliament, suffices. National Parliaments are only involved insofar as they may oppose to the 
adoption but they do not have to expressly ratify it. 
The ‘simplified revision procedure’ provided for in Article 48(6) TEU, on the other hand, is 
concerned with amendments to Part Three of the TFEU which do not result in an increase in 
Union competences. As with the passerelle clause, a convention and an IGC are dispensable. 
Since the European Council takes decision by unanimity also under this head, each Member 
State is vested with a de fact veto right. An additional hurdle to overcome is that, like for the 
‘ordinary legislative procedure’, ratification in the Member States is required in accordance 
                                                             
4 Note: there is another procedure applying to accession treaties (Art. 49 TEU); but since this is not of relevance 
for the topic of this paper, this procedure is not included. 
5 B. de Witte, The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation of a Financial Stability Mechanism [Working 
Paper], Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (2011)[Retrieved via 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/18338, last visited 1st December 2011], p. 3. 
6 Art. 48(2) TEU. 
7 Art. 48(3) TEU. 
8 Art. 48(3) TEU. 
9 P. Broin, How to Change the EU Treaties – An Overview of Revision Procedures under the Treaty of Lisbon, 
[Working Paper] Centre For European Policy Studies (2010) [Retrieved via http://www.ceps.be/book/how-
change-eu-treaties-overview-revision-procedures-under-lisbon-treaty, last visited 1st December 2011], p. 3. 
10 Art. 48(4) TEU. 
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with their domestic procedures. It will be seen below in how far this could constitute a 
challenging impediment for the ESM in some countries. 
 
 
3. The Establishment and the Purpose of the ESM 
 
Before examining the manner by which the European Stability Mechanism is going to be 
incorporated in the EU legal order, a brief overview of what this mechanism entails and how 
it has been adopted shall be given. 
Endorsing the Declaration pronounced by President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel at 
Deauvillecalling upon the Member States to considerTreaty changes so as to allow for the 
establishment of promising crisis mechanism,11 the European Council agreed to take precise 
steps towards this direction at the end of October 2010.12 The states remarkably expressed 
their preference to establish such a mechanism not by the European Union itself, but as an 
EU-independent Treaty amongst them governed by International law. This decision was made 
for good reasons as it allowed the Member States to allegedly use the simplified revision 
procedure under Article 48(6) TEU. It was argued that the amendment, constituting a form of 
enhanced cooperation, merely affects the ‘internal policy’ part of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, which is contained in Part Three, and does not entail an 
increase in power or competences of the European Union. All requirements of the ‘simplified 
revision procedure’ were, therefore, deemed fulfilled.13It will be seen below that my opinion 
differs on this point. Not even a month later, the European Council agreed on a draft text 
aiming to add a third clause to Article 136 TFEU. Upon adoption, Article 135(3) subsequently 
reads: 
 
“The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be 
activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting 
of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict 
conditionality.”14 
 
The amendment was finally adopted at a third meeting in March 2011. When entering into 
force in summer 2013, the ESM will replace the temporary European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and absorb the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM).15 In 
essence, the mechanism with its seat in Luxembourg comprises of a pool of financial aid with 
a capital stock of initially seven hundred billion euro,16that can be made available to Member 
States undergoing severe financial troubles under the condition to declare themselves subject 
to tight austerity measures.17 The last step which had still to be taken was the official signing 
of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, which eventually occurred in 
July 2011.18 
                                                             
11 Franco-German Declaration: Statement for the France-Germany-Russia Summit, Deauville, 18 October 2010. 
[Retrieved via http://www.elysee.fr/president/root/bank_objects/Franco-german_declaration.pdf, last visited 5th 
December 2011]. 
12 European Council (23 October 2010) Conclusion; EUCO 52/11. [Retrieved via 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/125496.pdf, last visited 5th December 
2011]. 
13 De Witte, [Working Paper], Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (2011), p. 7. 
14 European Council (24-15 March 2011) Conclusion. 
15 Miller, [Working Paper], House of Commons (Standard Note: SN/IA/5812) (2010), p. 2. 
16 Art. 8(1) Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism. 
17 J. B. Gott; ‘Addressing the Debt Crisis in the European Union: The Validitiy of Mandatory Collective Action 
Clauses and Extended Maturities’. 12 Chicago Journal of International Law 1 (2011), p. 206. 
18 See link: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/financial_operations/2011-07-11-esm-treaty_en.htm. 
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What is thus worth reiterating is the fact that the ESM will not be governed by Union law, but 
is  instead  subject  to  general  rules  of  International  law  and  is  thus  exempted  from  any  
constraints EU law would normally impose upon such a mechanism.19Moreover, this 
amendment will diminish the vigour of the no-bailout rule contained in Article 125;a 
provision that has hitherto prohibited the possibilityto provide direct financial support from 
one Member State to another (though this was done in the past nonetheless).20 
 
 
4. Legal Assessment of the Treaty Change 
 
After having presented a short overview of the ESM, we may now turn to the essential 
questions of (i) why a Treaty amendment for the ESM was needed in the first place and (ii) 
whether the mechanism will be based on solid legal ground after such amendment. To this 
end, recourse has to be made to the two mechanisms already in existence - namely the EFSF 
and the EFSM - and the legal issues they have been subject to. 
 
4.1 Need for Treaty Amendment 
 
Being adopted in May 2010, both instruments (EFSF and EFSM) are considered to be based 
on  rather  thin  ice  from  a  legal  perspective.  Since  the  mechanisms  basically  provide  for  the  
possibility of giving loans to troubled states under strict conditions, it is not entirely clear 
whether such measures are not at odds with the ‘no-bailout clause’ of Article 125(1)  
TFEU.21 This clause excludes liability of the Union or a Member State for debts of another 
Member State, and has been frequently referred to by Angela Merkel in the course of the 
crisis prior to the Declaration in Deauville, echoing the general fear in the German population 
that the EU has been drifting towards a transfer union.22 
The second issue concerned the Article on which the EFSM was based - Article 122(2) 
TFEU. It reads that the Council may grant financial aid to Member States in severe 
difficulties where these difficulties were caused by circumstances which are beyond the 
Member States’ control. It can, however, quite easily be argued that the governments of 
Greece and Ireland, both having received money under the mechanisms, at least partially 
contributed to the excessive debts due to which their respective countries are currently 
struggling.23 
The German constitutional court, well-known for its rigid advocacy of democratic principles 
in such issues, is at the moment confronted with two pending cases - one regarding the ESFS, 
the other regarding the EFSM - whose outcome is balanced on a knife’s edge.2425They are in 
essence concerned with the violation of the no-bailout rule as well as the allegedly wrong 
decision to base the EFSM on Article 122 TFEU, on the one hand, and the fact that the 
German Parliament had not been given any say in dispensing financial aid to Greece which 
                                                             
19 De Witte, [Working Paper], Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (2011), p. 8. 
20Managing the Euro Crisis – Are Changes to the EU Treaty Necessary?,[Report]Mayer Brown (2011) 
[Retrieved via http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=11753&nid=6, last visited 1st 
December], p. 1. 
21De Witte, [Working Paper], Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (2011), p.. 
22 G. Barrett, First Amendment? The Treaty Change to Facilitate the European Stability Mechanism, [Working 
Paper] The Institute of International and European Affairs (2011) [Retrieved via 
http://www.iiea.com/publications/first-amendment---the-treaty-change-to-facilitate-the-european-stability-
mechanism, last visited 1st December 2011], p. 4. 
23 Ibid, p. 6. 
24 See e.g. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Richter verhandeln über Milliarden für Griechenland, 5thJuly 2011.  
25 See e.g. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Karlsruhe zweifelt an Neuner-Gremium,29th November 2011. 
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was seen as leading to an erosion of basic parliamentary powers, on the other hand.26For an 
interim measure, the court has decided not to allow any other bail-outs until a final judgment 
is delivered.27 
Facing these cumbersome issues, the Member States wisely chose to seek the pave of Treaty 
amendments. Proposals to equally base the ESM on Article 122(2) TFEU were in fact rapidly 
dropped.28 Not only would the additional clause added to Article 136 TFEU diminish the 
consequences of a negative ruling in the German Constitutional Court, because future 
measures could then be put in place on a solid legal basis,29but it also, by taking the 
intergovernmental route, opens the door to a field of decision-making freedom which would 
be unthinkable under current EU law.30 
 
4.2 Assessment 
 
We shall now turn to the essential question of whether the ESM truly serves the intended 
purpose of ironing out the legal problems with which its predecessors were confronted. The 
two most important features of the ‘simplified revision procedure’ under Article 48(6) TFEU 
may be recapped at this point: first, any amendment under this head must not result in an raise 
of Union competences, and, second, the various Member State have to ratify any amendment 
in accordance with national constitutional rules – which may even require a referendum in 
certain countries. This is indeed a point worth dwelling on, for especially the Irish 
requirements as regards ratification proved to be cumbersome in the past.31 
Whether a referendum is required in this Member State is dependent upon the so-called Crotty 
test, devised by the Irish Constitutional Court in Crotty v. An Taoiseach (1987).32 What this 
test comes down to is the assessment of whether Treaty amendments will lead to a change in 
the ‘essential scope or objectives’ regarding the Treaty at hand. Should the answer be 
affirmative, a referendum must be called.33 The test is thus also of special interest in respect to 
this paper in the sense that we may kill two birds with one stone: by having regard to the 
criteria set out in Crotty we can simultaneously examine whether the ‘simple revision 
procedure’ of Article 48(6) TEU was indeed the appropriate manner of amending the Treaty. 
For, it will be remembered, this procedure must not be seized should the amendment at stake 
alters Union powers. 
The Commission itself commented, in its Opinion on the European Council decision, on this 
issue stating that the adopted change is not to expand the competences conferred on the Union 
thus far. This is deemed to be the case because all the member states have already taken part 
in the EFSF which the ESM is intended to substitute.34However, in light of two pending cases 
before the German Constitutional Court, this statement appears somehow audacious. The 
entire argumentation rests in fact on the risky assumption that the putting in place of the 
                                                             
26 See e.g. Der Spiegel, Complaints about rescue fund – Germany’s Top Court may attach strings to Euro 
bailout, 13th June 2011. 
27 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Richter verhandeln über Milliarden für Griechenland, 5thJuly 2011. 
28Miller 2010, p. 3 (cited in note 2). 
29Art. 136(3) TFEU will prevail over Art. 125 TFEU under the conditions set out in the former provision due to 
the principle of lex specialis derogate legi generali. 
30 De Witte, [Working Paper], Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (2011), p. 6. 
31 Miller, [Working Paper], House of Commons (Standard Note: SN/IA/5812) (2010), p. 6. 
32 Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] IESC 4; [1987] IR 713 (9th April, 1987) 
33 Dr. G. Barrett (2010), Does the Treaty Amendment on the European Stability Mechanism Require a 
Referendum in Ireland?, [Working Paper] The Social Science Research Network (2011) [Retrieved via 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1938659, last visited 5th December 2011.], p. 4. 
34 Commission Opinion: on the draft European Council Decision amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union with regard to stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the 
euro; COM (2011) 70/3, 20th December 2010 [Retrieved via http://www.europolitics.info/pdf/gratuit_en/288350-
en.pdf, last visited 5th December 2011]. 
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instruments was lawful under currentEU law. Yet as it has been demonstrated above, this is 
still a matter of considerable debate. It should not be forgotten that the ambiguity of Article 
122 TFEU as well as its relationship to Art. 125 TFEU was one major incentive to call for the 
amendment in the first place. 
The reasoning may be considered to stand on even shakier ground when noticing what the 
European Stability Measure will entail. In the Conclusion of the European Council from mid-
December 2010, one special feature of the ESM was intended to provide for the possibility 
that insolvent Member States may negotiate a ‘comprehensive restructuring plan’ with 
creditors from the private sector in order to regain liquidity. In order to facilitate this, 
collective action clauses (CACs) shall be included inall government bonds within the euro 
area after the ratification of the amendment.35 Whilst normally bondholders may decide by 
unanimity to alter the terms of its assets (so-called unanimous action clauses), collective 
action clauses allow for these decisions to be taken by a supermajority (a majority prescribed 
in the clauses itself). In addition to this (but maybe not of equal range), euro area governments 
will be required to lengthen the maturities of issued bonds;36 though it is thus far not quite 
certain whether this will constitute a recommendation or a genuine mandate.37 Due to this lack 
of clarity, the following legal analysis will not focus on this point; yet, it is still worth-
mentioning that if they are indeed enacted in binding form, they will be subject to basically 
the same criticism. 
Gott argues in his assessment regarding the validity of CACs and extended maturities that 
they  may  assumingly  be  tied  to  the  establishment  of  the  ESM  thanks  to  the  doctrine  of  
implied powers. Under this doctrine, measures may be valid under EU law even if there is no 
specific legal basis for them provided they aim to secure the effectiveness of another valid 
action.38 It follows that these changes of bond terms become a prerogative for the EU bodies 
in the sense that they will be empowered toenact binding EU legislation relating to fiscal 
policy of the Member States.3940 Though the heads of states have not yet explained how 
CACS will eventually be put in place, the most likely way would be the enactment of an EU 
Directive.41 It is exactly this feature which makes the Treaty amendment challengeable in my 
opinion. 
This is so because if we rely on the author’s conclusion we subsequently face a pressing 
question: If the ESM is not deemed to increase any Union competences and merely aims to 
substitute  the  EFSF  and  to  absorb  the  EFSM,  why  has  the  Union  not  already  adopted  
legislation aiming to alter national bond terms if it is deemed necessary? The answer is 
simple: hitherto the Treaties do not provide for any interference with national bond terms by 
any  EU  institution.  The  power  to  interfere  with  the  fiscal  policy  of  the  Member  States  has  
never  been  transferred  upon  the  European  Union  at  another  time.  This  does  not  come  as  a  
surprise because the EU comprises only a monetary but no fiscal union. However, 
interference with bond terms of Member States certainly falls into the latter category which 
remarkably would mean a noteworthy move to fiscal or even political integration.42 
                                                             
35 See Annex II in European Council (December 16-17) Conclusion; EUCO 30/1/10 [Retrieved via 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/118578.pdf,  last  visited  5thDecember 
2011]. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Gott, 12 Chicago Journal of International Law 1 (2011), p. 207. 
38 Ibid, p. 225 (see also for doctrine of implied powers: Commission v Council, Case C-176/03). 
39 Ibid, p. 207. 
40 Karel Lannoo, The EU’s Response to the Financial Crisis: A mid-term review, [Working Paper] CEPS Policy 
Brief (2011) [Retrieved via http://www.ceps.eu/book/eu%E2%80%99s-response-financial-crisis-mid-term-
review, last visited 1st December 2011], p. 8. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Gott, 12 Chicago Journal of International Law 1 (2011), p. 227. 
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If this is what has occurred via the given amendment to Article 136 TFEU- meaning that the 
validity of such CACs tied to the ESM under the doctrine of implied power is accepted -, this 
can be considered to lead to an augmentation of EU legislative powers to the effect that the 
European Council has wrongly decided to amend the Treaty in accordance with Article 48(6) 
TEU. 
Surely, the European Stability Mechanism itself is, first and foremost, established amongst the 
euro states by virtue of an independent Treaty,43 and the European Council had had good 
reasons not to include the propositions of the European Parliament relating to the involvement 
of EU institution in determining the conditionality of financial assistance under the ESM. For 
this would have undoubtedly brought about a clear extension of Union competences.44 Yet as 
I have demonstrated above, even the current regime of the ESM poses many questions in 
respect to the procedure by which it was set in place. The independent Treaty does indeed 
enable the Member States to go far beyond the usual scope of Union policy. But it is not a 
means by virtue of which new powers may be conferred upon the EU itself allowing it to 
become active in areas of national policies which were inviolable in the past. 
Admittedly, a final assessment remains hitherto difficult since the precise terms as regards 
CACs will be drafted not before the end of 2011. While working on this paper insufficient 
information were available in this regard. My preliminary assessment makes it dependent 
upon the arrangements of the collective action clauses with respect to the involvement of 
Union institutions concerning the terms of such CACs whether a de factoincrease in 
competences will have been brought about by the amendment or not. The possibility of 
considerableparticipation of EU institutions in the arrangements governing national bond 
terms is not to be excluded. Should this eventually be the case, the result is a step forward 
towards fiscal integration under Union law which is solely possible via an extension of Union 
powers. 
This of course is likely to gravitate constitutional complaints before national courts and will, 
therefore, certainly exacerbate the ratification process. I do not share the optimism of Brian 
Cowen,  Taoiseach  of  Ireland,  who held  that  calling  for  a  referendum in  his  country  will  be  
regarded dispensable.45When litigation before or reference to the court will be sought by 
whatever party, the ratification process is in danger for the afore-stated reasons. The Crotty 
test, as has been said, focuses on changes in the ‘essential scope or objectives’ of a Treaty. 
Making a move from a monetary to a fiscal Union, however small this move arguably might 
be,  indeed alters the character of the EU in an essential  manner for what reason I  am of the 
opinion that the court will highly question the amendment adopted. 
The ESM faces another problem in view of the litigation before the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht concerned with the validity of prior bailouts. Should the court 
deem the financial rescues in the past to be contra EU law, the Treaty amendment adopted this 
year must inevitably be considered an extension of Union competences. Even though the 
aftermaths  of  such  a  judgement  do  not  concern  the  whole  of  Europe,  it  will  have  negative  
effects on German ratification and thus constitutes a threat to the ESM’s coming into 
operation.46 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
It follows from the foregoing that the adopted change to Article 136 TFEU, allowing for the 
setting up of the European Stability Mechanism, leaves considerable doubts as to whether the 
                                                             
43 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
44 De Witte, [Working Paper], House of Commons (Standard Note: SN/IA/5812) (2010), p. 7. 
45 Miller,  [Working Paper], House of Commons (Standard Note: SN/IA/5812) (2010), p. 6. 
46 Barrett , [Working Paper] The Institute of International and European Affairs (2011), p.11- 12. 
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‘simplified revision procedure’ was indeed the correct procedure for amending the Treaty. 
Whilst the amendment at hand will certainly reduce the vigour of the no-bailout clause in 
Article 125 TFEU – an important step which proved indispensable to take -, it remains a 
tricky question whether the amendment will suffice for all measures and actions actually 
envisaged by the ESM. 
Dissenting from the predominant opinion amongst legal scholars, I am rather reluctant to 
believe in the validity of the present solution sought by the euro states. It can only be 
reiterated that the mandatory introduction of collective action clauses, admittedly subject to 
terms and conditions which are hitherto not utterly clear, can be considered to constitute an 
extensive stretch of the competences currently conferred upon the EU. The same is held to be 
true for the extension of national bond maturities once it is decided to enact them via binding 
EU  legislation  as  well.  In  respect  thereof,  it  will  also  be  highly  interesting  to  see  how  the  
German Bundesverfassungsgericht is  going  to  rule  on  the  former  bailouts  of  Greece.  Policy  
reasons may incite the court to decide in favour of these rescues. However, this is not to say 
that there will not be any ‘but’ in the judgement, restricting Germany to take part in any 
bailouts in the future – including those under the ESM. 
There is a clear upside to the whole picture, nonetheless. This economic and sovereign debt 
crisis, provided it will not be the ruin of the euro area, will certainly lead to further promising 
integration processes within the European Union. The Member States have begun to 
understand the importance of a common fiscal policy in light of the troubles they currently 
undergo, notwithstanding whether this is desired by national voters or not. It is indeed 
remarkable how long the EMU has been able to survive throughout the years without such 
policy.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  EMU is  the  first  example  of  a  monetary  union  which  is  not  
also a fiscal union.47 It might, however, be the first example where such an undertaking fails if 
long-term solutions are not going to be found in due time.48 
                                                             
47 M. Bordo, Does the euro need a fiscal union? Some lessons from history, [Working Paper]. JEL (2011) 
[Retrieved via http://shadowfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Bordo-Euro-Needs-A-Fiscal-Union.pdf, last 
visited 2nd December 2011],p. 2. 
48 Note: After having finished this paper, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy announced their plans to possibly 
renew the EU Treaties to a larger extent; either together with all 27 Member States or alternatively only with the 
17 euro Member States. Further details in this regard were not available yet. Both heads of state have also 
expressed their preference to prepone the coming into operation of the ESM to 2012. This will certainly be 
discussed extensively at the European Council meeting in a few days. 
Apart from that, the very recent judgement of the German Constitutional Court in regards to the validity of the 
EFSF and the say the German Bundestag is entitled to have in deciding on dispensing any financial aid to 
troubled states could not be included anymore, either. Briefly speaking, the Court has ruled to dismiss the claim 
lodged against the aid measures – to the effect that prior bailouts are not deemed illegal-, but simultaneously 
hold that Parliament must be involved in future rescues. A short summary of the judgementin English may be 
retrieved via: http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg11-055en.html.  
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DECLARATION 17 ON PRIMACY: DOES IT STRENGTHEN OR 
WEAKEN THE SUPREMACY OF EU LAW? 
 
Leonore De Mullewie 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
More than forty years after the European Court of Justice (ECJ) established the principle of 
primacy in Costa v ENEL1, its relationship with the national constitutional courts is less clear 
than ever. How has the debate evolved? Have the deficiencies that motivate national courts to 
resist recognizing the supremacy of EU law always been consistent? This paper will analyze 
the doctrine’s conceptual development, from its birth at Luxembourg to the attempt to codify 
and  incorporate  it  in  Declaration  17  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  It  will  also  focus  on  the  legal  
consequences of this mysterious principle, and will also examine its unexpected political and 
symbolic manifestations. 
The paper will begin with an outline of the principle since its first enunciation in the leading 
case Costa v ENEL2. How easy has it been for Member States to concede their sovereign 
power to the Union? The evolution of the principle can be illuminated from two perspectives: 
the innovative creations of the ECJ and the troubled responses from national constitutional 
courts. In fact, the application of the principle has built up a dichotomy between the national 
courts and the ECJ over time in three ways: issues surrounding fundamental rights, the 
concept of Kompetenz-Kompetenz and the potential for conflict between national constitutions 
and EU law.3 It will also be demonstrated that the ECJ’s ideals were far removed from legal 
reality.  
The second part of this paper will consider the scope of the principle of supremacy in the 
event that the Constitutional Treaty were adopted. The legal, political and symbolic potential 
outcomes will be considered. Would the introduction of the principle of supremacy in a treaty 
have indirectly led to a form of acknowledged jurisdictional hierarchy between national courts 
and the ECJ? Or was there to be just a smooth crystallization of what had been law since the 
Costa4 case? To this end, this paper will focus on the extent of the codification’s effects in 
terms of its hypothetical drawbacks and enhancements. One might distinguish two important 
perspectives: first, the political and symbolic implications, and second, the ambiguous 
element from the Member States’ and ECJ’s perspective. It will be demonstrated that the 
authors of article I-6, caught in a bind, chose to leave the article, despite it being open to 
contentious interpretations. 
Thirdly, we will analyze the recent challenges encountered by the removal of article I-6 
in the new Lisbon Treaty. The principle of primacy is now found in Declaration no. 17, which 
is not part the of primary law, but rather, a ‘pocket of flexibility’ for Member States and their 
political perspectives. Consequently, it remains to be seen whether the pre-Lisbon Treaty 
controversy over the primacy of EU law over all national laws in all circumstances will 
continue under the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 
2 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 
3 M. Kumm & V. Ferres Comella, ‘The primacy clause of the constitutional treaty and the future of 
constitutional conflict in the European Union’, 3 Oxford Journal 2-3(May 2005), p.474-475.  
4 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 
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2. Evolution of the Principle 
 
The principle of supremacy is concerned with the relationship between EU law and the 
national law of the Member States.5 More specifically, the principle holds that EU law takes 
precedence over any national law that conflicts with it. This was enunciated by the ECJ, for 
the first time, in Costa v ENEL in 1964, where the ECJ held that the EEC law, because of its 
special and original nature, could not be overridden by national law of the Member States.6  
There was no reference in the EC Treaty with respect to the supremacy of EU law, nor to the 
hierarchical structure between the EC law (now EU law) and national laws. Instead, the 
European  Court  addressed  the  issue  in  relation  to  EEC  law  as  a  whole  and  of  its  
effectiveness.7 Consequently, the principle of supremacy can be said to be a pure 
jurisprudential creation of the ECJ, developed and elaborated by the judges of the European 
Court through its decisions.  
In 1970, the ECJ’s finding in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft8 went a step further by 
expanding the scope of EU law supremacy over the national laws of Member States. After 
this finding, the ECJ acknowledged that all binding measures adopted by the EU would trump 
the entire national law, even up to and including national constitutional law. In doing so, the 
ECJ’s  judgment  effectively  denied  the  respective  autonomy  of  jurisdictions  of  the  Member  
States.9 It is no surprise that the judgment of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft sparked 
disagreements between national constitutional courts and the ECJ. Most courts acknowledged 
the principle of supremacy over ordinary national laws but held that supremacy was 
uncontestably conferred from their own national constitutions, and as such, that the primacy 
of EU law existed within clear limits.10 In other words, the Member States were much more 
reluctant to concede the absolute nature and quality of the principle than its practical 
function.11 On this matter, the German constitutional court affirmed that some parts of its 
constitution was inalienable (such as human rights) and were considered to prevail over EU 
law in a case of conflict.12 In Frontini13, the Italian Constitutional Court expressed the same 
limitations to those of the German Constitutional Court, holding that the primacy of 
Community law (now, EU law) was based on the Italian Constitution, and not on the acquis 
communautaires of the ECJ.  
The doctrine of supremacy was further developed in Simmenthal.14 The ECJ held that EU law 
takes precedence over all prior and subsequent national laws, which imposed a duty on the 
national courts to set aside any national law that conflicted with EU law. Following this 
decision, Italian courts continued to maintain the position in Granital15 and Fragd16, in which 
there was no acknowledgment that Community law (EU law) has primacy over the Italian 
Constitution, and that Italian courts retain ultimate authority when Community law (EU law) 
infringes fundamental rights.17 Italian courts reserve the ultimate Kompetenz-Kompetenz.18  In 
                                                             
5 C. Tobler & J. Beglinger, Essential EU Law in Text, (HVG-ORAC, 2010), p.39. 
6 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 
7 C. Tobler & J. Beglinger, Essential EU Law in Text, p.39. 
8 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1970] ECR 1125 
9 N. Foster, EU Law Directions (2nd ed., Oxford Publishing, 2010),  p. 122. 
10 Ibid, p. 122-123. 
11 See B. De Witte, The Nature of the Legal Order, in P. Craig and G. De Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law 
(1999), p. 193-205 
12 P. Craig & G. De Bùrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th ed., Oxford Publishing, 2011), p. 273-274. 
13 Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze [1974] 2 CMLR 372 
14 Case 106/77 Administrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629 
15 SpA Granital v. Amministrazione delle Finanze [1984] ICC 21  
16 SpA Fragd v. Amministrazione delle Finanze [1989] 72 RDI 
17 P. Craig & G. De Bùrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (4th ed., Oxford Publishing, 2008), p. 365 
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summary, the principle of EU law primacy was far from perfect. Judges continued to resist by 
favouring the cherishment of their respective constitutions. Even though the creation, 
affirmation and development of the principle of supremacy were well endorsed in a rational 
progression of ECJ cases law, legal reality was not consistent. Recognition of the primacy 
principle was not a real obligation but rather, a mere suggestion from Luxembourg’s judges. 
This was the result of an absence of a proper and defined jurisdictional hierarchy. Without a 
hard-edged Treaty provision, supremacy was at best suggested to  national  judges  who  
remained free to respect it or not.19 
 
 
3. Primacy Clause: Acquiescence to Imposition 
 
In this context, would the Constitutional Treaty have made a difference with its codification 
of the primacy principle by article I-6? The paper contends that the content of the principle 
would have remained intact, but its extent would have been put into question. This outcome 
would have resulted from the fact that it would have become conventionally materialized.20 
With that state of affairs, the judges of Luxembourg would not have suggested, rather, they 
would have impliedly imposed their perspective in a Treaty. It is an open question whether 
this new metamorphose of the principle would have been capable of abolishing constitutional 
conflicts. Was the proposal a crystallization of an acknowledged doctrine without further 
effect?  
Article I-6 of the Constitutional Treaty21 stated that: ‘The Constitution and law adopted by the 
institutions of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it shall have primacy over 
the law of the Member States’. Furthermore, a Declaration annexed to the Final Act of the 
Intergovernmental Conference stated: ‘The Conference notes that article I-6 reflects existing 
case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and of the Court of First 
Instance’.22  It  was  the  first  time  that  the  principle  of  supremacy  was  given  an  explicit  
constitutional and legal basis. Though, some specialists would argue that this had in fact been 
done to some extent in the paragraph 2 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Treaty by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam.23 
According to Paragraph 2 of the Protocol, ‘the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality … shall not affect the principles developed by the Court of Justice regarding 
the relationship between national and Community law’.  
To date, it is widely recognized that the principle of supremacy is the linchpin of the ability of 
the Union to function properly.24 Without such principle, Member States would be able to 
ignore any measures adopted by the EU institutions if they consider that it contradicts their 
economic or political interests.25As a consequence, we can question which effects the 
codification of the principle would have entailed. So, if the Member States had enacted a 
supremacy  clause,  would  have  it  not  resulted  in  what  is  already  part  of  the  acquis 
communautaire?  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
18 Cartabia, M., Report on Italy, in A.-M.Slaughter & al., The European Court and National Courts, Doctrine 
and Jurisprudence, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) 
19 J-C Piris, Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis, (CAP, 2010), p. 81. 
20 E.  Dubout  &  al.,  De la primauté “imposée” à la primauté “consentie”: Les incidences de l’inscription de 
primauté dans le traité etablissant une Consitution pour l’Europe, p.3. 
21 Originally, the supremacy clause was formulated in art. I-10 of the draft Constitutional Treaty  
22 Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Declarations to be annexed to 
the Final Act of the IC and the Final Act, Brussels, [6 August 2004] CIG 87/04 Add 2 (available at:  
http://ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/04/cg00/cg00087-ad02.en04.pdf) 
23 J-C Piris, Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis, p.80. 
24 See Case 106/77 Administrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629 
25 Ibid. 
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3.1 Primacy Clause: its Symbolic and Political Dimensions  
 
At first sight, we may suppose on several grounds that even if the new primacy clause was, in 
terms of content, a mere codification of what was already part of the EU law, it still would 
have made a difference.  
The question of whether article I-6 would have had a constitutive or a declaratory character 
depends on which perspective is considered. From the ECJ’s perspective, things have always 
been crystal clear, even before the hypothetical primacy clause. It seems quite plausible that 
article I-6 had a simple declaratory nature for the ECJ in relation to the line of reasoning that 
it adopted since Costa v ENEL.26 The  wording  of  article  I-6  would  have  been  a  mere  
reiteration of what the ECJ ruled in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft27. The maintenance of 
status-quo was further enhanced by the declaration annexed to the constitutional treaty28 
which stated that: ‘Article I-6 reflects the existing case law of the Court of Justice of the EC 
and of the Court of First Instance’.29  
What follows from this? The ECJ would have been able to continue to opine on its version of 
supremacy in more legitimate way by using the text of the Constitutional Treaty. This explicit 
constitutional endorsement of the ECJ’s primacy jurisprudence would have led to greater 
authority and legitimacy by abrogating the complex interpretative streams in existence since 
the early nineteen-sixties. In this way, codification would have strengthened the ECJ’s claim 
for supremacy of EU law.30  
Furthermore, it cannot be argued that the European constitutional legislators had, before the 
draft of the Constitutional Treaty, tacitly endorsed the primacy of EU law. As far as the ECJ 
was concerned, the doctrine of primacy had been law since Costa v ENEL31, however, the 
legal reality was that the Member States had never explicitly acknowledged it, despite many 
opportunities to qualify or to revoke it. On the other hand, judicial and legal cooperation 
opened the path to collective inaction by the Member States, and the application of the 
principle by the ECJ. To consider collective inaction a tacit consent makes sense in the case of 
a simple majority, but this was not the case here. In order to amend treaties, unanimous 
consent of all member states is required.32 In this sense, the primacy clause would have not 
simply been embodied in a treaty but would have been a tacit assumption that all the Member 
States were ready to play the game according to the same rules regarding the primacy of EU 
law to exist as a result of their ratification in their respective Constitutions.33 However, would 
this have been defeated by the potential deficiencies that might have brought article I-6?   
It is nonetheless interesting to see that the collateral effect of article I-60 would certainly have 
taken a bi-dimensional significance. Under this article, the Member States were explicitly 
allowed, for the first time, to withdraw freely from the Union. But in which way would that 
have affected the supremacy of EU law? It might be assumed that, to the extent that Member 
States can exit the Union, policy grounds suggest that they should be loyal to its principles 
and  rules  as  long  as  they  remain  within  it.  This  includes  the  principle  that  EU  law  has  
                                                             
26 Monica Claes, The National Court’s Mandate in the European Constitution, (Hart Publishing, 2006), p.676.    
27 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
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29 D. Piqani, Supremacy of European Law revisited: New developments in the context of the Treaty Establishing 
a Constitution for Europe,  paper  presented  at  the  VII  World  Congress  of  the  International  Association  of  
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supremacy over national law.34 But again, would this not lead the Member States to threaten 
to leave the Union if their perspective was not adopted?  
Therefore and only to a certain degree would embedding a supremacy clause in the 
Constitutional Treaty have created a provision looking like a tightrope walker in-between 
political and symbolical implications, tempting to hold in its instable hands the legitimate 
claim that EU law is the supreme law of the Union.35  
  
3.2 Primacy Clause: Smoke and Mirrors? 
 
Against this background, it is doubtful that the entrenchment of a supremacy clause in the 
Constitutional Treaty would have extinguished all forms of conflict and would have changed 
the European version of supremacy. As we shall see, the codification of the principle would 
have had no real legal effect, but rather would have amounted to a counter productive move.  
The most significant, but by no means the only problem, was that the wording of article I-6 
was intrinsically ambiguous.36 The broad and elusive nature of the wording gave rise to two 
major concerns, or perhaps, deficiencies. Firstly, there is the unsettled issue of national 
constitutional checks on EU law concerning possible ultra vires actions of the EU. Secondly, 
uncertainties about the interpretation of the clause would have involved the disjuncture 
between the opinions of the Union and national courts to become even more troublesome. 
The clause in article I-6 established that primacy would be applied in accordance with  ‘the 
Constitution and law adopted by the institutions of the Union in exercising competences 
conferred on it’. In other words, EU legislation had primacy as long as the EU acted within its 
sphere of competence. To a certain extent, the article clearly stated the boundaries of the 
application of the principle of supremacy, but it had not clearly resolved who was to 
adjudicate whether EU legislation was ultra vires.37 That reminds us the heart of the 
controversies in the previous jurisprudence mentioned above.  
Secondly, the clause stated that EU law shall have supremacy ‘over the law of Member 
States’. This could have been interpreted in two ways: as operating over all national law 
including Member States’ constitutions or, as operating over all national law, excluding 
national constitutions.38 One could have argued that technically, national constitutions were 
part of the law of a Member State. This represents the declaratory character of the article with 
respect to the ECJ’s perspective.39 However, the absolute side of this legitimacy argument (as 
mentioned above) would have been counterbalanced by the doubtful possibility that national 
constitutional courts would have been persuaded to forgo previous concerns. Ultimately, is 
not the application and acceptance of the primacy of EU law dependent on the Member 
States?  
Why was article I-6 drafted in such an ambiguous manner? Did its authors draft without 
clarity purposely, or was it an unconscious tendency? The former would seem to be the most 
probable answer, since it is highly doubtful that its drafters did not have the longstanding 
controversy  about  the  matter  in  mind.   It  is  striking  to  see  that  the  ambiguity  was  further  
enhanced by the content of article I-5 (1). The provision not only reiterated that the Union 
shall respect national identities40 but also that the fundamental constitutional structures of the 
Member States must be respected as an integral part of the national identity. Therefore, article 
I-5 could have been seen as an authorization to violate the principle of supremacy, which 
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imposes a limitation on its absolute character. As a result, the Constitutional Treaty, as 
surprising as it may seem, attempted to codify the principle of supremacy as a qualified 
principle. Would this system of counterbalance between national concerns for the 
preservation of national constitutional identities and the absolute European claim of 
supremacy have contributed in preventing hostility in constitutional dialogues between 
national  constitutional  courts  and  the  ECJ?  This  was  the  line  of  reasoning  that  France  and  
Spain have adopted in their a priori decisions concerning the introduction of the primacy 
clause.41 In its decision, the French constitutional court stated: ‘the close proximity of articles 
I-5 and I-6 thereof, show that it in no way modifies the nature of the European Union, nor the 
scope of the principle of primacy of Union law as duly acknowledged by article 88-1 of the 
Constitution, and confirmed by the Constitutional Council in its decisions referred to 
hereinabove [...]’. On the same line, the Spanish court concluded that primacy clause was 
already present in its own Constitution and that it required no further modification.42  
This proves that the primacy clause was just theoretically a mere representation of the status 
quo. There lies the heart of the problem. Why would you impose potential source of conflict 
in a Treaty provision on a matter that is already inherently induced? This, all the more since, 
the  Constitutional  Treaty  was  far  away  to  provide  any  conclusive  reasons  and  symmetrical  
provision for domestic courts to accept the supremacy of EU law over their legal perspectives 
and their national constitutions. In this sense, article I-6 was even counter-productive since it 
would have not unveiled the many questions concerning the relationship between the law in 
the Members States and the EU law. Instead, article I-6 was clearly a definitive retreat from 
an absolute version of supremacy rather than its strengthening. Some might even say that its 
codification would have brought unnecessary discussions and cases on a principle that was 
already deeply rooted as such in the Union law.43  
 
 
4. Primacy: From Codification to Declaration 
 
The Constitutional Treaty failed to enter into force following the negative outcome of the 
referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005.44  Three years later, against all odds, a new 
Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, entered into force. This new Treaty replicated many of the changes 
that would have been implemented by the Constitutional Treaty. Unsurprisingly, the Lisbon 
Treaty sidestepped the direct expression of the primacy principle that was contained in the 
controversial article I-6 of the Constitutional Treaty. Without real legal consequences, article 
I-6  was  dropped  at  the  request  of  several  Member  States  opting  for  an  evolutionary,  rather  
than, revolutionary progress of the rules of supremacy.45 On  the  same  token,  the  European  
Council in 2007 held that sidestepping article I-6 would ‘diminish the constitutional 
character’ of the Lisbon Treaty.46  
Declaration 17 confined the principle as follows: ‘The Conference recalls that, in accordance 
with well settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Treaties and the 
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law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member 
States, under the conditions laid down by the said case law’.  
This leaves open the status of the primacy principle under the Treaty of Lisbon.47  After all, 
can we now say that Declaration 17 is just a political relief for the skeptical Member States, or 
will it have a narrower application that what it literally states? It has been demonstrated in this 
paper that there is dichotomy between what is explicitly written in a juridical text and what is 
not, and that this is largely questionable from both a theoretical point of view and a practical 
one. In this context, will the pre-Lisbon Treaty controversies relating to supremacy of EU law 
in all circumstances, and over all national laws, continue under the Lisbon Treaty?   
Once again, the move from codification to its enshrinement in a Declaration has not changed 
the theoretical content of the supremacy rule. This was expressly confirmed in the Opinion of 
the Council Legal Service 48 which recalls that ‘The fact that the principle of primacy will not 
be included in the future treaty shall not in any way change the existence of the principle and 
the existing case-law of the Court of Justice’.  
In fact, the practical implications evoke déjà vu.  It  can  be  said  that  the  Declaration  suffers  
from the  precisely  the  same deficiencies  that  have  traditionally  motivated  national  courts  to  
resist recognizing the unqualified primacy of EU law. Its wording is as vague as article I-6 in 
the Constitutional Treaty, as it is framed in terms of EU law having ‘primacy over the law of 
the Member States’.49 What changes is that Declaration 17 is a non-binding political 
agreement, which of course, on one hand, backs the ECJ in its espousal of primacy, but also 
retreats from the codification of a qualified principle as suggested in the Constitutional 
Treaty.50 Therefore, the divergence of views between Member States and the EU will likely 
continue under the new legal order of the Lisbon Treaty. Neither of the opposing forces will 
be eager to re-exhume the issue.51  
Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that Declaration 17 has solved the pre-Constitutional 
draft concerns relating to the Kompetenz-Kompetenz, fundamental rights’ and conflicts with 
specific provisions of national constitutions. Though it has been held in Solange52, that the 
‘actual probability of future fundamental rights’ concerns is very low’ as the level of 
protection found in jurisprudence was found to be satisfactory, the two other grounds are still 
more than ever disputed.  The Treaty thus not moves beyond the status quo.53  
Declaration 17 has, in fact, strengthened the supremacy principle in avoiding its qualified 
enshrinement and allowing the smooth path to the acceptation of its absolute nature by 
changing the legal quality of the relation between the Member States and the Union.54 Is it not 
better to have a political consensus rather than a subjectively threatening legal imposition?  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
It  might  be  argued  that  the  removal  of  article  I-6  from  the  Lisbon  Treaty  was  relatively  
dangerous, because it might have led national courts to doubt the validity of the supremacy 
principle by holding that the ECJ’s long-standing view on primacy has lost its symbolic sense 
along the way. This is not likely however for two reasons. Firstly, because as the ECJ stated 
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in Simmenthal55, ‘in the absence of supremacy, Community itself would be called in 
question’. Therefore supremacy was, has been and will be the keystone of the functioning of 
the EU. Secondly, any such danger is largely outweighed by the hypothetical deficiencies of 
the primacy clause, namely, its qualified nature and its ultimate trend towards controversial 
interpretations.56 After all, it is now certain that the framers of article I-6 were not prepared to 
endorse the consequences of codifying an unconditional primacy clause - fearing 
constitutional crisis.57 
The discrepancy between national courts and the ECJ has essentially been problem of 
principle,  both  legally  and  politically,  but  it  has had no practical impact up to now58. This 
because national courts have not only relied on the straightforward rule of national 
constitutional supremacy, with their reserve to accept the unqualified supremacy of EU law, 
they have also acted on a concrete presumption that EU law should be applied in case of 
conflict59. If the primacy clause had been brought into the picture, this would have changed.  
We may then conclude that Declaration 17 has strengthened the principle of supremacy from 
being one of silent acceptance or controversial consented imposition to peaceful 
acknowledgement. It is now acknowledged, from past experiences, that the acceptance and 
application  of  supremacy  is  dependent  on  the  Member  States  and  not  entirely  on  the  ECJ.  
Neither the introduction nor the removal of article I-6 would change anything to the practical 
legal situation, albeit this removal had political consequences, by creating the impression that 
it has been the case and thus favoring smooth reasoning rather than rushing.60 Declaration 17 
leaves the debate open. The ECJ will continue to believe in its rubber-stamped absolute 
principle whereas, the Member States’ unnecessary fears will be avoided.  And after all, are 
not symbolic and political convictions the driving force of legal application? 
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ARTICLE 4(2) TEU: THE END OF THE SUPREMACY OF EU LAW? 
 
Vivian Bom 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines whether the obligation of the Union to respect the national identities of 
the Member States as stated in Article 4(2) in the Treaty on the European Union undermines 
the supremacy of EU law.  
I  have  chosen  not  to  look  at  the  rulings  of  the  national  (constitutional)  courts,  because  
ultimately the European Court of Justice has the competence to interpret Union law. I realize 
that the national courts have given their own interpretations on Article 4(2), but for this paper 
it is more relevant how the respect for national identities is interpreted on a Union level, than 
on a national level. 
First, this paper will address the Article itself, trying to find the meaning of this Article by 
looking into the history and the limits imposed on it by the Treaty itself. Second, this paper 
will discuss who decides whether there is a breach of the Article, and who is to judge on what 
constitutes a national identity. Third, this paper will address some case law of the European 
Court of Justice, trying to find out how the ECJ has dealt with the national identities of the 
Member  States  in  the  past.  Fourth,  this  paper  will  discuss  what  can  be  concluded  from  the  
judgments of the ECJ discussed in the previous part. With this part I will try to find out what 
Article 4(2) means according to the ECJ. In the final part a conclusion will be draw and the 
question will be answered whether, in practise and theory, Article 4(2) undermines the 
supremacy of EU law.  
 
 
2. The Limits of Article 4(2) 
 
Article 4(2) TEU1 ensures that the Union respects the equality of the Member States and their 
national identities. It defines national identities as political and constitutional structures. This 
article  also  ensures  the  respect  of  the  Union  for  the  essential  state  functions  of  the  Member  
States and states that national security remains the sole responsibility of the Member States.2 
The respect for national identities is not new in the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaties of Maastricht 
and Amsterdam already stated that ‘The Union shall respect the national identities of its 
Member States.’3 In  this  treaty  however,  the  term  national  identities  was  not  explained  
further.  Apparently  in  the  Lisbon  Treaty  there  was  the  need  to  define  what  constitutes  the  
national identity of a Member State. By the description given in the Article, it seems that 
national identity means constitutional  and political identity. Because the Treaty protects this 
constitutional  and  political  identity  the  question  rises,  whether  Member  States  can  use  their  
constitution to undermine the supremacy of EU law.  
Article 4(2) however, does not stand on its own. Article 4(1) states that competences not 
conferred upon the Union, remain with the Member States,4 and Article 4(3) ensures the 
principle of sincere cooperation of the Member States and the institutions of the Union.5 From 
this, especially from Article 4(3), it could be concluded that the respect for national identities 
is limited, or at least that a balance has to be struck between the respect for national identities 
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by the Union and the obligation for the Member States to ensure the principle of sincere 
cooperation. 
Article 4(3), does however not only ensures sincere cooperation for the Member States. This 
Article is also applicable to the Union. Looking at this Article from that perspective, it may 
strengthen Article 4(2), because it ensures, when read in conformity with Article 4(2), that the 
Union has to respect the national identities of the Member States. 
In Article 3(3) TEU,6 it is stated that the Union ‘shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic 
diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.’7 This 
Article seems to refer to the cultural identity of the Member States. Therefore one could argue 
that  the  cultural  identities  of  the  Member  States  do  not  fall  under  the  national  identities  of  
Article 4(2). However, Article 4(2) does refer to constitutional and political identities and 
these identities are often formed because of the cultural identity of a Member State. Because 
the cultural identity of a State is often inherent in the political and constitutional identity, it is 
not possible to exclude the cultural identity of a Member State from the national identity of 
that State.8  
In the Treaty of Maastricht the sub-article on the respect for the national identities was part of 
an article that also stated the principles on which the Union is founded9 and which ensured the 
respect of the Union for fundamental rights in the European Convention on the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.10 In the Treaty of Lisbon the values on which the 
Union is founded are stated in Article 211 and thus are not part of the same article anymore. 
However, Article 2 does state that these values are common to the Member States,12 and thus 
it can be concluded that these values form a part of the national and European identity of the 
Member States. From this it can be concluded that not just any national identity of a Member 
State is accepted by the Union, since this identity cannot go against any of the values 
mentioned in Article 2.13 14 
Another limit is imposed by Article 4(2) itself. The Article ensures the respect for national 
identities by the Union, but it does not define a hierarchy between Union law and national 
law. Therefore this Article does not mean that the national identities of the Member States are 
put above Union law, or the other way around, that Union law is put above the national 
identities of Member States. The wording of the Article itself implies, that whenever there is a 
conflict between Union law and the national identity of a Member State, this Union law and 
the national identity of that Member State have to balanced, and a proportionate outcome has 
to be sought.15   
 
 
3. Who is the Judge? 
 
From the previous part  it  has become clear that  the respect for the national identities of the 
Member  States  by  the  Union  has  its  limits.  The  next  question  is  then,  who  is  to  judge  on  
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whether there is an infringement of Article 4(2). When first posing this question, the answer 
seems clear. This Article is in the Treaty of the European Union, the ECJ has the competence 
to interpret Union law,16 so the ECJ should be the one to ultimately judge whether there is an 
infringement of this Article. However, when looking more closely, the answer to the question 
is not so straightforward. To establish whether Article 4(2) has been infringed, one would 
have to establish what the national identity of a Member State is.  To be able to do this,  one 
would have to interpret the laws of the Member State, and this does not fall within the 
competences of the ECJ,17 but  is  up  to  the  Member  States.  The  ECJ  has  the  competence  to  
interpret the meaning of the word national identity as used in the Treaty, but it does not have 
the competence to establish for the Member States what the national identity of that Member 
State is according to their national laws. Therefore the Member States have the power to 
determine what their national identity entails on the basis of their national laws, while the ECJ 
has the power to judge whether that national identity is infringed by Union law.18 This may 
seem to undermine the supremacy of Union law, because by this argumentation, a Member 
State could construe its national identity to be of such kind that every piece of Union 
legislation would go against their national identity, but the ECJ does have the competence to 
limit the word national identity as used in the Treaty, and the Member States are under the 
obligation to take these limits into account. Another reason why, by arguing this way, 
supremacy of Union law is not automatically undermined, is that it tells us noting about the 
legal effects of Article 4(2). The supremacy of Union law would only be undermined if the 
obligation for the Union to respect the national identities of Member States, leads to Member 
States derogating from, or restricting Union law, when Union law does not respect the 
national identity of a Member State. Therefore before concluding whether Article 4(2) 
undermines the supremacy of Union law, it first has to be examined what effects are given to 
this Article by the ECJ. 
 
 
4. Case Law of the ECJ 
 
Several cases dealing with Union law, infringing the national identity of a Member State, 
have been brought before the ECJ. In 1970 the ECJ stated in the Internationale 
Handelsgesellshaft case19 that  ‘the validity of a community measure or its  effect  within a 
Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental 
rights as formulated by the constitution of that State or the principles of a national 
constitutional structure.’20 The  Court  continues  with  acknowledging  that  the  protection  of  
fundamental rights form an integral part of Union law and that these rights are inspired by a 
constitutional tradition, common to the Member States. The Court is however in this case 
not examining whether a piece of Union law goes against German fundamental rights, but 
whether it goes against European fundamental rights.21 From this case it becomes clear that 
in 1970 the national identities of Member States ware not respected by the ECJ. States 
could not disregard Union law because of their national identities. In later cases the ECJ 
used the same line of reasoning.22 In the Flemish Government case23 the  ECJ  stated  ‘the  
                                                             
16 Art. 19(3)(b), Ibid. 
17 Art. 19(3) TEU and established case law of the ECJ. 
18 L.F.M. Besselink, 6 Utrecht law review 3 (2010), p. 45. 
19 Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellshaft mBH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125.  
20 Ibid. at para. 3. 
21 Ibid. at para. 4. 
22 S. Rodin, ‘National identity and Market Freedoms after the Treaty of Lisbon’, p. 10. 
23Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish Government [2008] 
ECR I-1683. 
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Court  has  consistently  held  that  a  Member  State  cannot  plead  provisions,  practices  or  
situations prevailing in its domestic legal order, including those resulting from the 
constitutional organisation of that State, to justify the failure to observe obligations arising 
under Community law’.24  
However, in the Omega case,25 the  Court  argued  differently.  In  this  case  the  German  
company Omega claimed, among other things, that the prohibition of certain laser games by 
the police in a state in Germany, was contrary to the Union law on the free movement of 
services. Germany justified the infringement of the free movement of services by claiming 
that these laser games ‘infringed a  fundamental value enshrined in the national 
constitution, namely human dignity’,26 this was, according to the Court, based on the public 
policy justification.27 In its judgement the Court recognized human dignity as a general 
principle of Union law. The Court continues its argumentation by stating that ‘[t]here can 
therefore be no doubt that  the objective of protecting human dignity is compatible with 
Community law, it being immaterial in that respect that, in Germany, the principle of 
respect for  human dignity has a particular status as an  independent fundamental  right.’28 
The Court also argues that the restrictions used to protect human dignity does not need to 
be common to all Member States.29 The Court uses the proportionality test to assess 
whether the German measure to protect human dignity was proportional to the restriction of 
the free movement of services. While assessing the proportionality of the measure the Court 
takes into account that according to the referring German court, the measure ‘corresponds 
to the level of protection of human dignity which the national constitution seeks to 
guarantee in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.’30 This case shows that, even 
though the Court first recognizes human dignity as a European principle, it also recognizes 
that there is a German principle of human dignity and takes into account the German 
constitutional protection of this principle when assessing the proportionality of the 
measure.31 The Court does however not refer to the respect of national identities, but 
justifies the German restriction solely on the basis of the protection of public policy. 
 In the Sayn-Wittgenstein case32 the Court did refer to Article 4(2).33 In  this  case  the  
Austrian authorities refused to register the name Fürstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein. Ilonka 
Fürstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein is an Austrian national who obtained her last name by 
adoption. She was adopted by a German national whose last name was Fürst von Sayn-
Wittgenstein, and by the adoption Ilonka became Fürstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein. However, 
in Austria all noble titles had been abolished and according to the Austrian law a last name 
that implied a noble title could not be registered. According to the Court this was an 
infringement of Article 21 TFEU. Austria argued that this infringement could be justified 
on the grounds of public policy. The Court agreed that public policy could be a 
justification, but only if ‘there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental 
                                                             
24 Ibid. at para. 58. 
25 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs- GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin des Bundesstadt 
Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609.   
26 Ibid. at para. 32. 
27 Ibid. at para. 28. 
28 Ibid. at para. 34. 
29 Ibid. at paras. 37,38. 
30 Ibid. at para. 39. 
31 Dr. S.A. de Vries, ‘The protection of fundamental rights within Europe’s internal market after Lisbon – An 
endeavour for more haromony’, The Europe Institute of Utrecht University Working Paper 4/10, p. 11, to be 
found at 
http://www.uu.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/REBO/REBO_RGL/REBO_RGL_EUROPA/Working_Paper_de_Vr
ies[1].pdf. 
32 Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien [2010], not yet reported.   
33 Ibid. at para. 92. 
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interest of society.’34  According to Austria, the abolition of noble titles implements the 
principle of equal treatment.35 The  Court  recognizes  this  as  a  fundamental  right  and  as  a  
general principle of law, compatible with Union law.36 The Court applies the 
proportionality test, just as in Omega, and states that ‘[i]t must be noted that, in accordance 
with Article 4(2) TEU, the European Union is to respect the national identities of its 
Member States, which include the status of the State as a Republic.’37 The Court continues 
that in this case the Austrian restriction does not seem to be disproportionate.38 
In this case, the Court recognizes the obligation of the Union to respect the national identity 
of Austria, but by the reasoning of the Court is seems that if the justification was based on a 
principle not recognized as a fundamental right under Union law, or as a general principle 
of Union law, it would not have been accepted by the Court. 
In Runeviþ-Vardyn39 the ECJ also referred to Article 4(2). In this case a woman wanted the 
spelling of her name altered on her Lithuanian birth- and marriage certificate, but by this 
change her name would contain letters that did not exist in the Lithuanian alphabet. The 
Lithuanian government refused this, and the ECJ recognized that this refusal is contrary to 
Article 21 TFEU. The Court also recognized that the protection of the national language of 
a State is part of its national identity and that the Union has to respect this national identity 
according  to  Article  4(2).  As  in  the  Sayn-Wittgenstein case, the Court stated that the 
infringement of Article 21 TFEU could be justified on the grounds of public policy, but that 
this has to be proportional. So in this case, as in the Sayn-Wittgenstein case, a justification 
on  the  basis  of  public  policy  is  possible  because  the  Union  has  to  respect  the  national  
identity of the State according to Article 4(2), as long as the restriction is proportionate.  
There are however  two difference between these cases. First, in the Sayn-Wittgenstein case 
the Court first identifies human dignity as a European principle of law and European 
fundamental right before taking Article 4(2) into consideration, while in Runeviþ-Vardyn 
the Court does not talk about a European principle of law or European fundamental right 
that could be a justification, but primarily considers the respect for national identities itself 
as a justification. Because of this, it seems that for Article 4(2) to be invoked by a Member 
State it is not necessary that the national identity that is to be respected entails a European 
principle of law or European fundamental right. This is logical, since the protection of 
national language in the latter case cannot constitute a European fundamental right or 
principle of European law. Second, in the Sayn-Wittgenstein case, the Court comes to the 
conclusion that the restriction seems to be proportional, while in Runeviþ-Vardyn, the Court 
lies down some guidelines as to how the proportionality test should be conducted, but 
leaves it up to the national court to decide whether the restriction is proportional or not. 
There are two other interesting cases concerning a conflict between national constitutional 
law and Union law. The first one is the Michaniki case,40 in which a Greek constitutional 
law was in conflict with a Directive. The Directive constituted an exhaustive list of 
justifications to exclude a contractor from an award procedure. On the basis of the Greek 
constitution, Greek wanted to exclude contractors from this award procedure on a ground 
not listed in this exhaustive list. The Court recognized that it could be possible to invoke 
                                                             
34 Ibid. at para. 86. 
35 Ibid. at para. 87. 
36 Ibid. at para. 89. 
37 Ibid. at para. 92. 
38 Ibid. at para. 93. 
39 Case C-391/09 Malgožata Runeviþ-Vardyn and àukasz Paweá Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto savivaldybơs 
administracija and Others [2011], not yet reported. 
40 Case C-213/07 Michaniki AE v Ethniko Symvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ypourgos Epikrateias [2008] ECR I-
9999. 
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this constitutional provision and exclude those contractors from the award procedure, but 
then found that this would be disproportional.41  
The second case is Commission v Poland,42 in which Poland claimed that it was not in 
breach of an EU Directive, because of national provisions. These national provisions were, 
according to Poland, based on protecting the ethical and religious considerations of Poland, 
43 and on the basis of these provisions the justification of protecting public morality for the 
breach of the Directive was invoked by Poland.44 The Court does not consider whether the 
protection of ethical and religious considerations can justify a derogation of an EU 
Directive by a Member State.45 It comes to the conclusion that ‘it is sufficient to hold that 
the Republic of Poland, upon which the burden of proof lies in such a case, has failed, in 
any event, to establish that the true purpose of the contested national provisions was in fact 
to pursue the religious and ethical objectives relied upon.’46 
From the Michaniki case it can be concluded that the ECJ recognizes that constitutional 
provisions of a Member State are not automatically to be put aside if they conflict with a 
Directive. This judgment even suggests that it may be justified for a Member State to 
disregard parts of Directives, if these conflict with constitutional laws, as long as the result 
is proportional.47 From Commission v Poland it  can  be  concluded  that  the  Member  State  
has  to  prove  that  the  constitutional  provisions  used  to  justify  from  the  derogation  of  a  
Directive were adopted to protect the national identity of that State, but this judgment also 
shows that the Court is willing to look at the possibility for Member States to derogate from 
Directives if this goes against the constitution of this State.48 
 
 
5. Conclusions Drawn from the Rulings of the ECJ 
 
From the case law of ECJ it can be concluded that the obligation to respect the national 
identities of its Member States can give the Member States a justification to derogate from 
Union law, but only in exceptional circumstances. As implied in Omega and the Sayn-
Wittgenstein case, if the justification  for restriction is based on fundamental rights, the ECJ 
will first determine whether these national fundamental rights are European fundamental 
rights or principles of European law. As also mentioned in the first part of this paper, 
national fundamental rights that go against European fundamental rights will probably not 
be accepted by the ECJ as a justification for the restriction of Union law.  
What has become evident in all cases, is that whenever a Member State wants to invoke the 
justification on the grounds of respect for the national identities, this justification has to be 
based on the protection of public policy or public morality or, possibly on other 
justifications  well  known  in  Union  law  such  as  for  instance,  public  security.  Another  
similarity between the cases is that the derogation from, or restricting Union law, is only 
possible if this is proportional, which is, as explained in the first section of this paper, 
already evident from the wording of Article 4(2). It also seems that national identity means 
the same as constitutional identity, since all cases dealt with constitutional provisions being 
in conflict with Union law. However, the ECJ has never given a definition of the term 
national identity. 
                                                             
41 A. von Bogdandy, 5 Common market law review 48, (2011), p. 1444. 
42 Case C-165/08 Commission v Poland [2009] ECR I-6843. 
43 Ibid. at para. 49. 
44 Ibid. at para. 54. 
45 Ibid. at para. 51. 
46 Ibid. at para. 52. 
47 A. von Bogdandy, 5 Common market law review 48, (2011), p. 1445. 
48 Ibid. 
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The case Commission v Poland has shown that it is not enough for a Member State to claim 
that constitutional provisions used to justify a derogation from Union law, protect a part of 
the national identity of that State. This case has shown that this claim has to be proven, 
before the ECJ will even consider the validity of the justification. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The ECJ has made, by its case law, somewhat clear what the test is when assessing whether 
Article 4(2) has been infringed or not. Even though it has only in a few cases referred to 
this specific Article, or used the wording national identities or constitutional identities, it 
has become clear, that under certain circumstances, Member States are allowed to derogate 
from Union law, or to restrict Union law. The Court has however not specified what these 
certain circumstances are, and what constitutes a national identity of a Member State and 
what does not. It is for instance not clear whether a constitutional provision that protects a 
fundamental right, which is not recognized by the Court as a European fundamental right, 
will  be  allowed as  a  justification  to  derogate  from,  or  to  restrict  Union  law.  It  is  also  not  
clear how the obligation for the Union to respect the national identities of the Member 
States relate to the principle of sincere cooperation for the Member States. But, since the 
Court has recognized in Omega, the Sayn-Wittgenstein case and in Runeviþ-Vardyn that 
Member States can be allowed to restrict Union law because the national identities of the 
Member States have to be respected by the Union, it can no longer be claimed that Union 
law has absolute supremacy. In some cases the constitutions of the Member States go 
before Union law when they are in conflict. However, how far this supremacy is restricted 
by Article 4(2) in practice, remains a question without an answer.  
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1. Introduction 
 
For many years the European machinery has been surging ahead with considerable speed1. 
The peaceful environment we, the European people, experience today might seem 
unexceptional, at times it might even be forgotten that it hasn’t always been this way2. That 
peace was the ultimate drive towards establishing what now often appears to be an inscrutable 
apparatus of ever increasing power3.  
The European Union was probably the best that could have happened to this continent. But 
time passed and power structures shifted. Nations now fear a daemon which they feel is 
encroaching upon their liberties and national identities4.   The  failure  of  the  Constitutional  
Treaty was a considerable blowback for the process of Europeanization. And resistance could 
not only be found in France and the Netherlands where the negative Referenda took place.  
The next step within the integrationalist framework required finding a way to overcome 
skepticism and the fear of losing identity. In the multi-layered complex constituting the 
European Union the questions on allocation and exercise of competences between the Union 
and the Member states plays a crucial part. The answers are the principles of conferral, 
subsidiarity, proportionality as well as the promise to loyalty and the duty to respect national 
identities5.  
This paper will focus on Article 4 (2) TEU and will consider the question whether the promise 
to respect national identities constitutes a possible way to set limits to European supremacy. 
In order to answer the aforementioned question Section 2 will examine how European 
sovereignty developed over time and who the Union itself as well as the Member States 
believe to hold ultimate authority. Section 3 will consider the historical development of 
Article 4 (2) TEU until the Lisbon Treaty and Section 4 will take a closer look at the concept 
of national identity and explore in how far its  scope coincides with its  usage in Article 4 (2) 
TEU. Section 5 will  then finally look at  the legal effects of Article 4 (2) TEU and examine 
possible consequences. 
 
 
2. EU Sovereignty and the Member States’  Point of View 
 
European integration requires a certain degree of trust and acceptance by the Member States. 
This does not sound groundbreaking, but at the time when today’s European Union came into 
existence, trust and tolerance were the main objectives in order to overcome mutual distrust 
                                                             
1 The author refers to the establishment and development of the European Union. It has its origin in the 1951 
created European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), consisting of six states and now finds itself being a 
political and economic Union of 27 independent Member States governed since 2009 by the Lisbon Treaty. 
2 N. Foster, EU Law Directions, (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 5. 
3 It  is referred to the increasing power of the European Union which has not explicitly been given to it  by the 
Member States, but which was developed in case law by the ECJ in decisions such as Van Gend en Loos or 
Costa/ENEL. 
4 M. Cini and N. Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, European Union Politics, (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 397-
404. 
5 A. Vorndran, Art. 4 und 5 EUV n. F. – Zum Schutz der Kompetenzabgrenzung- und ausübung (GRIN Verlag, 
2009), p. 1. 
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between France and Germany6. Further integration was seen as necessary to prevent conflict 
and war and to achieve peace7. International law knows such political communities that create 
treaties to achieve a common goal, but at the end of the day it will be the states that remain 
sovereign. This traditional conception was also believed to be used for the European 
Community, but it wouldn’t turn out to be this way8. 
Integration  was  based  on  the  idea  of  supranationalism, the construction of a Europe which 
would be above all its Member States, whose nationalism at that time was believed to be 
highly destructive9. Van Gend en Loos and  the  Costa case developed a new legal order by 
limiting the sovereign rights of the Member States10. Concerning the point in time when this 
doctrine of supremacy developed it appears to be quite early, as during the sixties and 
seventies the basic competences of the Union were still those of agriculture, the common 
commercial policy as well as competition policy and the internal market11.  
But over time the ideas of how integration should continue shifted towards 
intergovernmentalism, so more control was given to the national governments again12. And 
this came along with another phenomenon, namely Euroscepticism, of which the Maastricht 
Treaty can be regarded as displaying a certain degree13. This development came into the open 
i.e. by the fact that the number of Eurosceptic parties within the European Parliament and also 
within the Member States was growing14. One reason for this skepticism in the population is 
that the citizens of the European Union are of the opinion that European integration means the 
loss  of  national  identity,  how  recent  studies  show.  To  clarify  this,  an  example  of  a  
Eurobarometer from 2006 can be mentioned. It shows that UK citizens are among those most 
afraid of losing their national identity, with over 60% being afraid, whereas the average was 
39%15. These developments show that diversity was and still is a matter of great importance.  
Nevertheless it can be argued that there is remarkable obedience of the Member States 
regarding European obligations16. Such obligations can be to apply Union law instead of the 
respective national law in case the latter is contrary to Union law and enacted later in time. Or 
there  is  the  obligation  not  to  disregard  Union  law  in  case  it  conflicts  with  national  
constitutional law17. As the enforcement of EU law is a matter left to the national courts, the 
Union couldn’t do without them. 
Interestingly the national constitutional courts do not regard themselves to be obliged to 
accept EU law because Union law imposes such a duty on them, but because their respective 
constitutions themselves authorize such effect18. To give but a few examples, the UK finds the 
basis concerning the applicability of EU law in the 1972 Act, Ireland sees the European 
Community  Act  as  its  ground  for  justification;  Denmark  also  has  a  national  statute  
                                                             
6 L. Besselink, “National Identity before and after Lisbon”, Utrecht Law Review 6 (2010), p. 37. 
7 Foster, EU Law Directions, p. 5. 
8 D. Chalmers, European Union Public Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 185-186. 
9  Besselink, National Identity before and after Lisbon, p. 39. 
10 N. Foster, EU Law Directions, p. 119-120. 
11 G. Beck, „The Lisbon judgment of the German Constitutional Court, the primacy of EU law and the problem 
of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: A conflict between right and right in which there is no preator”, European Law 
Journal 17 (2011), p. 489. 
12 Cini and Borragán, European Union Politics, p. 86-90. 
13 Besselink, National Identity before and after Lisbon, p. 40 . 
14 I. Aronstein, “‘The Union shall respect cultural diversity and national identities’ Lisbon’s concessions to 
Euroscepticism – true promises or a boody-trap?”, Utrecht Law Review 6 (2010), p. 91. 
15 Cini and Borragán, European Union Politics, p. 399. 
16 W. Phelan, “Political Self-Control and European Constitution: The Assumption of national political loyalty to 
European obligations as solution to the lex posterior problem of EC law in the national legal orders”, European 
Law Journal 16 (2010), p. 253. 
17 Ibid, p. 254. 
18 J. Gerards, “Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine”, European Law Journal 17 
(2011), p. 83. 
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implementing the European Treaties as well as Article 20 of the Danish Constitution and 
lastly also Germany founds the application of EU law on the Zustimmungsgesetz19 together 
with Articles 23 and 24 (1) of the German Constitution20. This attitude is reflected in the case 
Brunner v European Union Treaty where  Germany  refers  to  itself  as  the  “Masters  of  the  
Treaties” that has deliberately given powers to the Union, but could also just implement an act 
with the opposite effect21.   
It can be seen that those national constitutional courts all found a way to accept the power the 
EU has and those approaches have been categorized into European constitutional sovereignty,  
national constitutional sovereignty and constitutional tolerance22. The first category, European 
constitutional sovereignty, would refer to those Member states that unconditionally accept EU 
supremacy,  but  at  the  time  no  national  constitutional  court  can  be  found  to  belong  to  this  
category. The second category, unconstitutional sovereignty, denies EU sovereignty, but 
regards  the  national  constitutional  courts  as  sovereign.  An  example  to  be  found  within  this  
category is Poland, whose Constitutional Tribunal declared absolute supremacy of Polish law 
over Community law23. The last category, constitutional tolerance, is a position taken by most 
Member States in which they recognize the special status of EU law as they consider it not to 
violate their constitutional foundation, but they nevertheless see themselves as being able to 
ultimately decide on the question of authority. 
This position is taken by Germany and the details are elaborated in the case Gauweiler v 
Treaty of Lisbon24, which is in most literature only referred to as the Lisbon judgment. Here it 
was held by the German Constitutional Court that a violation of the constitutional identity 
which is codified in Article 79.3 of the Basic Law would constitute an infringement of 
constituent power which is given to the people. Furthermore it is stipulated that sovereign 
powers are granted to the European Union only if inter alia the Member States’ constitutional 
identity was protected and that its sovereign statehood was maintained. 
So what is the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union? It regards itself as the 
ultimate arbiter when it comes to scope, validity and interpretation of EU law, as supremacy 
does not only include the Treaty articles but also secondary legislation such as case law. The 
question of who limits EU legislative competence, the ECJ on the basis of supremacy or the 
national constitutional courts of the Member States is referred to as Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
and has given rise to much debate25. 
The Member States underline their point of view by raising the issue of democracy. It can be 
argued that the primacy of national constitutional law can only be evaded by creating a 
European Constitution. One reasoning is that until such time as a European people would 
come into existence, the only way to legitimize democracy is to regard the Member States as 
possessing sovereignty, at least concerning the most essential fields26.   
This section shows that the principles of sovereignty and primacy of EU law have to be seen 
from different perspectives and it also becomes clear that an ultimate solution has not yet been 
found. Nevertheless those various judicial claims might be able to be mediated. One 
possibility could be found in Article 4 (2) TEU27. 
                                                             
19 The German Act implementing EU law 
20 Phelan, Political Self-Control and European Constitution: The Assumption of national political loyalty to 
European obligations as solution to the lex posterior problem of EC law in the national legal orders, p. 258-263. 
21 Brunner v European Union [1994] 1 CMLR 57, para. 55. 
22 Chalmers, European Union Public Law, p. 190-194. 
23 K. Kowalik-Banczyk, “Should we Polish it up? The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the idea of supremacy 
of EU law”, German Law Journal 6 (2005), p. 1365. 
24 Gauweiler v Treaty of Lisbon [2009] 2 BvE 2/08 
25 Beck, The Lisbon judgment of the German Constitutional Court, the primacy of EU law and the problem of 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz: A conflict between right and right in which there is no preator, p. 471. 
26 Ibid, p. 475. 
27 Chalmers, European Union Public Law, p. 201. 
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3. Historical Development of Article 4(2) TEU  
 
The  foundation  for  today’s  Article  4  (2)  TEU can  be  found in  Article  5  of  Section  1  of  the  
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), which dates back to 1958. 
Here the Member States were asked to facilitate the achievement of the Community aims. In 
the Maastricht Treaty under Article F (1) the Union is then called to respect the national 
identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of 
democracy. This imperative gained status after the Amsterdam Treaty came into force in 
Article 6 (3). And also the Constitutional Treaty addressed the relationship between EU law 
and constitutional law directly in Article 1-628. Today it reads in Article 4 (2) TEU: 
 
‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their 
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, 
inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, 
including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and 
safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility 
of each Member State.’  
 
The development which can be seen is that the earlier versions of the so-called identity clause 
did  not  fall  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ECJ29. Since Lisbon it does and has already been 
referred to in the case Sayn-Wittgenstein30. In this case Mrs. Sayn-Wittgenstein, an Austrian 
national residing in Germany, acquired the noble title “Fürstin” after adoption. The Austrian 
authorities changed her surname though as the law on the abolition of the nobility prohibited 
such titles31. The Austrian Federal Administrative Court then referred the question on whether 
Article 21 TFEU precluded legislation on the recognition of surnames in one Member State, 
in so far as it contained titles impermissible under the constitutional law of the other Member 
State32.  The Court noted that the Union is to respect the national identity of its Member 
States, which includes the status of the State as Republic33.  But  also  before  Lisbon  the  
protection of national identities was seen by the Court as a possible ground for justification 
concerning a limitation on certain fundamental freedoms, which can i.e. be seen in the case 
Commission v Luxemburg34.    
It can therefore be said that Article 4 (2) TEU displays the federal structure of the European 
Union and its Member States which cannot be interpreted as being hierarchical as both sides 
are to a certain degree dependent on each other to achieve their goals. On the side of the 
Union this dependence rests on the fact that it needs the Member States to enforce and 
implement Union law and on the side of the Member States this dependence can be seen in 
the need for national interests to be reached at Union level35.  
It can also be said that Article 4 (2) TEU represents a turning point in the development of the 
European Union. Whereas sovereignty was taken away from the Member States in the past, it 
is  now  ascertained  to  them  as  the  Member  States  are  seen  as  the  foundation  of  the  Union.  
Instead of creating a European Identity overriding the constitutional core of the Member 
                                                             
28 Vorndran, Art. 4 und 5 EUV n. F. – Zum Schutz der Kompetenzabgrenzung- und ausübung, p. 2. 
29 A. von Bogdandy and S. Schill, “Overcoming absolute primacy: Respect for national identity under the Lisbon 
Treaty”, Common Market Law Review 48 (2011), p. 1422. 
30  Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein [2010] 
31 Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein, para. 3. 
32 Ibid, 35. 
33 Ibid, 92. 
34 Case C-473/93, Commission v Luxemburg [1996] ECR I-3207 
35 Bogdandy and Schill, Overcoming absolute primacy: Respect for national identity under the Lisbon Treaty, p. 
1425. 
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States, their national identities are now respected36. This makes Article 4 (2) TEU represent 
the notion of pluralism which can also be found in the motto of the European Union “United 
in diversity”37. The fundamental constitutional settings vary considerably throughout Europe 
as we find republics, such as in Germany and constitutional monarchies, such as in the 
Netherlands or the United Kingdom; we also find parliamentary and semi-presidential 
systems38. Article 4(2) TEU stresses the equality between all Member States and can therefore 
not only be referred to as identity clause, but also equality clause39.   
This section shows that the idea of protecting national identities is basically as old as the 
European Union itself. But the meaning and also the scope of this protection have 
considerably changed over time. The following section explores the actual meaning of 
national identity and in what sense it is used in Article 4 (2) TEU. 
 
 
4. The Concept of National Identity  
 
National  Identity  is  first  and  foremost  a  particular  form of  identity,  whereas  identity  can  be  
defined as positioning the self opposed  to  the  others40. As national identity is composed of 
ethnical, cultural, territorial, economical and legal-political elements, it can be argued that 
national identity is the positioning of the national self opposed to foreign41. For this reason the 
crucial features of national identity are a common territory, common myths and memories, a 
common economy and public culture as well as legal rights and duties for each member42.  
Nevertheless, ambiguity exists as regards the notion of national identity, whereas it can be 
said  that  its  scope  is  more  limited  than  the  traditional  concept  of  State  sovereignty43.  If  we  
now look at the notion of national identity as used in the Treaty on the European Union 
attention  is  first  of  all  drawn  to  the  fact  that  Article  4(2)  refers  to  national  identities  in  the  
plural, which can be interpreted as recognizing that a Member State might have a 
multinational identity or the plural represents plurality within the Union44.   
If the text of Article 4(2) TEU is compared to its predecessors the link made to the 
“fundamental structures, political and constitutional” draws a clear line separating the notion 
of national identity from elements such as culture, language or history45. So even though the 
origin of the term national identity is of a considerably wider scope, it is used in the Treaty as 
only  to  encompass  those  elements  which  are  enshrined  in  the  constitutions  of  the  Member  
States46.  
It has been argued that this limitation in scope is necessary as otherwise any question of EU 
law could be linked to the national identity of a Member State which would lead to the Union 
operating less efficiently47. Nevertheless what falls within the ambit of national identity of 
one Member State does not necessarily need to be part of the constitutional foundations of 
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another48. The French Constitutional Council stated in 2006 that it could not allow a directive 
violating the French national identity unless the pouvoir constituant would approve it49. In 
case law certain fundamental principles such as the rule of law, the principle of democracy or 
the principle of federalism have been accepted50. Another example is the Czech Constitutional 
Court which sees the protection of national minorities and ethnic groups as being part of their 
constitutional heritage51.  
As mentioned before the German Federal Constitutional Court gave in its Lisbon judgment a 
very elaborate definition of the German national identity52. Reference was made to Article 79 
(3) of the German Constitution to define the country’s national identity, which encompasses a 
prohibition to change elements that could affect democracy, the rule of law, the welfare State, 
the federal structure of Germany and the protection of human dignity53.  
This section shows that there is a difference between the actual concept of national identity as 
applied in literature or philosophy and the meaning of it as used in the Treaties. Furthermore 
an exact definition cannot be given, as each Member State perceives its constitutional 
foundations to be attached to different values, whereas it needs to be said that certain core 
concepts are to be found in every Member State.  
 
 
5. Legal Effects of Article 4 (2) TEU 
 
As can be understood from the aforementioned section the legal protection awarded to 
national identities is not absolute in nature. Article 4 (2) TEU should more be regarded as an 
exception granted to the Member States in cases they fear a severe encroachment upon their 
fundamental rights. It can therefore be seen more as another test of proportionality that puts 
the Member States in a position where they have a measure at their disposal to prevent 
disproportionate interference by the Union54. This balancing of interests can also be seen in 
the case Sayn-Wittgenstein where the Court held that a national measure, namely the abolition 
of nobility in Austria, had to be taken into consideration to balance the right of free movement 
of persons in the European Union55.   
Article 4 (2) TEU therefore has the effect of requiring the Union to leave sufficient room to 
the Member States concerning the implementation of certain community measures such as 
directives or it might have to consider exceptional opt-out possibilities for Member States 
whose national identity is affected56. Taken a step further it can be argued that in case no such 
exception is provided for Article 4 (2) TEU offers the possibility to justify non-compliance 
with an EU measure and by doing so a Member State could effectively limit the primacy of 
Union law57.  
Though it has not yet been recognized by the ECJ that Article 4 (2) TEU had such a function 
as to limit the principle of primacy it did recognize in the Michaniki58 case that the law of the 
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Member States cannot easily be overlooked and thereby gave Article 4 (2) TEU a certain 
normative weight59. But the question about who is the ultimate arbiter, and therefore deciding 
on what exactly constitutes national identity, remains open. The ECJ does not have the power 
to do so, as it would require interpreting national constitutional law. This would not be 
compatible with Article 19 TEU. For this reason it could be argued that it is the exercise of 
the Member States to establish the scope of national identity and left to the Court to examine 
the meaning of the disputed Union law60.  
It can be argued that there are procedures since the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon with 
which it is tried to fulfill the promise made in Article 4 (2) TEU. First of all a Member State is 
now able to withdraw from the Union in case it regards its national identity infringed in an 
intolerable manner and secondly there is the emergency break procedure, which also presents 
a possibility to have a State’s interest protected61. Nevertheless it can be said that the 
willingness of the Member States to limit their sovereign power is not always as present as the 
Union might infer in order to be effective in their work62.  
It can be observed from this section that Article 4 (2) TEU is a measure which can be used by 
the Member States to protect their national constitutional identities. And even though it has 
not yet explicitly been acknowledged by the ECJ that Article 4 (2) TEU would have the 
power as to limit EU primacy, it must be admitted that it does limit the powers of the Union 
as such. And it can also be thought of Article 4 (2) TEU as constituting a way to scrutinize the 
democratic aspect of the Union63.  But  as  this  provision  is  a  recent  development  a  clear  and  
definite answer as to how powerful it really is in limiting EU sovereignty is left to be seen. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In context of the history and development of the European Union Article 4 (2) TEU can be 
seen as a necessary expression of how integration is perceived. Member States are no longer 
willing to watch inactively how the Union gains more and more power. Even though they 
willingly grant powers to the Union, they also want to make sure to be part of the legislative 
development. Article 4 (2) TEU makes it possible for the Member States to prevent an 
intrusion upon what constitutes their national identities. An exact definition of this identity 
cannot be provided, as each Member State might regard other elements as fundamental. It is 
however certain that national identity only encompasses those fundamental elements found in 
a constitution, so protection is limited in scope as i.e. the protection of cultural or historical 
aspects might not receive any consideration. But overall a quite similar understanding of 
national constitutional identity is to be found among the Member States.  
To conclude it can be said that Article 4 (2) TEU does not grant unlimited discretion to the 
Member States, but even though it will ultimately be the ECJ to decide on the effect of Article 
4  (2)  TEU,  it  will  not  have  the  competence  to  establish  the  content  of  a  Member  States’  
national identity. Furthermore this identity clause recognizes a pluralistic conception that 
exists between Union law on the one hand and the national constitutional law on the other 
hand. It recognizes that a certain degree of acceptance and trust is necessary in the European 
Union, but that certain values must not be shared. We find the motto of the European Union 
“United in diversity” confirmed through the protection given to national identities.  So the 
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question on whether Article 4 (2) TEU constitutes a possible way to limit EU supremacy can 
in the author’s opinion be answered in the affirmative, even though it is difficult to determine 
how far this limiting power goes at this point in time. 
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REFERENDA: THE WAY TO A MORE DEMOCRATIC EUROPEAN 
UNION? 
 
Albane Flamant 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
During  its  short  history,  the  European  Union  (EU)  has  often  had  to  face  criticism  for  its  
democratic deficit. In some occasions and especially after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, 
governments of member states have sought the support of their population through referenda 
when faced with important EU reforms or even the question of their country’s accession to the 
European Union. The results of these votes were not always favourable to the Union. The 
most striking example of this trend was the 2005 rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the 
populations of two founding EU member states, France and the Netherlands. Interestingly 
enough, some members of the Laeken drafting convention originally wanted this Treaty to be 
approved by a Europe-wide referendum.1 This approach was however deemed to be too 
federal and it was decided that the decision to hold a referendum should be left to the Member 
States.2 As a result, several countries such as Spain, the UK, France and the Netherlands 
decided to hold a referendum, while the others stuck with the traditional ratification process 
through parliamentary approval. After positive results in the first few countries, the dismissal 
of the Treaty by two founding members of the EU came as a shock and had a great impact on 
the subsequent development of the Union.  
 In the midst of an economic and identity crisis because of which the legitimacy of the EU is 
more questioned than ever, this paper will attempt to assess the validity of the use of referenda 
for the ratification process of something as complex as an European Union Treaty. In the first 
part of this paper, we will expose the arguments of supporters and proponents of plebiscite, 
and compare it to statistics and polls completed during the Irish, French and Dutch referenda 
when relevant. The author will then discuss the impact of these referenda on the development 
of the Union while arguing for the lack of real value of public vote in the ratification process 
of  a  European  Union  Treaty.  We will  then  examine  the  prospects  for  democracy  within  the  
Union.  
 
 
2. Main Body 
 
First we will look at the arguments put forward by both sides in the academic debate 
discussing the value of referendum for democracy.  
 
2.1 How Informed are They Really? 
 
One of the core arguments of referenda supporters is that this tool provides for an incentive 
for government and other political actors to channel more quality information to the public on 
the issue.3 This trend usually goes along with an increase in the demand of information from 
the public4. Different studies and Eurobarometer data from 1992 to 1997 show that people are 
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indeed better informed on the EU in countries in which referenda are held.5 In  the  general  
context of referenda, another study led by Mendelson and Culter supported this conclusion, 
stating that the knowledge gap between the previously well and poorly informed was indeed 
reduced.6 However, they underlined the fact that this change was actually very modest. An 
additional consideration in the first study mentioned was that the EUbarometer questions 
assessing EU knowledge were not ideal since they did not address specific treaty knowledge.7 
Moreover one might wonder whether the level of information of the voters, even if it is 
increased prior to the referendum itself, is sufficient for them to make an informed decision:  
After the Constitutional Treaty referendum, 34 percent of the French ‘No’ voters stated they 
had troubles understanding what the Treaty was meant to achieve8. This was a recurring 
phenomenon in the 2009 Irish referendum.9The problem here is not the intellectual capacity 
of voters but rather the fact that being well informed on such a complex topic demands time 
and dedication. Interestingly enough, studies found that the 2009 ‘Yes’ voters were as 
uninformed as their ‘No’ counterparts10. This phenomenon is thus widespread, no matter the 
direction of the vote.  
A possible counter-argument to this insufficient level of information of voters would be that 
in the case of the Constitutional Treaty, the EU had not planned for any communication 
budget. Nonetheless, the drafting process of this treaty had been more democratic and open to 
public than ever before in EU history: the proceedings were not held behind closed doors, the 
usual Council ministers were replaced by European and National representatives, and all the 
resulting documents and minutes were made available online.11 Yet voters were faced with a 
treaty of 450 articles, in addition to over 300 pages of protocol12.  How  likely  was  it  that  a  
majority of voters were going to take the time to read it article after article? Even if they did, 
how many of them had the knowledge and formation required to thoroughly understand its 
implications in terms or democracy or economy? It is an accepted fact that many citizens do 
not have a very thorough understanding of the workings of the European Union13. In this 
mindset, the population had to rely on the media, which tended to pick what they thought to 
be the most interesting issues and to explain them within the domestic political frame.14 Each 
of  these  channels  shaped  the  debate  according  to  their  political  leaning  and  sphere  of  
lobbying. Also, the media debate was actually heavily influenced by politicians and other 
relevant actors from neighbouring countries, who took a great interest in what was happening 
in France and the Netherlands.15  
Another argument advanced by the pro-side is that because referenda are public votes based 
on  an  issue,  not  a  person,  they  are  less  personal  and  thus  involve  more  substantial  
discussions16. However, we have seen that in the 2005 referenda, interests groups such as 
feminists or extreme political parties picked either side of the issue and indeed made it very 
personal. The stances taken by these interest groups in favour of one side or the other did not 
at  all  reflect  the  consequences  of  the  vote  they  advocated.  For  example,  many  of  the  ‘No’  
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campaigns were centred on a protest for more democracy within the Union.17Yet this was 
precisely one of the goals of the Constitutional Treaty, which was to be achieved through a 
greater involvement of national parliaments, new voting procedures and the introduction of 
the citizen’s initiative.18 This is also one more example of the relative ignorance of the voters 
leading up to the Constitutional Treaty referendum.  
 
 
2.2  Democratic Deficit and the Voters’ Perception of the Union 
 
Still, the core argument of referendum advocates lays in the democratic deficit of the 
European Union. Critics argue that the only way to take care of the lack of citizen 
involvement within the Union is to practice a more direct democracy through the use of 
referenda. It is additionally argued with reason that the least citizens are involved in the 
functioning of their government, the more they will not approve the policies and decisions of 
this same government.19If nothing is done to decrease the democratic deficit of the EU, this 
will further undermine the legitimacy of the Union, which is already questioned to a large 
extent in the context of the current economic crisis. However, as mentioned before in this 
paper, reducing the EU democratic deficit was precisely one of the main purposes of the 
Constitutional Treaty and this issue was consequently dealt with on many levels: 
generalization of the ordinary legislative procedure, introduction of national parliaments 
within the legislative process, creation of the citizen’s initiative, etc.20  
In addition, plebiscites are often no more than a second-order vote that the population uses to 
convey its opinion of the incumbent government or of another more general issue. 21 Once 
again, the French and Dutch referenda provide plenty of examples of national voters who 
decided on their vote based on things that had nothing to do with Treaty measures: their 
discontent with French President Jacques Chirac, their fear of the mythical Polish Plumber, 
their anti-Euro views, etc.22 In the case of France, the example of the Polish Plumber is 
telling: a study reveals that opening up to Poland had actually benefited France between 1994 
and 2004.23 Actually, at the time of the referendum, which was a year after the EU eastward 
enlargement, only 200 Polish plumbers worked on the French territory, and the plumbing 
industry was missing over 6,000 qualified plumbers to answer the French demand.24  
Referenda are denatured by interest groups who shape the issue to make it fit their agenda and 
obtain popular support, and as such do not represent the popular opinion as well as populist 
views suggest it. The fact that over 80 percent of the French ‘No’ voters were polled to 
ultimately be in support of their country’s membership to the European Union supports this 
view.25 Another possible interpretation of this disparity would be to say that while voters were 
supportive of France’s involvement in the European Union, they wanted the EU to go in a 
different direction. However, given the main concerns of the French ‘No’ voters were the 
disapproval of their president and unemployment,26 it  is  difficult  to  see  how  to  change  the  
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Union  based  on  these  two  issues.  The  first  one  is  clearly  domestic,  even  in  the  event  the  
French meant to question Chirac’s decisions in terms of EU policies (they could elect a pro-
EU  president  for  the  next  term),  while  the  second  one  is  a  matter  of  economic  policy.  The  
recent expansion of the EU to its ten newest members may have played a role here, but again, 
this had nothing to do with the question that was asked in the referendum.  The results of the 
Dutch referenda were even more surprising: According to Eurobarometers, the population of 
the Netherlands had been known to be the most fervent supporter of European integration 
among all founding members all the way since the 1970s.27 A similar trend could be observed 
during the 2009 Irish referendum, in which the EU was estimated to be supported by 89 
percent of all voters.28 Yet these three countries were supporters of the EU but rejected its 
treaties.  
Another interesting parallel to draw is the difference between the approval rates of French and 
Dutch governments compared to the ones in Spain, a country in which the Constitutional 
Treaty was easily accepted through a referendum shortly before the French and Dutch fiasco. 
While the French President Jacques Chirac was in a very controversial position (40 percent of 
the ‘No’ French voters stated they wanted to give him a lesson through their vote), the 
Spanish Zapatero government was in its first months of tenure and was still very well 
perceived by the Spaniards.29 While it  would be very simplistic to state that  the rejection of 
the Treaty was solely the result of a non-confidence vote geared towards the governments of 
France and the Netherlands, it is still a factor that should be taken into consideration in the 
evaluation of these referenda.  
 
2.3  Less Democracy and No Solutions 
 
Referenda provide for some other unwanted side effects. For example, the opinion reflected 
by the referendum will only tell the majority’s point of view. There will no representation of 
the many small minority groups existing within the country in which the referendum is held, 
which leads to the disenfranchisement of part of the population.30 It would consequently be 
very hard to provide fair protections to these minorities if the use of referenda was 
generalized.  
Additionally, referenda give a black or white answer that does not provide much direction for 
the European Union, especially if it is negative. In the case of the Constitutional Treaty, EU 
officials did not know what to do and the treaty’s rejection was followed by a two-year period 
of stagnation in the EU decision-making.31 Disturbed by the contradicting messages sent by 
the negative Dutch and French Referenda, the European Council failed to approve the 2007-
2013 budget.32 The impact of this rejection was significant, but left the Union clueless on the 
direction to follow next. In the later process of the drafting of the Lisbon treaty, the members 
of the Convention demonstrated their unease when some Member States stated their intention 
to hold referenda to ratify the document.33 In the end, all of them went along with ratification 
through parliamentary procedure, except Ireland, in which a referendum was constitutionally 
required.34  
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More importantly, there was a substantial change in the drafting process of the Lisbon Treaty 
itself. While the Laeken convention was unusually composed of national and European 
parliamentary representatives, the governmental ministers were back for Lisbon. The national 
parliaments still had a veto power on the Lisbon amendments, but their involvement was 
much  more  remote.  Overall,  this  was  a  step  back  in  the  fight  against  the  EU  democratic  
deficit.  
Another side effect is how these referenda affect the voting dynamics of the European Union. 
The fact that referenda are only held in certain Member States skews the democratic process 
by giving more influence to these states in the negotiations.35 One could even argue that this 
situation is a serious breach of treaty law: If we look at Art. 2 & 3 TEU, along with Art. 18 
TFEU, the two treaties expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of liability. Even though 
it is understandable that states would want to make the decision of having a referendum or 
not, this may be considered discrimination on the base of nationality, and in itself a very 
undemocratic process. If the Union was to continue to allow the use of referenda, it should 
allow the whole EU population to give their opinion, or stick with the previous procedure of 
ratification by government representatives with the assent of their national parliament.  
Where does this leave us in regards of democracy within the Union? While the EU has been 
largely criticized for its democratic deficit, in some ways it is modelled after its Member 
States, which are all using a government system based on representative democracy. 
European parliamentary representatives are directly elected to form an institution that is 
increasingly involved in the day-to-day functioning of the Union. In the same fashion, the 
Council of Ministers and the European Council are composed of members indirectly elected 
to serve in this position. The only European institution falling outside of that scope is the 
Commission, whose members are nonetheless elected through a process involving the 
European Parliament. In the case of the three first institutions, the fact that their 
representatives are directly elected through a set of national elections has given them a 
mandate that legitimizes their decisions.36  
In  many ways,  one  could  argue  that  EU citizens  almost  have  as  much influence  on  the  EU 
institutions that on their own national ones: as mentioned above, whether directly or 
indirectly, they have a say in the composition of most of the institutions of the EU, with the 
Commission that could be seen as equivalent to a Chancellor appointed by his directly elected 
peers (the European Parliament and the Council)37.  They  also  have  influence  on  the  Union  
through their domestic politics: the elections of their national leaders may be influenced by 
European Union affairs, since for example their support of an unpopular country’s adhesion to 
the Union could sway the next national elections in the favour of their opponent.38 
The problem however is that these national representatives tend not to take European issues to 
their electorate.39 This phenomenon can be observed on many levels: The European 
Parliament elections, for example, are currently playing a very secondary role in the mind of 
EU citizens, 40 and national parties just do not tend to have a European Agenda to present to 
their  voters.  All  of  this  contributes  to  the  overall  perception  of  the  EU  as  a  less  important  
issue for the public. On the European level, there has already been a small effort, with the 
statement in the Treaty on the European Union that EU political parties should contribute to 
forming political awareness and expressing the will of the Union (Art. 10 TEU). For this 
purpose, they have been provided with funding through Art. 224 TFEU. This effort should be 
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extended to the national level so that the elections of the European Parliament will not be seen 
as second order ones.  
According to Bowler, ‘the main problem is that people do not trust the elected officials and 
thus feel the need to be more involved in governance despite the lack of a substantive base of 
factual information as well as a potentially low desire of being involved in policy-making.41’ 
In this mindset, there needs to be a trade-off between direct and representative democracy. 
Representatives have incentives to become knowledgeable on the issue they are responsible 
for, while voters usually lack the knowledge to understand deeper policies issues.42 While the 
representative’s opinion does not always represent the voice of its constituency, it is 
preferable that he is the one making the decision, especially on issues on which citizens do 
feel strongly about.43 It is true that referenda are the only way to directly ascertain the popular 
will, but it should only be used in specific situations. Issues presented for the approval of 
citizens should be simple and straight-forward as to the consequences of the vote going one 
way or the other. They may be best used on questions of culture or morals, such as abortion or 
the death penalty, or on another level, on the accession to an international organization such 
as the European Union. Such referenda may assess the overall perception of the public on the 
issue, and thus help guide the legislator on how to best represent the popular will while taking 
into  account  the  everyday  reality  of  governance.  But  more  importantly,  an  effort  should  be  
made in terms of communicating with the representatives, and holding them accountable. A 
possible way to achieve this goal is for the citizens to be more involved as active members of 
their political parties.  
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The examples drawn from the experience of the Constitutional Treaty referenda were used to 
demonstrate their inadequacy for general treaty ratification. Some of the reasons for this 
inadequacy include the difficulty for voters to be sufficiently informed, the lack of connection 
between the questions voters are answering through their vote and the question asked by the 
referendum and the fact that referenda fail to provide a course of action, especially when 
answered negatively.  
This situation may be compared to a patient who could decide if the treatment proposed by his 
doctor is appropriate to cure his disease. In this situation, people would generally not be 
offended if they were told they do not have the necessary knowledge and formation to make 
that  call.  There  might  be  some  decisions  that  the  doctor  will  submit  to  the  approval  of  the  
patient,  but  they  will  rather  be  linked  to  the  way  the  patient  wants  to  live  than  to  the  
technicalities of the treatment. The issue will be more philosophical than practical. An 
example would be a patient refusing to undergo chemotherapy because he feels that it is not 
compatible with his lifestyle.  
This does not mean that the opinion of the public does not matter, on the contrary. An 
engaged public provide for a better quality of representation because of the increased level of 
accountability demanded, as well as the usually more selective election process. In the same 
way  EU  citizens  may  decide  on  electing  new  leaders  for  their  country  or  for  the  European  
Parliament if they are unhappy with the direction taken by the Union, the patient may decide 
to go to another doctor. In addition to elections, citizens may influence the day-to-day EU life 
in many other ways: a great example is the European citizen’s initiative, which is a great 
                                                             
41 Bowler and al., ‘Enraged or Engaged? References for Direct Citizen Participation in Affluent Democracies’, 
60 Political Research Quarterly 3 (2007), p. 353. 
42 Kessler, ‘Representative Versus Direct Democracy: the Role of Informational Assymmetrics, 112 Public 
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opportunity for motivated citizens to provide for legislative ideas. Given that the regulation 
putting this initiative into place only allows for the first one to be launched in April 2012, we 
have currently no experience of its practical shortcomings. Its procedure might have to be 
adjusted to make sure that the citizen’s voice will be heard by the Commission, for example 
by putting into place a right of appeal to the ECJ for the initiators if the Commission rejects 
their proposal.   
In  this  mindset,  it  is  necessary  for  the  Union  to  find  ways  to  interest  its  citizens  to  the  EU 
project, since it is in many ways impacting their lives as much as their national government. 
However this is a challenge faced at both the European and domestic levels: It is difficult to 
get people involved in the democratic process, no matter where you are. The best account for 
this phenomenon is the low rate of participation of voters in countries in which voting is not 
mandatory. Nonetheless, the EU should double its efforts to get people to be more 
knowledgeable about the functioning of the EU in general, as well as to get them to demand a 
more specific European agenda from their national parties. One of the goals here is to make 
people realize that European elections are in no way of secondary order: decisions taken on 
EU level affect the way we travel, the way we work, the way we eat, the way we study, etc. 
Citizens currently have so many possibilities to influence the course of EU decision-making. 
In addition to all the ones that have been mentioned, they also have the right to challenge, 
directly or indirectly through their national parliaments, relevant EU legislation or even acts 
of the Commission. What they need is to be more aware of these possibilities, as well of the 
influence of the EU on their everyday life. For that purpose, there should be even more 
information and transparency.  
In many ways, the EU representative system set out by the Lisbon Treaty provides for much 
more democratic safeguards than referenda, in which emotions run as high as during a 
football match: the voters will rather side with the loudest fans than base their choice on a 
rational evaluation of the situation. As a result of the use of referenda, the opinion of several 
minority groups are left out, and the discriminatory way they have been used in 2005 and 
2009 has led to a skewing of the balance of voting powers in between member states. While a 
more engaged European citizenship is something we should thrive for within the European 
Union, referenda are just not the appropriate tool to achieve that goal.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The failure of the Constitutional Treaty, which will be further examined below, is here taken 
as an example in order to explain why democracy appears to be an unsuitable mean to ratify 
the European Treaties. The paper will try to do so by analysing the more immediate and 
practical reasons (i.e., lack of knowledge or lack of interest in the Union’s affairs) which will 
be then reconnected to deeper causes, such as the citizens’ attachment to their own national 
identities and the consequent inexistence of a common European identity.  
With the peoples so strongly related to their national collective consciences (as intended in the 
light of Durkheim’s theory), the European experience can only remain an intergovernmental 
one, in which the political elites and the heads of state will keep negotiating and reaching 
agreements way too far from the citizens to even think that national referenda could be 
successful.  
The argument is that Europe is not ready for direct democracy and it might never be mature 
enough: the more time passes and the more its complexity grows, making it unthinkable that 
common citizens with few and limited information could be competent active participants of 
the ratification process.  
 
 
2. The History of the Failure  
 
In one of the declarations attached to the Treaty of Nice (2000), namely Declaration 23 on the 
Future of the Union, it was called for a ‘deeper and wider debate about the future of the 
European Union’, recognizing ‘the need to improve and to monitor the democratic legitimacy 
and transparency of the Union and its institutions, in order to bring them closer to the citizens 
of the Member States’ and encouraging ‘wide-ranging discussions with all interested parties: 
representatives of national parliaments and all those reflecting public opinion, namely 
political, economic and university circles, representatives of civil society, etc’.1 
Subsequently, in 2000, the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, gave a speech during 
which he launched a public political debate about the possibility of having a Constitution for 
Europe, showing that the political elite was ready to take a step towards the citizens.2 
Upon the desire to bring the Union closer to the people (as expressed in the mentioned 
Declaration 23), the Member States met at the Convention on the Future of Europe which 
opened in Brussels in February 2002 and began working at what, one year later, was called 
the Draft Constitutional Treaty. The draft was then presented to the Intergovernmental 
Conference (ICG) in October 2003 where the Members agreed that they had time until 
October 2004 to complete the ratification process: on that date the Constitutional Treaty was 
signed by all the States.3 However, it never entered into force. 
 
                                                             
1 Declaration  23  to  the  Treaty  of  Nice  on  the  Future  of  the  Union,  final  act  available  on  
http://www.eurotreaties.com/nicefinalact.pdf (last visited on: 5 November 2011). 
2  G.  de  Búrca,  The EU Constitution: in Search of Europe’s International Identity, (Europa Law Publishing, 
2005), p.4. 
3 D. Chalmers, European Union Public Law, (Cambridge, 2007), p. 37. 
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3. The Immediate Causes of the Failure 
 
Article  447  of  the  Draft  established  that  the  Constitution  had  to  be  ratified  by  all  Member  
States according to their own national constitutional requirements, hence each State had a 
veto power on its entrance into force.4 
After October 2004, the Constitutional Treaty was ratified by parliamentary approval in 
Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, Greece, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria, Germany, 
Latvia, Cyprus, Malta, Belgium, and in Spain and Luxemburg via referenda.5 Regardless of 
these Member States’ support, in the end, the Constitution never became effective because 
vetoed by the popular referendums held in France and in the Netherlands.  
On May 29, 2005, 55% of  the citizens of France voted against the Constitutional Treaty, and 
so did the 61,6% of the Dutch on June 1, 2005, arresting like this the integration process for a 
‘period of reflection’.6 Other referendums were, in fact, scheduled for Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, and the UK, but these were all postponed after the French 
and Dutch negative outcomes.7 
Numerous studies and public surveys were conducted after the rejection in order to 
understand the reasons behind their ‘Nay’, and interestingly enough, it was found that many 
voted against it for the all kinds of reason but the Constitutional document in itself. 
In France, the opponents revealed that while casting their votes they were indirectly 
expressing their concerns about their domestic socio-economical issues, their general 
discontent with their own political class, and also their fear about the eastern enlargement, in 
particularly the possible entry in the Union of Turkey and the eventual availability of the 
cheap-labour of the east.8 To take a closer look at the data, 31% of the people that voted said 
‘no’ because they were scared of the estimated negative effects on their own economy 
(increases of unemployment and relocation of business), 18% rejected it as a way to prove his 
opposition  to  Jacque  Chirac  (the  French  President  at  the  time),  6%  did  it  to  show  their  
disapproval of a possible Turkish admission, and 3% disagreed with eastern enlargement in 
general.9  
In the Netherlands the situation was not much different: 32% of the opponents declared they 
lacked sufficient information about the constitutional text, 19% feared the loss of national 
sovereignty, 14% was opposing their national government and politics, and 7% stated that the 
Constitution would facilitate eastern enlargement, leading to a relocation and a loss of jobs.10 
As these numbers show us, in both countries when the people went to vote, they let their 
domestic political and economic concerns have the precedence over the Draft Treaty they 
were  voting  on.   Many  of  those  ‘No’  were  not  meant  to  express  a  rejection  of  the  
Constitutional text per se, but rather a way to slow down the whole integration process or to 
highlight  their  dissatisfactions  with  their  own  national  politicians.  For  the  Dutch  voters  the  
                                                             
4 Text of Article IV-447 available on http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:0186:0202:EN:PDF  (last visited on: 5 November 
2011). 
5J. Wouters et al., European Constitutionalism Beyond Lisbon, (Intersentia, 2009), p. 19-20 (table 2). 
6  R. Podolnjak, ‘Explaining the Failure of the European Constitution: A constitution-making Perspective’,  57 
Collected Papers of Zagreb Law Faculty (2007), p. 2. 
7 J. Wouters et al., European Constitutionalism, p. 20 (table 2). 
8  H. Milner, ‘Yes to the Europe I Want: NO to This One. Some Reflections on France’s Rejection of the EU 
Constitution’, 39 Political Science and Politics (2006), p. 257; and B. Stefanova, ‘The “No” Vote in the French 
and Dutch Referenda on the EU Constitution: A spillover of Consequences for the Wider Europe’, 39 Political 
Science and Politics (2006), p. 252. 
9 European Commission 2005 b, The European Constitution: Post-Referendum France Eurobarometer 171. 
(N.B. for all Eurobarometer data see http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm . 
10  European Commission 2005B, The European Constitution: Post-Referendum: Netherlands 
Eurobarometer 172. 
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referendum was merely an opportunity to ask Brussels to pay more attention to Dutch issues11 
and to address their concerns about the common currency and the economic consequences 
that the Euro had on their lives. The general perception was of ‘an institution costing too 
much and threatening both our jobs and our social securities’.12 
Lack of information, loss of national sovereignty, opposition to the national governments, 
expensiveness of Europe, future eastern enlargement, Turkey admission, loss of jobs and 
business relocation: these all the reasons for the French and the Dutch people to say NO. And 
yet the referendum was focusing on a complete different topic: should the Draft Constitutional 
Treaty be ratified, yes or no? The question looked very simple and straightforward, however, 
it contained ‘a multiplicity of demands and policy dimensions hardly captured by the question 
itself’13 and  the  domestic  political  elites  clearly  ‘failed  to  address  the  need  for  a  continued  
focus on the Constitution itself’, so that finally people forgot about the issue in question (i.e., 
the Constitutional Draft) and popular referenda proved themselves to be ‘of limited utility as 
an aggregate measure of the popular will in the EU’.14 
In her study ‘Taking Cues on Europe?’, Hobolt argues that competent voting depends on the 
information and stimuli provided to the public by the political elites15 and that the outcome of 
a referendum like the one that took place in 2005 would be seen as truly democratic only if 
the people had casted their choice in strict relation to the issue in question, but in fact the data 
show us that the voters said ‘no’ on the basis of ‘second-order’ factors related to their national 
concerns.16 
 
 
4. Deeper Causes of the Failure: Attachment to National Identities 
 
The mere fact that people voted on unrelated or second issues or that they did it aware of 
lacking the required knowledge is a symptom of a more general lack of interest in the Union’s 
affairs. As demonstrated by Aarts and van der Kolk, the Dutch newspapers were rarely 
attentive to European matters, while the public tended to show little interest towards active 
participation in the Union: the turnout of the EP’s elections in 2004 was 39%, a much lower 
rate compared to national elections.17 According to other studies across the EU, 79% of the 
people interviewed believed they were insufficiently informed, while 62% did not intend to 
participate in the debate at all, and that the support for democracy at the European level is 
20% less than the support for their national democracy.18 
This apparent apathy and, from time to time, even antipathy towards the Union could be 
reconnected to the sense of threat against national sovereignty and identity perceived among 
the countries.19  As Smith claims in his article, individuals ‘are afraid to let go of the old’,20 
they are holding tight to their national cultures. From a nationalist perspective, the nation-state 
is the only ‘legitimate government and political community’21 they may commit their loyalty 
                                                             
11  Milner, 39 Political Science and Politics (2006), p. 258. 
12 Aarts and van der Kolk, ‘Understanding the Dutch “No”: The Euro, the East, and the Elite’, 39 Political 
Science and Politics (2006), p. 243. 
13  G. Tsebelis, Veto Players, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 
2002), p. 117. 
14 Stefanova, 39 Political Science and Politics (2006), p. 254. 
15S. Hobolt, ‘Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and Party Endorsements in Referendums on the 
European Integration’, 46 European Journal of Political Research (2007), p. 177. 
16 S. Hobolt, 46 European Journal of Political Research (2007), p. 157. 
17 K . Aarts and H. van der Kolk, 39 Political Science and Politics (2006), p. 243. 
18  Eurobarometer, CEC 2001c. 
19 D. Dunkerley et al., Changing Europe- Identities, Nations and Citizens, (Routledge 2002), p. 119. 
20  A. Smith, ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity’, 68 International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs) (1992), p. 56. 
21  Ibid. 
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to: its members speak the same language, share the same memories, traditions, and history, 
they might even fought wars together for their own country, holding on to ‘shed blood, sweat, 
and tears’22 of the past. Their common heritage is what distinguish them from the others and 
before the European Coal and Steal Community was found in 1951, Europe was well known 
for its history of conflicts between sovereign and independent states.  
We  were  born  divided  and  now  it  is  very  difficult  for  us  to  fit  together.  Smith  calls  it  ‘the  
concept of collective cultural identity’,23  made of continuity, unity and perseverance. As 
humans, we love habits, they are comfortable, we tend to be a bit reluctant towards changes 
and  we  do  not  always  react  well  when  these  changes  are  rapid  and  imposed  upon  us  from  
outside. So even if the new generations might have lost that Romantic concept of nationalism 
and commitment to their land, it is still quite understandable why the majority of EU citizens 
believe they do not share a common identity.24 
The people declaring a stronger attachment for their national identity are 30% more than the 
ones declaring some sort of attachment to Europe:25 ‘national pride still runs very high in 
almost  all  EU  Member  States’.26 Therefore,  if  we  consider  a  constitution  as  ‘a  union  of  
people’27 and if we recognize that the ‘traditional political community’28 is missing, then it 
will not come to a surprise that the peoples of Europe did not accept the idea of a common 
Constitution. 
As further analysed by Podolnjak, the core of the problem lied in the fact that the Draft 
proposed was a very complex document, forged by experts and chiefs of state during 
intergovernmental negotiations and on which citizens should have not voted a simple ‘yes’ or 
‘no’, firstly because they did not have the necessary knowledge to formulate a competent and 
complete opinion on the matter, and secondly because such a simplistic approach was not 
capable of reflecting the multitude of aspects addressed in the proposed document.29 Instead 
he proposes a different kind of democracy for the Union: related to Stein’s study, his advice is 
to  submit  the  EU  institutions  under  a  greater  control  of  the  national  parliaments  during  the  
legislative process, i.e. he proposes a more extensive form of representative democracy, 
especially considering that direct democracy proved to be a dangerous instrument more than a 
tool for popular wise participation in the Union’s development.30 
The second observation advanced by Podolnjak is that maybe we should not force direct 
democracy to legitimize the European integration process, maybe the whole assumption that it 
is possible to transfer constitutional principles from a nation-state’s level to the Union’s is a 
wrong assumption. Perhaps the highly debated ‘democratic deficit’ is meant to persist due to 
the lack of ‘affinity of mutual understanding between the EU institutions and the citizens’31 
and we should not worry too much if the Union’s policy turns out completely different from 
the one envisaged in our countries. So that in the end, the very nature of the Constitution is to 
be  criticized:  the  Draft  Constitution  should  have  been  seen  as  a  ‘treaty’  more  than  as  a  
‘constitution’, should have been divested of all that empty constitutionalism, should have not 
been proposed to the people directly and should have been ratified by the national parliaments 
as any other international treaty. 
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23  Smith, 68, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs) (1992), p. 58. 
24  Eurobarometer CEC 2000. 
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26 D. Dunkerley et al., Changing Europe, p. 120. 
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5. National Identities and their Nexus with the Law: Durkheim’s Theory of Legal 
Development 
 
Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) played a crucial role in the modern analysis of the sociology of 
law. Particularly, he explained how law can hold societies together, preventing its members 
from taking different directions and communities from falling apart.32 
According to his view, a society is basically a moral system in which law is the explicit 
manifestation of common morals.33 The more society develops, the more human relations 
become complex and diversified. Each one finds his own occupation and each one becomes 
indispensable to the other so that, in the end, a net of interdependences is created.  
We are all necessary for the correct functioning of society, we all have interest in others, and 
that interest is what keeps us united. In other words, these economic dependences and 
exchanges are what bind us together in a permanent way.34 The modernization of society 
accentuated individualism without leading to the disappearance of solidarity: social solidarity 
and morality are still there and the law is their indicator.35 
If we look at this theory from a national perspective, we can see that social communities share 
ethical principles that are, to a certain extent, common to all its members. National 
communities recognize their identity inside their morals, their language, their ethical rules and 
perhaps even religion. They all possess a social solidarity of which the law is the objective 
and codified form.36 
This shared set of beliefs and values is what Durkheim defines as ‘collective conscience’.37 
From this we can deduce that a nation’s legal system is to be interpreted as the expression of 
the people’s morals, and its legitimacy lies in the fact that such moral rules are also the 
individuals’ rules. If you recognize yourself in a community and its law, then it is easier to 
accept it. But if Europe does not possess a common identity then its citizens do not feel any 
moral cohesion, hence they will not perceive the purpose of a common constitution. 
Actually what happened was the exact opposite: as they faced to possibility of an irreversible 
constitutionalism for Europe, they closed themselves even strongly behind their national 
‘collective consciences’. And if people do not identify themselves with the Union as an entity 
then it is easier to understand why popular enthusiasm was missing. 
 
 
6. Incompetent Voter: Direct Democracy Violated? 
 
The lack of a common European identity explains why the plebiscites failed so badly: direct 
democracy was misused in those referenda, and as Professor van der Mei pointed out in his 
article,  ‘when voters use the constitutional rights for the wrong reasons,  I  fail  to understand 
what  is  so  democratic  about  it.  In  fact,  it  would  rather  seem  an  insult  to  the  notion  of  
representative democracy, which is introduced not just for reasons of efficient decision-
making, but also to ensure that the decisions are taken by representatives who know what they 
are talking about’.38 
Precisely in relation to the aspect of incompetent voters, Hobolt published a political research 
in which she analyses the matter in depth. As she underlined, in 2004, 33% of the European 
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public had never heard of the Constitution and more than half of the interviewed was unable 
to answer correctly about specific questions related to the Draft39.  After the referendum, the 
Dutch voters (one-third) and the Spanish voters (one-quarter) affirmed that they felt not 
sufficiently informed about the text and, therefore, rejected it.40 
Even on more general basis, citizens appeared to be better informed about their national 
governments and politics, whereas they had a much lower knowledge about the whole 
functioning of the EU and its institutions.41 
We may also focus for a moment on another example of failed referendum, the one which was 
held on June 12, 2008 in Ireland on the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.42 53.4% voted against 
it due to lack of information, but also concerns about some national laws (abortion and 
neutrality laws) and the hypothetical pan-European army.43 Further studies demonstrated that 
lack of information played a major role in that case. Gora analyzed the Irish public press 
between the 6th and  the  12th of June 2008, namely The Evening Herald, The Irish 
Independent, The Irish Times.44 She argued that the key to form a competent electorate is to 
provide the people with neutral and accurate information (provided, of course, that these 
people read the newspapers on regular basis). With regards to neutrality, she found that 53% 
of the published statements were explicitly in favour of the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty: this 
is clearly not impartial enough.45 Concerning the correctness of the information, she 
discovered that 63% of the material related to the Treaty contained unsound or unreliable 
observations, and, occasionally, even false arguments.46 
This is shown here simply to prove how the public press may not be sufficient for building the 
knowledge necessary to the people before voting. Such a knowledge was highly necessary 
considering the complexity of the text in question. The Constitution had, in fact, a very 
technical wording, 448 articles with numerous protocols and declarations attached, for a total 
length of 470 pages on the Official Journal. It comes with no surprise that an average person 
felt insufficiently prepared to vote soundly and consciously on the document.  
 
 
7. The Missing Constitutional Spirit in Europe 
 
This  section  will  briefly  discuss  the  lack  of  a  deeper  notion  of  constitutionalism throughout  
the European political system by looking, firstly, at Podolnjak’s argument of the missing of a 
‘constitutional moment’ and, secondly, at the lack of a ‘constitutional patriotism’ as presented 
by Kumm. 
When Podolnjak writes about a constitutional moment he refers to a moment in time (which 
may  be  either  short  or  last  a  few  years)  that  is  particularly  suitable  for  the  ratification  of  a  
constitution.47 His argumentation appears quite logical: history teaches us how great 
constitutions came after revolutionary moments during which people were excited and in need 
of having a new codified set of laws to insure the restored order. The author mentions 
Professor Edward McWhinney’s work Constitution-making in which he elaborates on the 
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matter. According to the Professor, constitutions generally happen right after a period of 
public euphoria because it is exactly upon such an excitement that the citizens are really 
willing to accept them.  
Usually we speak about the years following social or political crisis, revolutions, or wars of 
self-determination,48 none of which applied to the European situation in 2004, when the 
Constitutional Treaty was first proposed. 
The citizens of Europe did not feel such an impellent urge for a new beginning or for a more 
secure and legitimate legal order so that, in the end, they approached it completely 
unenthusiastic.  
The argument advanced by Kumm goes even a step further. He analyzed the French and the 
Dutch negative responses, together with the decreasing turnouts of the EP’s elections and the 
adverse responses collected by the Eurobarometer surveys,49 concluding that the missing 
ingredient was a deep-rooted ‘constitutional patriotism’. By considering the universal 
principles of democracy, human dignity, and rule of law referred in the preamble of the 
Constitution, he asserts that a constitutional commitment is not just a mere arrangements over 
an abstract set of commonly accepted values, but it also a deeper connection with the past 
through which a constitutional agreement serves the purpose of reaching a certain political 
system in the future.50 
He further explains that the actual electoral and political system of Europe is organized in a 
way that prevents rather than promoting the development of a strong European identity.  
This is due to the fact that the work of the European Parliament, in his view, does not follow 
within the topics of public interest and this is because this institution lacks the power of 
agenda-setting: the general opinion, therefore, is that its function is restricted, that its 
members are most likely not to change anything with the Union, hence that it will not make 
much a difference whether a certain representative wins the elections or not.51 This would also 
explain why the general turnouts for the European Parliaments elections of 2004 was 45.7% 
(the lowest ever registered before),52 with an overall fall of nice percentage points from the 
turnouts in 1979 to the ones in 2004.53 
These data should not surprise us if we consider that the electorate does not see the purpose of 
indicating its favourite representative because it cannot perceive the political power of the 
institution per se. The electoral campaigns are incapable of presenting a valid program truly 
European, especially considering that most of the debates in each country focus on national 
concerns: there are discussions on the benefits and costs of membership, pros and cons of the 
deepening of the integration process,54 but there is nothing that indicates to the public what 
type of Europe they should aim to.  
Looked from this perspective, the solution would be a better public education which could 
help the people to develop a thicker European awareness and conscience. This could favour 
the creation of a more conscious electorate with a deeper common identity willing to move in 
the same direction. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
The paper tried to analyze the function of direct democracy within the European Union 
electoral system. The starting point was the rejection of the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe by the referendums held in France and in The Netherlands in May and June 2004 
respectively. Driven by the desire of bringing the Union closer to the people, the direct voting 
proved itself to be a very dangerous choice which, in the end, materialized the risk of bringing 
the integration process to a standstill.  
Post-referenda surveys demonstrated that in both countries the majority of the ones who 
rejected the Constitution did it inspired by ‘second-order’ issues. The referendums asked the 
citizens whether the document should have been ratified, but many declared they voted ‘no’ 
because they meant to show disapproval towards their national governments, towards the 
eastern enlargement (in particular Turkey’s possible admission), towards the expensiveness of 
the EU, and others because they felt insufficiently informed about the text. This very last 
motivation is arguably the most alarming one: direct democracy could only function properly 
if people were capable of casting their votes with the required knowledge of the topic at stake. 
Equally worrisome is the fact that very few declared they voted against it due to a sincere and 
conscious disagreement with the content of the text per se.  
Another interesting reason behind the rejections was the perceived threat to national identities 
and sovereignty. As explained by Durkheim’s theory of social and legal development, each 
community as its own set of values and principles. Its members are held together by a moral 
cohesion which is legitimized through their legal system. The law is then a social fact, an 
external factor which keeps people together in contrast with others. Laws are the formal 
expression of a people’s ‘collective conscience’, and the citizens of Europe decided to hold on 
to their own national solidarity afraid that a European constitution would might take it away 
from them, imposing a remote and extraneous government in Brussels. This also could help 
us understand why it is still impossible to speak about a European common identity, and why 
the paper refers to the peoples of Europe rather that to the European people. 
Together with the argument that the Constitutional Treaty was proposed in a moment of time 
not suitable for the creation of a constitution (i.e., a non- constitutional moment) and that the 
citizens perceive the European Parliament as an institution with too limited powers (it is not 
the agenda-setter of legislative proposals), it does not come as a surprise that the citizens felt 
not ready to give their consent to the Constitution. 
Moreover, the text of the document was very long and technical, arguably too complicated for 
the average citizen to be fully understood, also considering the fact that the public press and 
debates in the media failed to properly inform the public. The Draft Constitution should have 
intended as a treaty forged via intergovernmental bargaining, hence to be implemented via 
representative democracy, ratified either by the EP or by the national parliaments. 
For all these reasons, direct democracy failed to serve the purpose of giving more opportunity 
to the people to express their opinion, it rather merely gave them the chance to address their 
nationals concerns mixed with a more general apathy towards the Union’s political life. 
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THE NEED FOR AND THE BLESSINGS OF SOFT LAW: HYBRIDITY 
OF LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE 
 
Hannah Mangel 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
It  has  been  61  years  since  Jean  Monnet  came  up  with  a  plan  to  linking  the  coal  and  steel  
industries of the war giants France and the defeated post World War 2 Germany in order to 
prevent another war: the Schuman Plan setting up the European Coal and Steel Community. It 
seems that even 61 years later, Monnet’s ideas remain. They are recently being picked up 
again, incorporating the idea of adherence through dependence and peer review. Today, 
Monnet-like models of Governance can be witnessed in several EU policy fields, labeled as 
“Network Governance” and more generally as “New Governance”. The idea of such 
governance  is  however  not  that  “new” or  so  it  may seem.  What  is  in  fact  new is  the  means  
being used to establish such forms of governance. Today, the merging and inter-action 
between hard and soft law (Hybridity) is being used to establish effective enforcement models 
in several EU policy domains and enhance, as several authors point out, the effectiveness, 
legitimacy and transparency of the EU.1 This raises the question whether soft law may be a 
useful and beneficial means to achieve such ends. The paper will argue that this is in fact the 
case. It will to that end give an outline of what soft law is (Part II), explain the inter-relation 
of hard and soft law in the course of creating new governance models (Part III) and further 
introduce  two  current  examples  in  EU  law  to  illustrate  the  need  for  soft  law  in  current  EU  
governance (Parts IV and V). 
 
 
2. What is Soft Law? 
 
The most often quoted definition of soft law has been established in Francis Snyder’s 
influential paper, in which he identifies soft law as ‘rules of conduct which in principle have 
no legally binding force but which nevertheless may have practical effect’.2 Soft  law  is  
therefore the name given to measures, which do not constitute legislative acts passed by 
Council and Parliament (hard law). The very purpose of putting a name on this kind of 
measures, according to Beveridge and Nott is the possibility to identify measures that are not 
law but nevertheless have some legal implications.3  
Soft law began to develop in the European Union in the 1970s.4 The sources of EU law are 
currently listed in Art. 288 TFEU. The article mentions recommendations and opinions as soft 
law instruments available to the European institutions. It fails to take account, however, of the 
variety of other soft law mechanisms circulating in the EU law sphere. Other examples are 
frameworks, resolutions, communications, declarations, guidance notes and inter-institutional 
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agreements.5 The development of soft law depends on the nature of the specific instrument, 
however usually it forms out of negotiations and discussions between the involved parties. 
They are also the ones influencing the outcome and the purpose of the new soft law.6  
As becomes evident, the very basic and probably most important feature of soft law is that it 
is not legally binding in itself. However, the ECJ held in the Grimaldi case that  soft  law  
instruments, in the case at hand a recommendation, that soft law can indeed produce legal 
effects.7 This is to mean that they should be taken into consideration by the courts when EU 
legislation is being interpreted. Snyder defines the effect of soft law as no independent legal 
effect. However, soft law does produce legal effect as it derives it from other sources of law.8  
The question arises, what exactly the appeal of the employment of such interests for the 
institutions of the Union may be. The EU uses soft law for a variety of reasons. Here, 
especially, the use of soft law instruments has proven to be a very helpful measure in order to 
give credit to the very basic principles of the European law. As Senden acknowledges, the 
Union also aims at ‘(enhancing) the effectiveness, legitimacy and transparency of EU 
action’.9 Main fields of legislation where soft law has been used include the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, employment law, education, culture, public health and competition law.10 
The purposes of soft law are manifold and have been outlined by many scholars. Soft law 
instruments form an important part in the exercise of the principle of subsidiarity, as they, due 
to their very nature, constitute the least intrusive form of legislation one could think of. As 
introduced at the Edinburgh Summit 1992, and deeply linked to the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality, the non-binding instruments should be employed preferably where it is 
deemed to be appropriate.11 It is obvious that soft law comes in extremely handy in particular 
in matters where the EU does not have exclusive competence, but not exclusively in these 
fields, as becomes clear in the case of competition law. The general advantages of soft law as 
oppose to hard law include that non-binding measures are more flexible, less expensive and 
less time consuming than ‘real’ legislation and they involve more expert opinions.12 Further, 
soft law is a way of informing and educating the public of official opinions, attitudes and 
guidelines. It is a more easy way of guiding the officials in the application of Union law.13  
However, frequently criticized is the lack of transparency of soft law. The Union soft law has 
the advantages for the institutions that they can also develop soft law even if they have no 
competence in legislation assigned under the treaties.14 Looked at from a different angle, one 
could also see this as a rather negative characteristic, as it gives the judiciary and the 
executive a dominant role, while the legislator’s role can be easily disregarded and slimmed.15 
Other points of criticism circle around the question of affectivity of soft law as it is not legally 
binding and therefore dependent on the arbitrariness of the different actors and it is further not 
challengeable before a court. These enforcement issues lead to a reduction of legal certainty 
of soft law.16 It  is  still  unclear  what  the  role  of  soft  law  should  be.  This  will  be  further  
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elaborated upon in Section III in which the paper addresses the inter-relation of hard and soft 
law.  
 
 
3.  New Governance through Hybridity of Law 
 
The interaction between soft and hard law is one that is debatable as to extent and effectivity. 
All is linked to the question, what the role of soft law should be in times of change in matters 
of  governance  and  whether  or  not  hard  law  is  more  important.  Experts  agree  that  soft  law  
should not be exploited in order to avoid coming to fixed conclusions, which hard law would 
provide.17 This fear is especially big concerning the Commission and can also be linked to the 
fear of the ‘competence creep’ within the Union. It seems that by many scholars, soft law is 
rather seen as a substitute for hard law as an alternative to it.18  
Beveridge and Nott add that soft law has many benefits, however these are closely related to 
the interaction with hard law. Soft law can be a means of interpretation for hard law or it can 
be a base for the later creation of hard law, when details are still being worked out.19 They 
examine  two  legal  theories  on  whether  soft  law  can  actually  be  considered  law  or  not:  the  
formalist and the contextual approach. The formalist approach indicates that soft law is a ‘pre 
legal variant in effect if not in form’ and can therefore be considered law. In contrast, based 
on the definition by Francis Snyder as quoted in Part II, soft law can be deemed to have 
‘practical effects’, however, it only ‘operates in the shadow of the law’ and is therefore not 
law itself.20  
Scholars agree that soft law cannot exist alone but in order to be effective, there has to be 
some sort of co-existence with hard law. Soft law can then give expression to the general 
principles set out by hard law.21 It should further be noted that scholars do acknowledge that 
there may be a ‘collapse into hard law’ whereby soft law becomes hard when it is often 
employed by the Commission and the European courts.22 This comes close to the effects 
taking place in the international law sphere, where draft articles may become law with their 
frequent application. Of course, soft law can also collapse into hard law through the adoption 
of hard law instruments with the same contents. This is also called instrumental hybridity.23 In 
these cases,  soft  law is seen as a ‘stepping stone to hard law rather than as an alternative to 
it’.24   
Dawson summarizes this problem as the ‘double-bind of soft law’. Soft law must create 
credibility through the exercise of power, however, the more it does so, the more the 
legitimacy of such power is doubted and the question is asked whether it is justifiable to let 
soft law ‘(override)…the necessary due process guarantees the Union’s legal structure 
offers’.25 
Nevertheless, it is commonly accepted that hard law is rather linked to traditional forms of 
governance, whereas the evolution of soft law has opened up possibilities for new forms of 
governance. New governance, according to Scott and Trubek is any governance model that 
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derives from the ‘Classic Community Method (CCM)’.26 The classic community method 
involves, according to the authors, mostly the traditional Union legislative instruments, like 
the commission’s exclusive initiative in the legislative process (the creation of hard law) and 
qualified majority voting.27 In essence, this can be characterized as the centralized governance 
model, as De Visser points out.28 The Union institutions and above all the Commission are the 
main bodies, to enforce the legislation and they derive their right to do so from hard law 
instruments (the treaties and secondary law).  
According to the authors, there are two ways in which modern governance derives from the 
Classic Community Method. Firstly, there is ‘new, old governance’. This concept can 
basically be summarized as the creation of soft law norms as oppose to hard law legislative 
acts. The authors stress that the flexibility of these new types of law is the central 
characteristic that distinguishes them from the traditional law.29 Here, the main features of the 
traditional governance models are still kept however. Secondly, there is the creation of 
completely different forms of governance30 to which network governance can also be deemed 
to belong to. The association with new governance is closely linked to the agenda of the 
Lisbon summit.31  
But what exactly are the characteristics of these supposedly new government models? Trubek 
and Trubek’s definition of new governance amounts to governance that has ‘the capacity to 
encourage experimentation, employ stakeholder participation, rely on broad framework 
agreements which have flexible and revisable standards and use benchmarks, indicators and 
peer review to ensure accountability’.32 It becomes clear that the authors indirectly list a 
number of soft law instruments, which indicates that new governance is closely linked with 
the introduction of soft law. This also becomes clear with De Búrca and Scott’s definition, as 
they  propose  that  new  governance  particularly  does  not  function  through  the  ‘formal  
mechanism of traditional command-and-control type legal institutions’.33 Command and 
control is a governance model in which there is a top-down approach where the executive is 
the only body ensuring enforcement of the law (a traditional model).  
Maher  claims  that  new  governance  is  also  closely  linked  with  the  Monnet  method  of  
governance.34 As  with  the  establishment  of  the  ECSC,  as  the  first  example  in  European  
Integration, results are achieved among a group of states through the establishment of a 
network. Mutual dependence leads to adherence to the rules of the community. More 
specifically, this new phenomenon is referred to as network governance.35 Slaughter defines 
network governance as ‘sets of direct interactions among subunits of different governments 
that  are  not  controlled  or  closely  guided  by  the  policies  of  the  executives  of  those  
governments’.36 This means that the national governments are the ones to apply and enforce 
the European Law, all the while supervised and controlled by the actors within the network 
itself. This can be done by the commission or the national authorities, then called the 
European Regulators Group.37  
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Coming back to the legal basis of such governance, the hybridity of soft and hard law, one can 
observe that lately, soft and hard law co-exist in the same policy areas38 such as competition 
and employment law. Hybridity is the central term given to this rather new phenomenon of 
interaction between hard and soft law in EU governance.39 It can, according to de Búrca and 
Scott,  be divided into 3 categories in order to make the definition more comprehensible, 
namely baseline, instrumental and default hybridity.40 In baseline hybridity, soft law has a 
gap-filling function to help complement the existing hard law. Instrumental hybridity 
incorporates the development of legal norms through new governance. The prominent 
‘collapse into hard law’ is also part of this type of hybridity. Lastly, default hybridity, is 
‘governance in the shadow of the law’.41 It  is  difficult  to  draw  the  line  between  these  3  
categories, however they all equally involve hard law as a second component in the legal 
basis of governance. 
 
 
4.  Example 1: Employment Law, the OMC 
 
One example of network governance can be observed, as mentioned before, in the field of 
social and employment policy: The Open Method of Co-Ordination (‘OMC’). This non-
binding method was introduced with the European Employment Strategy (EES).42The OMC’s 
governance is set up through six general principles: participation and power sharing, 
multilevel integration, diversity and decentralization, deliberation, flexibility and revisability 
and experimentation and knowledge creation.43 Scott and Trubek mention the OMC explicitly 
as  belonging  to  the  second  category  of  departure  from  the  ‘CCM’,  a  form  of  new  
governance.44 
 The  conduct  of  the  OMC is  closely  linked  to  the  employment  of  soft  law instruments.  The  
agenda is set by the annual ‘Employment Guideline’, which is adopted by the European 
Council.45 Then, each state issues its own action plan, which is then controlled by 
Commission and Council. Jointly, they issue the Employment Report and issue 
recommendations on how to achieve the envisaged results.46 It  is  remarkable  to  see  that  all  
these measures can be classified as soft law instruments.  
The question remains, however, what the contributions of soft law may be to the enforcement 
of employment law. This issue is, inter alia, addressed by Trubek, Cottrell and Nance. They 
outline  the  six  main  effects  of  soft  law  on  the  network  and  the  work  on  the  policy  area.  
Shaming may result in the member states trying to comply with the guidelines in order to 
avoid negative critique by other member states. Diffusion through mimesis and discourse 
entails that the policy guidelines can easily be copied by the national authorities and 
constructed into a ‘new cognitive framework’. Further, an obvious effect is the networking 
power of the OMC, which like mentioned before, is able to incorporate more expert opinions. 
Also linked to the networking power of the OMC are the learning and deliberation effects 
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through which knowledge can be easily transferred and transposed into highly functional 
policy decisions.47 These  effects  have  been  categorized  by  Trubek  and  Trubek  as  either  
bottom-up or top-down effects.48 Shaming is the prime example of a top-down effect, whereas 
deliberation can be categorized to be more a bottom-up effect.  
The OMC is according to Dawson not based on the assumption of a collapse into hard law. It 
is actually expected to stay the way it is. This is because of the nature of the policy fields. In 
employment and social issues the EU only has limited legal competence. Harmonization is 
not an issue in this field, it is in fact never been an objective of the member states. It is 
therefore not a transitional form of governance but rather a ‘permanent compromise’.49  
Questionable is whether the hybridity in the field of social and employment policy is actually 
more successful than a hard law approach. A research carried out by the authors of the book 
Complying with Europe suggests that this is in fact the case. According to the report, in which 
several employment acts and their enforcement were examined, the scholars found that 
enforcement is actually lacking in a number of cases. The case study also observed the 
number of cases in which an infringement procedure has direct effect and found that in 50% 
of the cases brought before the ECJ, no direct effect can be approved.50 Trubek and Trubek’s 
study provides the reader with the assumption by critics of soft law that hard law is an 
essential component in employment law, however the OMC could hinder the establishment of 
such  hard  law.51 However,  the  study  carried  out  by  the  authors  of  Complying with Europe 
may suggest that hard law is actually not as effective as one might think (at least standing on 
its  own)  and  therefore  not  the  essential  part  of  successful  governance  in  the  21st century.52 
This can maybe also be proven by the fact that the OMC is ever-expanding into other policy 
fields such as pensions, health, social inclusion and education.53 
 
 
5. Example 2: Competition Law, the ECN 
 
The  second  prime  example  of  network  governance  in  the  EU  is  the  European  Competition  
Network (‘ECN’). The Network is comprised of the National competition authorities and 
commission officials.54  The  inclusion  of  soft  law  in  competition  law  is  not  a  new  
development. Soft law has been a distinct feature of competition law since the 1960s.55 
However, the interaction of hard and soft law has increased significantly with the 
modernization package Reg. 1/2003.56 It entered into force on 1st May 2004.57 It includes the 
Commission giving up its exclusive prerogative to enforce Art. 101,102 TFEU.58 
Though set up through a regulation (and therefore a legislative act) the ECN’s rules and 
mechanisms are laid down in soft law instruments, namely six Commission notices.59 The 
Regulation only sets out the basic rules under which the soft law rules should then be applied 
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in order to ensure their uniform application.60 Further  rules  are  then  set  out  in  soft  law  
instruments such as the Notice on Cooperation with the Courts.61 De Burca and Craig in fact 
claim that the ECN was a ‘radical departure from existing institutional structures’.62  
The ECN currently has as its core function exchange of information between the NCAs, and 
therefore not a harmonization function.63 The set up of the ECN fits into the Monnet model of 
governance, having a horizontal as well as a vertical component. Horizontally, all NCAs are 
equal and have enforcement powers granted to them under the respective TFEU articles.64 
Vertically, the Commission is the supervisor of the network, being the ‘first among equals’. 
All rights are obtained from the Commission, all obligations are held to the commission, 
making the NCAs accountable to the commission within the network.65 The  network  has  
therefore been characterized as centralized as well as supranational.66  
Maher outlines the increasing hybridity in competition law by categorizing them in several 
new government  modi.  Firstly,  one  can  witness  a  decentralization  of  authority.  Authority  is  
rather with the NCAs themselves and not with the EU67 although it has to be kept in mind that 
the commission is still the supervisory body (centralized component). Secondly, as is typical 
and crucial to the employment of soft law is the flexibility that comes with it. Thirdly, a self-
explanatory feature of network-based governance is the growing decentralization and focus on 
private actors.68 The ECN aims at exchange of advice as well as evidence for competition law 
cases.69 
Wilks mentions, in his paper on the evolution of the ECN, criticism of the network as being 
not transparent enough. This being a typical criticism of soft law, one must still see the ECN 
as a highly successful mechanism.70 To proof this point, the author references a study 
conducted by the expert journal Global Competition Review in which a ranking of similar 
Competition networks has been conducted. The ECN is ranked on first place equally with the 
US and UK institutions.71 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
We can conclude that the examples have shown how the Union has developed new 
governance models to cope with modernization. The ECN and OMC are perfect examples of 
why network governance seems to be so successful as oppose to traditional law enforcement 
methods. The changes in enforcement are in fact the most important feature of these new 
governance modes, as they are what sets the networks apart from traditional regulation of and 
by the Union. The development of soft law has proven to be inevitable in order to achieve 
these results. The paper has shown that one of the many benefits of soft law is its flexibility, 
which allows it to serve as the creator of new (network) governance in the European Union. It 
should not be disregarded however that this is, not due to soft law alone. It is rather a result of 
the hybridity of the law, the very effective combination of binding hard law and flexible soft 
law, without which network governance would probably be impossible to establish. To end, 
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61 Ibid, p.8 
62 P. Craig et al, The Evolution of EU law, (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 735 
63 I. Maher, 31 Fordham International Law Journal 6 (2007), p.1731 
64 Ibid, p.1731 
65 I. Maher, 31 Fordham International Law Journal 6 (2007), p. 1731 
66 S. Wilks, ‘The European Competition Network: What has changed?’ (2007), p.3 
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the paper should advert to the harmonization aspect of the law. Both examples are not aimed 
at harmonization of the member states laws. The harmonizing aspects of EU competition law, 
for example can be seen in the respective treaty articles, not in the European Competition 
Network’s achievements. Therefore, the examples have also shown what soft law cannot 
achieve. 
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INCREASING USE OF THE INSTRUMENT OF REGULATION 
INSTEAD OF A DIRECTIVE: GOOD OR BAD? 
 
Lisa Marx 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The impetus for this paper has been provided by a 2004 study on the use of legal instruments 
in  European  Union  law  as  well  as  a  2011  empirical  study  on  The  European  Union  Policy-
Making dataset. Both studies emphasis that Regulations are the most extensively used 
instrument passed by the Union legislator, especially by means of the consultation procedure 
and the ordinary legislative procedure. The results of these analyses, namely the decline in the 
use of the instrument of Directive in comparison to the rise of Regulations, will mainly be 
attributed to three core problems, outlined in detail in the main body of this paper. 
Regulations will be presented as means to realize the Union’s objective of harmonizing EU 
law with national law in the appropriate competence fields much more efficiently, due to their 
advantages of clarity, predictability and effectiveness due to the uniform interpretation of EU 
law. These advantages will be highlighted by reference to the internal market and the 
Constitutional Treaty.  
It shall be stresses that the empirical analysis explain the status quo of  EU  legislation  The  
subsequent comparative analysis aims at providing the necessary information to understand 
the status quo as regards Union legislation: Why and under which circumstances Regulations 
materialize as the more appropriate instruments for the purpose of harmonizing EU law with 
national laws, and how the decreasing use of Directives over the period from 1976 to 2010 
can be explained. Reference will be made to different academic opinions, inter alia expressed 
by the European Commission towards the shift of the use of legislative instruments to 
Regulations. 
Finally, this paper will highlight the attitudes of the European Union itself, the European 
Union citizens as well  as the view of national parliaments as representatives of the Member 
States of the Union with regard to the delicate question whether the increasing use of the 
instrument of Regulation instead of a Directive is to be regarded as good or bad. A subjective 
conclusion will be drawn - mainly by reference to the point of view of the observer. 
 
 
2. Regulation versus Directive: Uniformity versus Discretion 
 
According to Article 288 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, the Union 
legislator shall exercise the Union’s competences by means of Regulations, Directives, 
Decisions, Recommendations and Opinions. The characteristics of the former two legislative 
instruments are defined as follows: 
  
“ […] A Regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States. A Directive shall be binding, as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and method. […]“1 
 
The central difference between these two legislative instruments lies in their binding effect: 
Whereas Regulations are described as having general application, Directives are only binding 
                                                             
1 Article 288 TFEU. 
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on the Member States as to the result they sought to achieve. Hence, by means of Regulations, 
every Member State is  required to give effect  to the same legislative text and they therefore 
represent the most centralizing instrument of all legislative instruments2 in the Union context. 
Regulations apply to objectively determined situations and produce legal effects as regards 
categories of persons described in a generalized and abstract manner.3Consequently, the 
European Parliament jointly with the European Council or the Commission will pass 
Regulations whenever the need for uniformity is present. 
Besides their general application, Regulations are also characterized by their direct 
applicability. Regulations automatically form part of the domestic legal order of the Member 
States from the day they enter into force. No further transposition or implementation is 
required. In fact, any further implementation of Regulations is illegal, as such measures may 
negatively affected the uniform application of Regulations4in the Member States or mislead 
private parties from the direct source of their rights and obligations5 under EU law. 
Directives highly contrast with Regulations: As the choice of form and method is left to the 
Member States in order to achieve the end result envisaged by Directives, Member States are 
awarded a considerably high degree of discretion to adjust the Union instrument to the 
national law peculiarities. Usually, Directives themselves define the deadline by which the 
Member States have to implement the Union measures into national law. During this period of 
implementation, the national authorities remain in control over the realization of EU law 
within their national legal framework6 and thereby leave some room of manœuvre to the 
Member Sates. However, the effect of Directives should not be undermined by the fact that 
the Member States act within a margin of discretion as regards the implementation and 
adaption of Directives into the national law: The failure to implement a Directive within the 
implementation period will lead to state liability.7In addition to the remedy of state liability, 
Directives are characterized by having vertical direct effect8 as well as indirect effect9, thus 
representing important enforcement mechanisms for this type of legislative instrument.  
The decisive factor whether to opt for the instrument of Regulation or instrument of Directive 
is therefore represented by the objective the Union sought to realize. Directives are 
predominantly used to bring the national laws of the Member States in line with each other, 
and have been the prominent instrument with regard to the operation of the internal market.10 
Regulations, in contrast, are a means to harmonize the law of the Member States in a more 
radical and absolute manner due to their centralizing effect. Practice has shown that especially 
in the area of private international law, Regulations present the preferred instrument in order 
to achieve Union objectives.11 
From the perspective of the legislative arguments presented, Regulations appear to be the 
preferred legislative instrument whenever the Union aims at exercising its authoritative 
powers. The legislative characteristics of Regulations – general and direct application, the 
overall binding effect and the protection of uniformity as regards the interpretation of EU law 
– ensure that the Union’s Member States pursue the Union’s course of conduct. Hence, 
                                                             
2 Damian Chalmers, European Union Public Law, (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010), 
p. 98. 
3 Joined Cases 789/79 and 790/79 Calpak v Commission [1980] ECR 1949. 
4 Case 39/72 Commission v Italy (premiums for slaughtering cows) [1973] ECR 101. 
5 Case 34/73 Variola v AmministrazionedellaFiananze [1973] ECR 981. 
6 European Commission,  ‘Application of EU law’,  
 http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/introduction/what_directive_en.htm (last visited: 05th December 2011). 
7 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 
8 Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and SW Hampshire Area Health Authority [1986] ECR 723. 
9 Case 14/83 Von Colson& Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891. 
10 European Commission, ‘Application of EU law’. 
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Regulations are a greater means to exercise the Union’s sovereignty and demonstrative 
primacy over national law. Directives, in contrast, rather present asofter course of cooperation 
between the Union and its Member States. Greater consideration is given to national 
peculiarities and traditions by the grant discretion. It seems as if the Member States and the 
Union operate on the same level of authority and legislative influence, which is definitely not 
the case as regards Regulations.  
 
 
3. Looking at Regulation versus Directive from a Different Perspective: An Empirical 
Overview of the use of EU Legislative Instrument from 1976 to 2010 
 
The shift in the legislative practice from using Directives to Regulations is more than just an 
observation. Empirical data confirms that the Union legislator focuses, especially during the 
last three decades, on the instrument of Regulation, which consequently results in the decrease 
of using the instrument of Directive for the purpose of harmonizing the national laws of the 
Member States of the Union. A 2004 study calculated that Regulations count for 31 per cent 
of all legislation, thereby 
representing the most 
widely used legislative 
instrument in the Union 
context.12 Decisions present 
the second widely used 
instrument, counting for 27 
per cent in case they are 
addressed to parties, and for 
ten per cent in case not 
being addressed to a party 
expressly.13 International 
agreements and Directives 
each only counted for nine 
per cent of all Union 
legislation.14 
 
In line with the 2004 study is Frank Häge’s15 research analysis European Union Policy-
Making Dataset, presented in 2011, which provides comparative tables and figures as regards 
the use of legislative instruments and the types of procedures used in the European Union. For 
the purpose of this paper, the empirical data consulted focuses on the type of instrument 
passed by the Union legislator. 
The table to the right shows the type of file by the total number of documents by type of file.16 
9.159 Regulations have been filed in 2010, whereas the number of Directives only counts for 
2.023 documents.17 Häge’s calculations in the context of the total number of documents filed 
                                                             
12 A.  v.  Bogdandy,  F.  Arndt  and  J.  Bast,  ‘Legal  Instruments  in  European  Union  Law  and  their  Reform:  A  
Systematic Approach on an Empirical Basis’, 23 Yearbook of European Law 91 (2004), p. 97. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Dr Frank M. Häge works as a lecturer in Politics in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at 
the University of Limerick in Ireland. In 2009, he received the best PhD Thesis Award 2009 of the University 
Association for Contemporary European Studies. His research interests concentrate on European Union Politics, 
International Cooperation and Conflict, as well as Quantitative and Comparative Research Methods. 
16 Frank M. Häge, ‘The European Union Policy-Making Dataset’, 12 European Union Politics (2011), retrieved 
from http://eup.sagepub.com/content/12/3/455 (last visited: 26th November 2011). 
17 Ibid. 
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by the Union legislator in 2010, namely 29.772 documents, show that Regulations represent 
30,73 per cent of all Union legislation.18 As the number of Directives filed in 2010 counts for 
2.023 documents, meaning that only in 6,79 percent of all circumstances the Union legislator 
decided in favour of Directives.19 Comparing these results with the 2004 study presented 
above, the use of Directives has further decreased, from nine per cent of all Union legislation 
to approximately only seven per cent in 2010. Regulations, however, maintain their status as 
being the most widely used type of all legislative instrument: Their percentage counts still 
counts for approximately 31 per cent in 2010 as it was the case in 2004. Hence, the Union is 
rather inclined to file Regulations in order to realize Union objectives, thereby assuming a 
dominant position in the legislative process and exercising its primacy over national law in as 
many cases as possible. 
Of course, advocates of Directives may argue that the decreasing use of Directives is a 
phenomenon, which only occurred in the 21st century, especially with regard to the principles 
of ever closer Union20 incorporated by the Lisbon Treaty and the expansion of the internal 
market due to the Union enlargements in 2004, 2005 and 2007. Beyond doubt, these factors 
play a decisive role in the shift of the use of legislative instruments in favour of Regulations, 
as the need for uniformity and guiding legislation is definitely greater with 27 Member States. 
However, the decreasing use of Directives has already been apparent in the 1970s, meaning 
that the preference of Regulations for the achievement of the Union objectives is actually not 
a recent phenomenon.  
The studies therefore confirm that the Union has assumed its dominant position through the 
constant filing of Regulations over the last three decades: The comparison of the number of 
legislative proposals by type of file made by the Union legislator during the period from 1976 
to 2010, the following table is presented by Häge21:  
 
 
 
 
Considerably less legislative proposal have been presented by the Union legislator in 2010 
than in 1976: Whereas in 1976 191 legislative proposals - including Regulations, Directives 
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and Decisions – have been presented, the number counted in 2010 for only 116 proposals.22 
This means that the Union legislator felt less need to pass legislation in 2010 than in for 
example 1976, or as the graphs show, in 1990. This consequently means that the need for 
uniformity and legislative consistency in 2010 is less high than it was at the beginning of the 
functioning of what now is the European Union. Secondly, the graphs show that Regulations 
have been the preferred instrument in contrast to Directives in consideration of the whole 
period from 1976 to 2010, without any exception.23 The gap between the use of Regulations 
and Directives was considerably high in 1991, when approximately three times more 
Regulations have been proposed in contrast to Directives. This trend is leveling out in 2010, 
although  still  two  and  a  half  times  more  Regulations  are  proposed  than  Directives:  77  
Regulations versus 30 Directives.24 Once more, the Union enjoys being the legislative leader.  
Overall, the empirical analysis of the use of EU legislative instruments confirms the 
observation that the use of Directives is decreasing. By contrast, the use of the instrument of 
Regulation can be considered as continuously high, taking into consideration the period from 
1976 to 2010. From a different angle, however, the use of Regulations is not necessarily 
increasing, as the percentage remained unchanged at 31 per cent of all Union legislation from 
2004 to 2010. Personally, the empirical date rather confirms that, due to the fact that the 
Union is in less need to pass legislation as in comparison with the last three decades, the 
decreasing use of Directives is compensated by the use of Regulations. Thus, Regulations can 
remain their status as being the most widely used Union legislative instrument. This is, 
however, only a hypothesis. 
 
 
4. Going into Detail: Regulation versus Directive in the Academic Debate 
 
The deceasing use of Directives can be attributed to three major issues of consideration: 
Firstly,  the  improper  use  of  Directives,  which  is  closely  related  to  the  second  point  of  
dissatisfaction, namely the blurred distinction between Directives and Regulations and thirdly, 
the problem of adequately and timely implementing Directives into the law of the Union 
Member States in conjunction with the subsequent interpretation of these instruments by the 
national courts of the Member States. In this regard, the European Commission described 
Directives as an ‘instrument hybride, et de statute ambigu’,25 thereby referring to the complex 
– in my point of view highly technical - character of Directives. As their status is said to be 
ambiguous, an ultimate definition of Directives has not be provided yet, which presents itself 
as an obstacle to legal certainty.  
Pinpointing these disadvantages as regards Directives draws attention to proposals to replace 
them, which have regularly been issued during the history of the European Union: During the 
Intergovernmental Conference leading to the establishment of the European Union, a 
replacement proposal for Directives was explicitly made:26 The essence of the instrument of 
Directive was proposed to be recycled by creating a new legislative instrument, establishing 
basic principles of the Union and leaving the Member States a considerable degree of 
discretion as to their implementation.2728 In 1992, the Sutherland Report announced the 
recommendation of transforming Directives into directly applicable Regulations, on the 
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condition that a certain degree of approximation of the laws of the Union Member States 
through the use of Directives has been realized.29 In line with these proposals are the Molitor 
Report of 1995 as well as the White Paper on European Governance issued in 2001, which 
argue for the replacement of Directives for the sake of legal certainty and transparency of 
Union law. In addition to the proposals made, the Constitutional Treaty argued for the 
abolishment of Directives, which would have been compensated by the evolvement of a new 
legislative label, absorbing the peculiar characteristics of Directives.30 
Overall, the proposals made stress the need for guarantee of the uniform application and 
interpretation of Union legislation, and on the other hand the importance of a single point of 
reference for individuals, inter alia subjects of EU law, as well as national courts for the 
enforcement of their rights in the Union framework.31From these proposals’ perspective, the 
Directive as such is rather viewed negatively, as it fails to successfully guarantee these 
legislative needs. However, as these proposals have never been legally materialized, the 
Directive is said to have survived them, in the sense of rebutting criticism.  
From a jurisprudential point of view, the case law of the European Court of Justice to a large 
extent blurred the distinction between Directives and Regulations.32This evidence provides 
proof for the second point of criticism. Moreover, practical reality has proven that at least 
some room of manœuvrefor the Member States is required to fully adapt their national laws to 
EU Regulations, although this may be forbidden on paper. By contrast, the Union tends to 
draft Directives as detailed and precise as possible, thereby actually drafting ‘lois 
uniformes’.33 Hence,  the  gap  between  Directives  and  Regulations  grows  smaller:  The  
Directive becomes akin to the Regulation, and vice versa. Consequently, the distinction 
between ‘The Big Two’ is further blurred.  
Apart from the theoretical debate for the replacement of Directives, the degree of discretion 
awarded to the Member States under the instrument of Directive has proved in practice to 
leave too much freedom of implementation by choosing form and method, thus exceeding the 
acceptable room of manœuvre. In contrast, piece-meal transposition34 also  works  perfectly.  
The alternative route provided by the Union legislator itself to counteract deviation and tactic 
piece-meal techniques is the Regulation. As indicated by the European Commission in this 
regard, the replacement of Directives by means of Regulations, where this is both legally 
possible and politically acceptable, simplifies the immediate application of Union law and 
provides the opportunity of directly invoking the rights mediated through the Regulation by 
private parties.35 
More recently, Professor Mario Monti advocated the shift to Regulations in his Report A New 
Strategy for the Single Market36. Although acknowledging the greater possibility of adjusting 
of national rules and preferences to Directives concerning the internal market,37 the 
implementation period for Directives is highly time-consuming due to the risk of non-
implementation or incorrect implementation. In this regard, Monti attributes the decreasing 
use  of  the  instrument  of  Directive  in  the  field  of  the  internal  market  to  the  three  core  
                                                             
29 Prechal, 1 European Constitutional Law Review (2005), p. 4. 
30 Christian Twigg-Flesner, ‘Good-bye Harmonisation by Directives, Hello Cross-Border only Regulation? – A 
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31 Prechal, 1 European Constitutional Law Review (2005), p. 4. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid.  
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implementation of Directives. 
35 Commission, A Europe of results - applying community law, COM (2007) 502 final, n.12; Commission, 
Working document - Instruments for a modernised single market policy, SEC (2007) 1518. 
36 Mario Monti, A New Strategy For The Single Market – At the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society. 
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advantages of Regulations: Clarity, predictability and effectiveness.38 He furthermore recalls 
the argument of greater enforceability of rights generated by Regulations to private 
parties.39However, he admits, Regulations cannot be used in isolation from any considerations 
of the legislative status quo of the Union and its Member States: The instrument of Regulation 
is perfectly deployable to the management of new areas, in which the need of harmonization 
is faced with regard to limited interaction between the Union and the national legal systems.40 
Looking  at  Regulations  from  the  flipside  of  the  coin,  the  Commission  refers  to  legal  
impossibility as well as political unacceptability as the two predominant constraints with 
regard to the increasing use of Regulations instead of Directives. Recalling that Regulations 
would – especially to the advantage of the functioning of the internal market and EU 
consumer contract law according to Twigg-Flesner – create a single and coherent set of law, 
Member States would be deprived of using national terminology and concepts when 
implementing Directives.41 However, due to the doctrine of consistent interpretation, 
Directives have to be transposed and applied into national law in line with European law in 
any way,42 which deprives the Member States of their freedom to regulate cross-border 
disputes. In this regard, Regulations offer the advantage of leaving no room for questions 
about the relevant European law and its application.  
Civil law systems are inclined to regard Regulations as a considerable threat to their civil 
codes, as they argue for the preservation and integrity of their civil codes, which would be 
challenged by the integration of Regulations into the domestic law.43 Nevertheless, this 
argument  presented  cannot  amount  to  legal  impossibility  as  far  as  the  preference  of  
Regulations to the detriment of Directives is considered. As Twigg-Flesner argues, the shift to 
Regulations only confirms legal practice reality: Directives seem to be de facto Regulations, 
and vice versa. Directives are drafted in such detail containing technical rules that Member 
States are in any case not able to deviate from the text presented in a Directive.44 As both 
legal instruments grow alike, the use of Regulations is firstly practically and secondly legally 
possible in reality, although theory may indeed differ and present the shift as impossible. 
The second constraint presented by the Commission concerns political unacceptability, which 
is probably the argument lobbied by the national parliaments of the Member States. The more 
Regulations are in force, the more influence, sovereignty and authority gains European law 
and the less would domestic law be of relevance. National parliaments would rightfully 
question the rationale for this reduction of legal competence. Recalling criticism, for example 
the competence creep and the democratic deficit of the European Union, national parliaments 
may over the course of time and with the increase of political and legal power due to the shift 
to Regulations consider the Union as a rival, and no longer as a route for European 
integration. 
 
5. Conclusion: Drawing the Threats Together 
 
Regulation versus Directive –an EU Law superstar, mutant and survivor versus clarity, 
predictability and effectiveness. This paper aimed at pinpointing the (dis)advantages of both 
legislative instruments and the reasons for the shift in legislative emphasis from Directives to 
Regulation from firstly an empirical and secondly a comparative point of view. The 2004 
study as well as the study presented by Häge prove that the Union legislator is more inclined 
                                                             
38 Monti, A New Strategy For The Single Market – At the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society. 
39 Ibid.  
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41 Twigg-Flesner, 2 European Review of Contract Law 7 (2011), p. 8. 
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43 Twigg-Flesner, 2 European Review of Contract Law 7 (2011), p. 8. 
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to use Regulations, in order to make EU law fully applicable in the domestic systems of its 
Member States. The analysis of the empirical date leads to the conclusion that the Regulations 
presents itself as a well-working, continuous legislative instrument, which takes great 
preference over the Directive. Although the need for legislation declined, the Regulation is 
still the most-widely used instrument, meaning that the fields in which legislation still 
develops is either directly covered by the use of Regulations or substituted by a Regulation to 
the detriment of Directives, which is now the case as regards legislation for the internal 
market. Therefore, it is possible to say that the decrease in the use of Directives is 
compensated by the use of Regulations.  
It stands to reason that both the comparative and the empirical observations ask whether we 
are actually still in need for Directives after all. Why does the Union not simply legislate by 
means of Regulation? Would Regulations not be better timesaving as well as preventing 
legislative battles between the Union and its Member States? According to the authors’ view 
expressed, they would. Regulations work more efficiently, continuously and directly. 
According to the Union’s history however,  they would not.  Directives are a vital  part  of the 
EU legislative framework, during good and bad times. Whether the Directive will ever strike 
the happy medium between good and bad is highly questionable. In my personal opinion, it is 
the Directive’s extraordinary, controversial and ambiguous character, which greatly 
contributes to its legislative survival. The Union should decide for Directives whenever the 
field of European law so requires, as this is in my personal view important to enhance 
cooperation and the well functioning of the Union. Regulations sometimes seem to be too 
radical by conveying too much EU dominance, and sometimes being far in excess of what is 
necessary to achieve the Union’s course of conduct. 
After all, this paper therefore leaves the question whether the increasing use of Regulations 
instead of Directives is to be regarded as good or bad to the eye of the beholder. The Union 
surely welcomes this increase, as it enhances its legislative authority, sovereignty and primacy 
over national laws. Individuals may also consider the increase as an improvement of the 
protection of their rights under EU law by making the Member States directly responsible for 
their failures under EU law and providing greater possibilities for private remedies. In 
contrast, the Member States itself and their national parliaments may legitimately consider the 
legislative developments as plainly bad. Deprived of their legislative discretion, the room for 
manœuvreand adjustment of EU law into the national law decreases considerably. Adherence 
to  EU  law  ultimately  questions  whether  the  Member  States  are  still  the  masters  of  the  
European Union, or whether the Union itself has assumed the authority to function on its own, 
albeit considering the doctrine of conferral of powers.  
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PLAUMANN AND THE STANDING OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS  
 
Katja Zimmerman 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Under Article 263 TFEU, non-privileged applicants have to meet the criteria of individual and 
direct concern in order to acquire locus standi before the General Court1 (and before the Court 
of Justice of the European Union in case of appeal2) if they challenge a legislative act which is 
not addressed to them.3 In Plaumann v. Commission4 the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  
Union elaborated on the concept of ‘individual concern’ and set out criteria (the so-called 
Plaumann criteria5) to determine whether individual concern exists in a particular case.6 It is 
common consensus in the legal doctrine that the Plaumann criteria are strict  and difficult  to 
meet: especially for interest groups.7 The latter was particularly shown in the case 
Greenpeace and Others v. Commission where the General Court held that the action was 
inadmissible because of the fact that Greenpeace did not have locus standi due  to  a  lack  of  
‘individual concern’.8 In  appeal,  this  was  affirmed  by  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  
Union.9 
This paper will in the following concentrate on the question whether the standing of 
environmental organizations under Article 263 TFEU should be expanded or whether the 
current system has to be classified as being capable of fulfilling the needs of the European 
society. In order to answer this question, the Plaumann criteria will be analyzed. Second, 
prominent case law of the General Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union will 
be presented to demonstrate that the European courts10 have not yet acknowledged ‘individual 
concern’ in cases where an environmental organization started proceedings under Article 263 
TFEU. Afterwards, the impact of the Aarhus Convention11 will  be  examined  in  the  light  of  
                                                             
1 Art.  263 para. 4 TFEU juncto Art.  256 para. 1 TFEU juncto Art.  51 of Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the 
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Cambridge 2011), p. 49. Also see I. van Bael, Due Process in EU Competition Proceedings, (Kluwer Law 
International 2011),  p. 366. 
3 A. Kaczorowksa, European Union Law, (Routledge-Cavendish, New York 2008), p. 450-451. Also see A. 
Limante, ‘Actions for Annulment before ECJ after the Lisbon Treaty: has the access to justice improved?’, 
http://egpa-conference2011.org/documents/PSG10/LIMANTE.pdf (last visited 05.12.2011), p. 2-3 and D. 
Chalmers, European Union Public Law, p. 414. 
4 Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Commission [1963] ECR 199. 
5 T. Tridimas & P. Nebbia, European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004), 
p. 38-39.  
6 Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Commission [1963] ECR 199 para. 4. 
7 M. Eliantonio & N. Stratieva, ‘From Plaumann, through UPA and Jégo-Quéré, to the Lisbon Treaty: the locus 
standi of private applicants under Art. 230(4) EC through a political lens’, Maastricht Faculty of Law Working 
Paper 2009/13 (2009),  p. 2. Also see D. Chalmers, European Union Public Law, p.425 and T. Tridimas & G. 
Gari, ‘Winners and Losers in Luxemburg: a Statistical Analysis of Judicial Review before the European Court of 
Justice and the Court of First Instance’ 35 ELRev. 2 (2010), p. 131-173.  
8 Case T-585/93 Greenpeace and Others v. Commission [1995] ECR II-2205. Also see R. Macrory, Regulation, 
Enforcement and Governance in environmental law, (Cameron May, London 2008), p. 596. 
9 Case C-321/95 P Greenpeace and Others v. Commission [1998] ECR I-1651. Also see T. Treves a.o., Civil 
Society, International Courts and Compliance Bodies, (T.M.C Asser Press, The Hague 2005), p. 152. 
10 For the purpose of this paper, the term ‘European courts’ shall include the General Court as well as the Court 
of Justice of the European Union.  
11 UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters (1998). 
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access to European courts in case of NGOs. Fourth, on arguments supporting extension of the 
standing will be elaborated. Hereby, the cases UPA12 and Jégo-Quéré & Cie v. Commission13 
will form a substantial part of the discussion. Subsequently, arguments opposing this 
extension will be examined. In the end, the conclusion will be drawn that an extension of the 
standing of environmental organization should be considered and that such an extension can 
be defended on a legal basis.  
 
 
2. The Plaumann Criteria: the Need for Non-Privileged Applicants to Demonstrate 
‘Individual Concern’   
 
In 1963 (in the case Plaumann v. Commission of the EEC), the Court of Justice of the 
European Union laid down the criteria for non-privileged applicants to prove that ‘individual 
concern’ is present when a legislative act is challenged in a proceeding under Art. 263 TFEU 
before a European court.14  
In the Plaumann case, Germany wanted to abrogate a certain import tax that had to be paid by 
importers of clementines.15 In order to be legally able to do so, Germany was required to 
receive the Commission’s consent first.16 However, the Commission did not approve 
Germany’s plans.17 As a consequence, Plaumann, being an importer of clementines himself, 
started proceedings before the General Court, asking to annul this Commission’s Decision.18  
The most surprising aspect of the judgement is how the Court began its argumentation.19 In 
the second paragraph of the Court’s argumentation, it is stated that Article 263 TFEU ‘neither 
defines nor limits the scope of (individual and direct concern). The words and the natural 
meaning of this provision justify the broadest interpretation’.20 The Court goes even further 
by  arguing  that  parties  may  not  be  deprived  of  their  right  of  access  to  the  European  courts  
caused by a too restrictive approach of the article in question.21 This is surprising in that far as 
that this Court in the course of its judgment established that ‘individual concern’ exists only if 
a ‘decision affects [applicants] by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by 
reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue 
of these factors distinguishes them individually’.22 The wording of the so-called Plaumann 
criteria and their adoption in the case law of the European courts demonstrate until today how 
difficult the proof of ‘individual concern’ is.23 These criteria therefore act as a barrier between 
                                                             
12 Case T-173/98 Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Commission [1999] ECR II-3357. On appeal: Case C-50/00 
P Union de Peqenos Agricultores v. Council [2002] ECR I-6677 
13 Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré & Cie v. Commission [2002] ECR II-2365. On appeal : Case C-263/02 P Jégo-
Quéré & Cie v. Commission [2004] ECR I-3425. 
14 Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Commission [1963] ECR 199, para. 4. Also see M. M. Slotboom, A comparison of 
WTO and EC law: do different objects and purposes matter for treaty interpretation?, (Cameron May, London 
2006), p. 217.  
15 Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Commission [1963] ECR 199. Also see D. Chalmers, European Union Public Law, 
p. 418. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid.. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Appendix 1: Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Jurisprudence 
(http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/communication/Appendixes.doc.pdf). 
20 Also see S. Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU law, (Oxford University Press, New York 2007), p. 217.  
21 Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Commission [1963] ECR 199, 2nd para. of the Court’s actual judgment. Also see 
Appendix 1: Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Jurisprudence 
(http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/communication/Appendixes.doc.pdf). 
22 Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Commission [1963] ECR 199, para. 4. Also see P. Craig & G. de Burca, EU law: 
text, cases, and materials, (Oxford University Press, New York 2008), p. 517. 
23 S.D. Phillips & S. Rathgeb Smith, Governance and Regulation in the Third Sector: International Perspectives, 
(Routledge, New York 2011), p. 176.To that effect also see Case T-585/93 Greenpeace and Others v. 
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the European courts and the non-privileged applicants and are, as a consequence, subject to 
criticism.24 
 
 
3. The Standing of Environmental Organizations under Article 263 TFEU as of Today   
 
Although the Plaumann criteria were established almost half a century ago, they are still 
rigorously applied in cases where environmental organizations try to start proceedings before 
the General Court (as well as in cases of appeal before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union).25 This led to the circumstance that cases in which the European courts acknowledged 
that environmental organizations successfully passed the criterion of ‘individual concern’ are 
non-existent.26 
In the following, it  will  be discussed how the General Court  and the Court  of Justice of the 
European Union examine the standing of environmental organizations. Due to the structural 
limits of this paper, the focus will be laid on three prominent judgments of the European 
Courts: Greenpeace and Others v. Commission27, EEB and Stichting Natuur en Milieu v. 
Commission28 and WWF v. UK29. 
 
3.1 Greenpeace and Others v. Commission  
 
In the case Greenpeace and Others v. Commission, the standing of environmental 
organizations under Article 263 TFEU was examined by the General Court for the first time.30 
In this case, Spain received funds from the EU in order to construct two power plants – one in 
Gran Canary and one in Tenerife.31 Greenpeace, together with two other environmental 
organizations and inhabitants of these islands started proceedings before the General Court 
against this financial aid.32 
Whereas the inhabitants of Gran Canary and Tenerife argued that they meet the condition of 
‘individual concern’ because of the fact that they ‘have suffered or will suffer detriment or 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Commission [1995] ECR II-2205; Case T-236/04, EEB and Stichting Natuur en Milieu v. Commission [2005] 
ECR; Case T-91/07, WWF-UK Ltd. v. Council of the European Union [2008]; C-321/95 P Stichting Greenpeace 
Council (Greenpeace International) v. Commission [1998] ECR I-1651; Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré & Cie v. 
Commission, [2002] ECR II-2365; Case T-37/04, Região autónoma dos Açores v. Council [2008] ECR II-103.  
24 J. Fairhurst, Law of the European Union, (Pearson Education Limited 2007), p. 238. Also see M. M. 
Slotboom, A comparison of WTO and EC law: do different objects and purposes matter for treaty 
interpretation?, p. 207.  
25 E. Kirk, EU law, (Pearson Education Limited 2009), p. 50. Also see G. Bebr, Developments of judicial control 
of the European communities, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1981), p. 227. To that effect also see 
Case T-236/04 EEB and Stichting Natuur en Milieu v. Commission [2005] ECR and Case T-91/07 WWF-UK 
Ltd. v. Council of the European Union [2008]. 
26 E. Chiti & B.G. Mattarella, Global Administrative Law and EU Administrative Law: Relationships, Legal 
Issues and Comparison, (Springer Verlag, Heidelberg 2011), p. 379. Also see M. Eliantonio, The Aarhus 
Convention and access to justice for environmental NGOs before courts in the EU: good news with a bitter 
aftertaste, Effectius Newsletter 14 (2011), p. 5.  
27 Case T-585/93 Greenpeace and Others v. Commission [1995] ECR II-2205.  
28 Joined cases T-236/04 and T-241/04, European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and Stichting Natuur en Milieu 
v. Commission [2005] ECR II-04945. 
29 Case T-91/07 WWF-UK Ltd. v. Council of the European Union [2008] ECR II-00081. On appeal before the 
Court of justice of the European Union see Case C-355/08 P WWF-UK Ltd. v. Council of the European Union 
[2008] ECR I-73.  
30 Draft Findings and Recommendations of the Compliance Committee with regard to Communication 
ACCC/C/2008/32 concerning Compliance by the European Union of 14.03.2011, p.5. 
31 U. Haltern, Europarecht: Dogmatik im Kontext, (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2007), p. 270. Also see P. Kent, 
Law of the European Union, p. 131. 
32 Ibid, p. 271. 
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loss’  resulting  from  the  grant  of  the  fund  which  on  itself  has  great  impact  on  the  
environment33, the environmental organizations adduced that they  
 
‘should be considered to be individually concerned by reason of the particularly important 
role they have to play in the process of legal control by representing the general interests 
shared by a number of individuals in a focused and coordinated manner’.34  
 
Additionally, they argue that their members do not lack ‘individual concern’ and that in such 
a case, the European courts had earlier acknowledged the standing of the representing 
organization.35 
However, the General Court, applying the Plaumann criteria, gave three reasons to support 
their conclusion that neither the Spanish inhabitants nor the environmental organizations did 
have standing.36 First, it was held that the individual plaintiffs’ position does not differ from 
that of the other inhabitants of the two Spanish islands.37 Second, it was argued that the three 
environmental organizations could not be qualified as being individually concerned because 
of the fact that the people they represent do not possess ‘individual concern’ themselves 
either.38 Third, in paragraph 62 of the judgement, the Court explicitly responded to 
Greenpeace,  stating  that  it  was  not  ‘in  any  way  the  interlocutor  of  the  Commission  with  
regard to the adoption of the ... decision’ and that it ‘cannot [...] claim to have any specific 
interest distinct from that of its members’.39 The Court of Justice of the European Union 
upheld the judgement of the General Court in appeal.40 
 
3.2 European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and Stichting Natuur en Milieu v. Commission  
 
In the case EEB and Stichting Natuur en Milieu v. Commission, the applicants aimed to annul 
EU Commission Decisions that contained the permission to keep using atrazine and simazine 
although it could not be excluded that this could have adverse consequences for health issues 
on the one hand and for the environment in on the other hand.41 The EEB consisted of 145 
different environmental organizations that were spread over the EU.42 
EEB and Stichting Natuur en Milieu first argued that they fulfill the criterion of individual 
concern because of the fact that these Commission decisions result in a regression when it 
comes to environmentalism.43 Second, they stated that their activities are in the field of 
environmentalism ‘in the context of Directive 92/43 and that, in that capacity, the EEB has a 
                                                             
33 Case T-585/93 Greenpeace and Others v. Commission [1995] ECR II-2205, para. 30. Also see Appendix 1: 
Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Jurisprudence (http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-
32/communication/Appendixes.doc.pdf). 
34 Ibid, para. 39. 
35 Ibid, paras. 37-38.  
36 Ibid, paras. 56-62. Also see D. Chalmers, European Union Public Law, p. 426-427. 
37 Ibid, paras. 56 and 60. Also see Appendix 1: Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Jurisprudence 
(http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/communication/Appendixes.doc.pdf). 
38 Ibid, para. 59.  
39 Ibid, para. 62.  
40 D. Chalmers, European Union Public Law, p. 426. 
41 M. Eliantonio, Towards an ever dirtier Europe?: how the Lisbon Treaty did not improve the standing of NGOs 
to challenge EU environmental measures, under 2. Also see Order of the CFI in Joined cases T-236/04 and T-
241/04, European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and Stichting Natuur en Milieu v. Commission [2005] ECR II-
04945, paras. 13-18. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Order of the CFI in Joined cases T-236/04 and T-241/04, European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and 
Stichting Natuur en Milieu v. Commission [2005] ECR II-04945, para. 54.Also see M. Eliantonio, Towards an 
ever dirtier Europe?: how the Lisbon Treaty did not improve the standing of NGOs to challenge EU 
environmental measures, under 2. 
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special consultative status with the Commission and other European Institutions’.44 Third, the 
plaintiffs held that an action before the General Court would be the most efficient legal 
instrument  to  challenge  the  Commission  Decision  since  otherwise  they  would  have  to  start  
proceedings in all of the 27 Member States of the EU.45  
The General Court followed the line of case law regarding the cases Plaumann v. Commission 
and Greenpeace and Others v.  Commission and therefore decided that the applicants do not 
have ‘individual concern’.46 Even the circumstance that EEB participated ‘in the process 
leading to the adoption of a Community act’ did not alter this conclusion of the court.47 Most 
notably, in paragraphs 71 and 72 of that judgment, the court pointed out that even the 
application of the Aarhus Convention (which will be dealt with under 3.4), which was already 
in force at the time the court delivered its judgment, could not result in the grant of  locus 
standi.48 
 
3.3 WWF-UK Ltd. v. Council of the European Union 
 
In the case WWF v. UK the applicant started an action before the General Court to annual 
certain parts of Council Regulation 41/2007 that deals with fishing activities in the EU.49 It 
has to be mentioned that the applicant participated in the Executive Committee of the North 
Sea Regional Advisory Council, which counseled the European Commission.50 That 
circumstance formed part of the plaintiff’s argumentation that ‘individual concern’ is 
present.51 
Again,  the  General  Court  as  well  as  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  on  appeal  
refused to acknowledge the ‘individual concern’ of the plaintiffs, stating that only the 
Executive Committee of the North Sea Regional Advisory Council itself and therefore not 
individual members of that council could prove ‘individual concern’.52  
 
3.4 The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (‘Aarhus Convention’) 
 
The Aarhus Convention was signed on 25 June 1998 in Denmark and aims to strengthen – as 
the official title of this Convention states – ‘public participation in decision-making and 
access to justice in environmental matters’.53 Although this convention is an international 
                                                             
44 Ibid, para. 45. 
45 Ibid, para. 46. Also see Appendix 1: Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Jurisprudence 
(http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/communication/Appendixes.doc.pdf).  
46 Ibid, paras.51-61. Also see M. Eliantonio, Towards an ever dirtier Europe?: how the Lisbon Treaty did not 
improve the standing of NGOs to challenge EU environmental measures, under 2.  
47 Ibid, para. 58. Also see Appendix 1: Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Jurisprudence 
(http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/communication/Appendixes.doc.pdf). 
48 Also see Appendix 1: Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Jurisprudence 
(http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/communication/Appendixes.doc.pdf). 
49 Case C 355/08 P WWF-UK Ltd. v. Council of the European Union [2008] ECR I-73, para. 1.  Also see 
D.Bünger, Deficits in EU and US Mandatory Environmental Information Disclosure: Legal, comparative legal 
and economic facets of pollutant release inventories, (Springer Verlag, Heidelberg 2011),  p. 215.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid, para. 55. Also see Appendix 1: Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Jurisprudence 
(http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/communication/Appendixes.doc.pdf 
52 Ibid, paras 66-69. On appeal before the Court of Justice of the European Union see Case C 355/08 P WWF-
UK Ltd. v. Council of the European Union [2008] ECR I-73.Also see M. Eliantonio, Effectius Newsletter 14, p. 
5. Also see Appendix 1: Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Jurisprudence 
(http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/communication/Appendixes.doc.pdf 
53 UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters (‘Aarhus Convention’) (1998). Also see Findings and Recommendations of the 
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legal instrument, it is nevertheless relevant in this discussion, since the EU is one of its 
signatories.54 Its ratification in the EU followed on 17 February 2005 through Decision 
2005/370/EC55.56 For the purpose of this paper, Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention is the 
most important provision of this convention since it lays down the right for parties (including 
NGOs) to have access to justice.57 Hereby, the NGOs – if meeting the conditions laid down in 
paragraph 5 of Article 2 of the Aarhus Convention - only have to demonstrate that they have 
‘a sufficient interest’ or that they maintain ‘impairment of a right, where the administrative 
procedural law of a Party requires this as a precondition’.58 The Compliance Committee with 
Regard to Communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part 1) concerning Compliance by the 
European Union has already come to the conclusion that the EU does not comply with Article 
9 of the Aarhus Convention because of the fact that environmental organizations were denied 
access to the European courts in cases where they had started proceedings.59 
In order to implement the Aarhus Convention, the EU has adopted several pieces of 
legislation, under which Regulation No 1367/2006.60 According to Art.12 of that regulation 
‘the non-governmental organization which made the request for internal review pursuant to 
Article 10 may institute proceedings before the Court of Justice in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Treaty’.61 The last part of this Article refers to Article 263 TFEU.62 
It is crucial and – as a consequence – widely discussed in legal doctrine because of the fact 
that it is not set out how the relationship between this part of the provision and Article 263 
TFEU should look like.63 The question remains whether Art.12 of the Aarhus Regulation has 
to be strictly interpreted, similar to the Plaumann criteria under Article 263 TFEU or whether 
this regulation could open the possibility to grant environmental organizations wider access to 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Compliance Committee with Regard to Communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part 1) concerning Compliance by 
the European Union, adopted on 14.04.2011 (http://www.endseurope.com/docs/110428a.pdf), para. 57.  
54 G-S KREMLIS, The Aarhus Convention and its implementation in the European Community, 
(http://www.inece.org/conference/7/vol1/22_Kremlis.pdf),  p.  141.  Also  see  M.  Eliantonio,  Towards an ever 
dirtier Europe?: how the Lisbon Treaty did not improve the standing of NGOs to challenge EU environmental 
measures. 
55 Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European 
Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to 
justice in environmental matters [2005] OJ L 124/1. 
56 A. Follesdal a.o., Multilevel regulation and the EU: The Interplay between Global, European and National 
Normative Processes, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008), p. 332. 
57 M. Eliantonio, Towards an ever dirtier Europe?: how the Lisbon Treaty did not improve the standing of NGOs 
to challenge EU environmental measures. 
58 Artt. 2 para. 5 and 9 para. 2 UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (‘Aarhus Convention’) (1998). Also see M. Kment, 
Grenzüberschreitendes Verwaltungshandeln, (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2010), p. 375-378. 
59 Findings and Recommendations of the Compliance Committee with Regard to Communication 
ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part 1) concerning Compliance by the European Union, adopted on 14.04.2011, 
http://www.endseurope.com/docs/110428a.pdf (last visited on 06.12.2011), p. 1-2.  
60 Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the 
application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Acces to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies. Also 
see Justice and Environment: European Network of Environmental Law Organizations, The Aarhus Regulation 
and the future of standing of NGOs/public concerned before the ECJ in environmental cases 
(http://www.justiceandenvironment.org/_files/file/aarhus-access-to-justice-study-2008.pdf), p. 3.  
61 To that effect also see E. Chiti  & B.G. Mattarella, Global Administrative Law and EU Administrative Law: 
Relationships, Legal Issues and Comparison, (Springer Verlag, Heidelberg 2011), p. 370. 
62 Ibid, and Communication to the Aarhus Convention’s Compliance Committee (2008),  
http://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/communication/Communication.pdf, (last visited 
on 05.12.2011). 
63 For example: Ibid. 
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the General Court.64 A case that might give an answer to that question is still pending before 
the General Court.65 
 
 
4. Why the Extension of the Standing Should be Supported  
 
In the following, arguments will be brought forward to support the extension of the standing 
of environmental organizations.  
First, environmental law is mostly laid down in legislative acts so that environmental 
organizations that try to bring an action before the General Court will, as a necessity, have to 
pass the Plaumann criteria.66 In this respect, it should be noticed that the Plaumann criteria 
are not always applied in the same strict manner.67 The case law of the European courts has 
shown that a stricter test concerning the standing of a plaintiff is applied in the field of 
environmental law than in a different field of law, such as competition law and state aid law.68 
In this context, it shall also be brought to attention that for corporations or trade unions it is 
considerably easier to acquire locus standi before the General Court than for environmental 
organizations.69 As a consequence, organizations engaging in environmental law, which try to 
start an action under Article 263 TFEU, challenging a legislative act, are in a disadvantaged 
position.70 This has led to a ‘democratic deficit’, since ‘public participation’ – a key element 
of a democratic society - is limited.71 According to legal scholars, Article 263 TFEU has to be 
theologically interpreted and therefore it has to be assessed how the needs have developed 
during the time and how the needs of the European society look like at this point.72 Having 
done  so,  the  next  step  would  be  to  either  adjust  the  upcoming  case  law  in  a  way  that  they  
comply with these needs, or to change the Treaty accordingly to meet these needs.73  
In  this  regard  it  could  be  argued  that  Member  States  are  in  the  position  to  protect  the  
environment and that therefore a treaty amendment is not necessary.74 However, it is 
established in the legal doctrine that NGOs are the best representatives when it comes to 
environmental interests because of the fact that they possess great knowledge when it comes 
to environmentalism.75 Additionally, they are in an objective position.76 This does not mean 
                                                             
64 Ibid. M. Eliantonio, Towards an ever dirtier Europe?: how the Lisbon Treaty did not improve the standing of 
NGOs to challenge EU environmental measures. 
65 Case T-338/08 Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe v. Commission (pending). 
Also  see  E.  Chiti  &  B.G.  Mattarella,  Global Administrative Law and EU Administrative Law: Relationships, 
Legal Issues and Comparison, p. 370.  
66 A. Limante, Actions for Annulment before ECJ after the Lisbon Treaty: has the access to justice improved?, 
http://egpa-conference2011.org/documents/PSG10/LIMANTE.pdf, (last visited on 05.12.2011), p. 17. 
67 E. Biernat, ‘The Locus Standi of Private Applicants under article 230 (4) EC and the Principle of Judicial 
Protection in the European Community’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/03 (2003), p. 14.  
68 Ibid, p. 14. To that effect see for example Case 26/76, Metro-SB-Groȕmärkte GmbH & Co KG v. Commission 
[1977] ECR 1875 and Case 730/79 Phillip Morris Holland BV v. Commission [1980] ECR 2671. 
69 Communication to the Aarhus Convention’s Compliance Committee (2008), 
http://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/communication/Communication.pdf (last visited 
on 5.12.2011), p. 3. Also see Ibid, p. 17. 
70 Ibid.  
71 J. Wates, Environment for Europe, NGO Keynote Address at Fourth Ministerial Conference of United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, (1998). Also see J. Peel, ‘Giving the Public a Voice in the Protection of the 
Global Environment: Avenues for Participation by NGOs in Dispute Resolution at the European Court of Justice 
and World Trade Organization’, 12 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 47 (2001), p. 48. 
72 E. Biernat, Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/03 (2003), p. 17. 
73 see Ibid. 
74 U. Haltern, Europarecht: Dogmatik im Kontext, (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2007), p. 282.  
75 N. Haenn & R. Wilk, The Environment in Anthropology: A reader in ecology, culture and sustainable living, 
New York: New York University Press (2007), p. 46. 
76   E. BIERNAT, The Locus Standi of Private Applicants under article 230 (4) EC and the Principle of Judicial 
Protection in the European Community, Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/03 (2003), p. 19. Also see N. HAENN 
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that a NGO does not position itself on a particular issue, but that it is free from self-serving 
interests, as it is the case with States, which primarily concentrate on interests concerning the 
State.77  
 
4.1 Union de Pequenos Agricultores (UPA) and Jégo-Quéré & Cie v. Commission 
 
It has to be mentioned here that the strict character of the Plaumann criteria is not only 
theoretically discussed by legal scholars.78 Instead,  the  need  to  increase  the  standing  of  
environmental organizations has not been left unheard in the European courts.79 This is 
demonstrated in the cases Union de Pequenos Agricultores (UPA)80 and Jégo-Quéré & Cie v. 
Commission81.82 
 
4.1.1 Union de Pequenos Agricultores (UPA) 
 
In the case Union de Pequenos Agricultores (UPA) the  applicants  tried  to  start  an  action  
before the General Court in order to annul a Council Regulation reforming the Spanish olive 
oil market.83 In this case, Advocate-General Jacobs tried to reform the criteria necessary to 
proof ‘individual concern’ in an action under Article 263 TFEU.84 In paragraph  60 of his 
opinion he therefore proposes that ‘a person (should) be regarded as individually concerned 
by a Community measure where, by reason of his particular circumstances, the measure has, 
or is liable to have, a substantial adverse effect on his interests’.85 It  is  remarkable that the 
General Court inherited Advocate-General Jacobs’ proposal.86 However, this progress was 
stopped by the Court of Justice of the European Union on appeal, which reverted to the 
application of the Plaumann criteria.87 
 
4.1.2 Jégo-Quéré & Cie v. Commission  
 
In the case Jégo-Quéré & Cie v. Commission the plaintiff started proceedings before the 
General  Court  in  order  to  seek  partly  annulment  of  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No.  
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1162/200188.89 The application of this Regulation would have had a great negative impact on 
the financial situation of the plaintiff.90  
Although the General Court applied the Plaumann criteria, it acknowledged in its judgment 
that the access to justice is a key element of a society.91 It further stated that the fact that the 
plaintiff in question has to be declared inadmissible lead to the situation that he loses his 
‘right to an effective remedy’.92 The Court also admits that no other legal instruments could be 
successfully used by the applicant that would lead to an admissible action before the 
European courts.93 The  essential  statement  of  the  General  Court  however  is  to  be  found  in  
paragraph 47 where it is stated that Article 263 TFEU ‘in the light of Article 6 and 13 of the 
ECHR and of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Right’ cannot be regarded anymore to 
secure the ‘right of an effective remedy’.94 Furthermore, in paragraph 50, the General Court 
held that the Plaumann criteria might have to be revised.95 On appeal, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union confirmed this ruling of the General Court and again applied the 
Plaumann criteria.96 
 
 
5. Why the Extension of the Standing Should be Opposed  
 
The ratio behind the Plaumann criteria is to ensure that applicants are individually 
concerned.97 It  therefore  aims  to  exclude  the  possibility  for  everybody  to  challenge  EU  
legislation in European courts.98 If the latter was not excluded, this could lead to the situation 
that EU legislation could only hardly be adopted since the group of possible plaintiffs - and as 
a consequence the number of admissible actions - would not be limited anymore.99 Harding 
even argues that it is not on the non-privileged applicants to challenge pieces of legislation 
that are not addressed to them but to the EU Member States.100 However, in contrast to this 
harsh opinion, NGOs already enjoy the possible use of legal instruments on European level in 
order to challenge legislative acts.101 According to Artt. 258 and 259 TFEU the Commission 
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or Member States can start proceedings against another Member State for not complying with 
environmental law before the Court of Justice of the European Union on behalf of a request of 
a NGO.102 A different possibility, where NGOs do not depend on either the Commission or a 
Member State, is to start an action before a national court, if that Member State recognizes the 
standing of a NGO.103 
Last,  the  Lisbon Treaty  has  introduced  reforms to  the  prior  system of  Article  263  TFEU.104 
Although these reforms did not have an impact on the Plaumann criteria itself, they had the 
consequence that the possibility for non-privileged applicants under that article were 
increased by creating the possibility to challenge regulatory acts, in case of which ‘individual 
concern’ does not have to be proven.105 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Legal scholars agree on the circumstance that the Plaumann criteria form a barrier between 
non-privileged applicants and their access to the European courts. When it comes to the 
question whether - and in case that question has to be answered in the affirmative – how it has 
to be resolved, such a consensus is absent. Different ways of solving the issue have been 
discussed in the course of this paper.  
What is remarkable, is the circumstance that neither the General Court nor the Court of 
Justice of the European Union has until now acknowledged ‘individual concern’ in a case 
where an environmental NGO acted as plaintiff in a proceeding concerning the challenge of a 
legislative  act.  However,  in  this  context,  it  has  to  be  recalled  that  the  General  Court  in  the  
cases Jégo-Quéré & Cie v. Commission and Union de Pequenos Agricultores (UPA) (and also 
Advocate-General Jacobs in the latter case) elaborated on the effects of the system of Article 
263 TFEU on non-privileged applicants and proposed that this system should be revised. 
Although these legal developments were not accepted by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union until now, they still serve as a demonstration for the growing awareness of the 
consequences of the strict application of the Plaumann criteria – especially on the side of the 
European judicial power. The call for an extension of the standing of environmental 
organizations  therefore  does  not  only  reflect  the  opinion  of  a  minority,  but  instead  of  a  
growing majority. The Plaumann criteria, as they are interpreted until now, can be considered 
to  breach  the  fundamental  right  of  access  to  justice  on  EU  level.  In  case  the  legislation  in  
question qualifies as legislative act which is not addressed to the plaintiff, other independent 
legal instruments are not available for non-privileged plaintiffs to challenge the act. The only 
remaining  possibilities  are  to  address  either  the  Commission  or  a  Member  State  to  start  
proceedings before the Court of justice of the European Union or to try to challenge the act on 
national level, if that Member State’s legal system provides for such an opportunity.  
Although valid reasons can be adduced to oppose an extension and to remain the application 
of the Plaumann criteria instead, these arguments cannot ace the supporting arguments any 
longer.  
                                                             
102 Artt. 258 and 259 TFEU. Also see K. Lenaerts & J. A. Gutierrez-Fons, ‘The General System of EU 
Environmental Law Enforcement’, Yearbook of European Law (2011).  
103 J. Peel, 12 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 47 (2001), p. 49.  
104 A. Arnull, ‘From Bit Part to Starring Role ? The Court of Justice and Europe’s Constitutional Treaty’, 24 
Yearbook of European Law (2005), p.1-25. Also see M. Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, 
Not Hearts’, 45 CMLRev (2008), p. 613-703 and R. Barents, ‘The Court of Justice after the Treaty of Lisbon’, 47 
CMLRev (2010), p. 709-728. 
105 A. Limante, Actions for Annulment before ECJ after the Lisbon Treaty: has the access to justice improved?, 
p. 17.  
Plaumann and the Standing of Environmental Organizations 
141 
To sum up, the conclusion has to be drawn in the light of the jurisprudence of the General 
Court and the legal doctrine in the field of the standing of environmental organizations that 
this standing should be extended to meet the needs of the European society.  
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STATE LIABILITY FOR JUDICIAL BREACHES OF UNION LAW: 
LOOSENING THE KÖBLER CRITERIA? 
 
Mayke Knoben 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In 2003 it was held in the Köbler judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union that 
it is possible to have state liability for judicial breaches of Union law. The Court confirmed 
this view in Traghetti del Mediterraneo. The existence of state liability was in both cases 
made subject to the same test. This test, as laid down in paragraph 51 of the Köbler judgment, 
contains three criteria. First, ‘the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on 
individuals’. Second, ‘the breach must be sufficiently serious’. Third, there must be ‘a direct 
causal link between the breach of the obligation incumbent on the State and the loss or 
damage sustained by the injured parties’. As an adaptation to the specific judicial context, the 
Court  held  that  a  breach  will  only  be  sufficiently  serious  when  there  is  a  manifest  
infringement. 
There has been a lot of critique on this test. Member States made complaints at the Court 
while Köbler was pending because they were against the concept of state liability for judicial 
breaches of Union law. Academics on the other hand criticized the test for being unclear and 
too strict to provide for an effective remedy. It should therefore be examined if a better test is 
available.  One  way of  doing  so  might  be  to  loosen  the  Köbler criteria. This is what will be 
researched in this paper: Do the Köbler criteria have to be loosened? To answer this question I 
will  look  at  case  law  of  the  European  Union  and  the  perspective  of  Member  States  on  the  
concept on general. The most attention will however be spend on a comparative analysis of 
the critiques academics gave on the Köbler test. 
To answer the main question, there must be taken a look first at what the current framework 
for state liability, especially in the field of judicial breaches, is. Since this paper is not focused 
on the framework, only the main rules of each case will be given. In the second part of the 
paper the critique on the concept of state liability for judicial breaches will be taken into 
account. Later on in this part, the Court’s response to this critique will be shown, next to the 
aspect if the Court’s answer is really that sufficient. The relevance of this part lies in the fact 
that it shows how delicate the balance between national interests and Union law is. In the third 
part critique on the Köbler test made by academics will be given. This critique shows both 
positive and negative parts on the test. This critique will finally be used in the fourth part to 
explain why a new criterion must be established. 
For  practical  reasons  I  will  consistently  refer  to  Union  law  and  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  
European Union, even on places where the terms Community law and the European Court of 
Justice were used in the past. 
 
 
2. The Framework of State Liability of Judicial Breaches of Union Law 
 
State liability, the concept where Member States can be hold judicially accountable for 
infringements in Community law, was a no-go option for a long period of time. In fact, in 
1991 EU Member States held explicitly at an intergovernmental conference that they refused 
to accept the concept of state liability for infringements of Community law.1 The conference 
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however  did  not  stop  the  now-called  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  (hereinafter:  
CJEU) to adopt this concept.  
The CJEU accepted state liability for judicial breaches of Union law for the first time in the 
case Francovich.2 In  this  case  the  CJEU held  that  state  liability  is  possible  when there  is  a  
piece of Union legislation that confers rights to individuals. Second, the content of these 
rights must be identified by provisions of this legislation. Finally, there must be a causal link 
between the breach of the obligation and the damage suffered by the parties.3 If state liability 
exists, the injured party must be awarded damages. 
After the CJEU held Francovich, there was a lot of confusion all around Europe on how to 
deal with this new concept.4 In Brasserie du Pêcheur, the CJEU took the opportunity to 
clarify what it held state liability should mean. First, it held that Member States are 
responsible for making good damage that is caused to individuals by the state because 
national legislation is in breach with Union law.5 Second, it held that the margin of discretion 
should be taken into account. If there was a wide margin for Member States, state liability 
should only exist when three conditions have been met. These criteria are the same as in 
Francovich; only the second criterion has changed. This is now that the breach must be 
sufficiently serious.6 Hereby, the CJEU gave different factors that should be taken into 
account. Third, the CJEU held that national legislation on state liability can also be applied in 
national  proceedings,  but  only  when this  legislation  is  not  stricter  than  the  European  test.  It  
should not be a fault-based test either.7 Finally, the CJEU held that a breach can be 
sufficiently serious even when the CJEU had not ruled on the specific issue before.8 
In Köbler9 the CJEU held that state liability is possible for judicial breaches of Union law as 
well. The Court thereby stated that the same criteria as in Brasserie du Pêcheur have to be 
used. A sufficiently serious breach will be achieved when there is a manifest infringement of 
Union law. This is a stricter test, since the judiciary needs a wider margin of discretion to 
function effectively.10 For a manifest infringement the CJEU gives a list of factors that have 
to be taken into account: ‘the degree of clarity and precision of the rule infringed; whether the 
infringement was intentional; whether the error of law was excusable or inexcusable; the 
position, where taken, by a Community institution and non-compliance by the court in 
question with its obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling under the third 
paragraph of article 234 EC.’11 These factors are the same as in Brasserie du Pêcheur except 
for the addition of the factor of the preliminary question in Köbler. 
In Traghetti del Mediterraneo12 the CJEU confirmed Köbler. It held that the latter has to be 
followed by Member States in creating state liability for judicial breaches of Union law. 
Furthermore, the CJEU held that Member States cannot create criteria that are stricter than the 
criteria that are mentioned in Köbler. Stricter criteria would make Köbler basically useless 
since they would make it practically almost impossible for a claimant to be awarded damages. 
That is not what the CJEU wanted when it adopted the concept for judicial breaches.13 
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In the final case that will be discussed in this paper, Commission v. Spain14, the CJEU 
declared for the first time that a Member State was in breach of Union law, solely based on 
the Spanish supreme court’s decision. Normally a judicial breach will have some legislative 
aspect or an aspect of misinterpretation of Union law. This time there was a pure judicial 
infringement that was not based on such factors.15 The CJEU thus extended the possibility to 
have state liability for breaches of the national judiciary. 
What is shown by this case law is that the concept of state liability has extended over time. 
The state can now also be hold liable for breaches of Union law made by the judiciary. 
However, this test is stricter since a sufficiently serious breach will only exist when there is a 
manifest infringement of Union law. This test should not be made stricter as was tried by the 
Italian authorities in Traghetti. Finally, the CJEU also made it possible to create state liability 
that is solely based on a judicial infringement of Union law. 
 
 
3. A Critical View on the Concept of State Liability for Judicial Breaches of Union Law 
 
3.1 Criticism on the Concept 
 
As already stated, Member States did not want to create a separate system of state liability for 
breaches of Union law.16 The  Member  States  had  several  reasons  for  this.  These  were  
expressed to the CJEU when Köbler was  pending.  The  grounds  of  objection  were  based  on  
the  principles  of  res judicata and legal certainty, independence of the national judges, 
impartiality of national courts and the parallel between the national rules and Union rules.17 
Member States argued in Köbler that accepting state liability would mean that res judicata 
would not be respected. Via this concept it would namely be possible to challenge a decision 
that was held by the national supreme court, a court whose decisions normally cannot be 
challenged. 18 This  would  of  necessity  lead  to  legal  uncertainty  as  well:  the  authority  of  a  
decision is unclear until the claimant decides not to challenge it. 
Member States argued that creating state liability for judicial breaches of Union law would 
affect the independence of the national judiciary as well. This is because it would make it 
possible to penalize the judicial power for its decisions. Penalizing the judicial power could 
then have effects on how the judicial power will decide on disputes in the future. Furthermore, 
the independence of the national judicial power will be inflicted by the legislative power. The 
legislative power will be responsible for making the penalty framework, a responsibility 
Member States must be, considering the division of powers, very careful about. Afraid of a 
ruling of the CJEU expanding state liability, the Member States held in Köbler that state 
liability for judicial breaches should stay a domestic matter.19 
The third argument Member States posed was that state liability for judicial breaches would 
infringe the impartiality of national courts. The test for impartiality is subject to objective and 
subjective criteria and closely related to article 6 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (hereinafter: ECHR).20 Especially the objective criterion will be in play; It is not 
unlikely that the same court will judge on both the initial proceedings and on the claim for 
damages, especially in appeal. Garde warned that as a result of this, a claim for state liability 
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can go up to the national supreme court, the same court that is claimed to have infringed 
Union law.21  It will be hard to call such a proceeding independent and in line with the ECHR. 
This opinion is shared by Cabral and Chaves.22 
Finally, Member States argued that accepting state liability for judicial breaches would create 
a parallel between national rules and Union rules. They held that national rules on state 
liability for judicial infringements already exist in several Member States. Therefore there 
would be no need to adopt a new system custom-made for breaches of Union law.23 
 
3.2 Adopting the Concept 
 
Despite the fact that Member States were reluctant towards the adoption of state liability for 
judicial breaches of Union law, the CJEU held that such a concept should be adopted anyway. 
The main reason why the CJEU did this was already stated in Francovich: if an individual 
would not have the possibility to get redress because the state acted in breach of Union law, 
Union law would no longer be effective nor would it be able to create rights for individuals.24 
Such a thing is even true for judicial breaches. In Köbler the CJEU held once again that state 
liability is ‘inherent in the system of the Treaty’ and that ‘that principle applies … whichever 
is the authority of the Member State whose act or omission was responsible for the breach’.25 
Here the CJEU shows once again that Union law and Union case law is supreme over national 
law. Member States have to comply with Union law whether they like it or not. According to 
Albors-Llorens, state liability can be seen as ‘the ultimate indirect mechanism to secure 
Member States’ compliance with their Community obligations’.26 
State liability however should not be unlimited. It is important for the existence of state 
liability that the claimant has been deprived of rights which Union law confers to individuals. 
For judicial state liability, it needs to be pointed out that a claimant normally can appeal 
against  a  judicial  decision.  In  those  cases  there  will  not  be  a  deprivation  of  rights.  There  is  
only such deprivation when a court against whose decision cannot be appealed holds a 
decision in breach of Union law. The CJEU held in Köbler that only for those situations the 
concept of state liability can be used.27 This limitation is clear because a claimant should 
always use an effective judicial remedy. Suing the state after a judgment in first instance is 
not effective since it would deprive the judiciary to correct its own mistake. 
When it adopted a somewhat limited concept of state liability, the CJEU took the criticism of 
Member States in account as well. On the argument of res judicata the CJEU held that a claim 
for damages is a new case and does not of necessity have the same purpose or involve the 
same parties as the proceedings that lead to the decision that is now indirectly challenged. 
Therefore the authority of this decision is not challenged. So, the CJEU did not agree with the 
Member  States  on  the  argument  of  res judicata and legal certainty.28 The  reasoning  of  the  
CJEU is logical as it clearly states that the initial proceedings and the proceedings for 
damages are two different proceedings and thus res judicata and legal certainty are not 
endangered. 
On the second argument, the independence of the judiciary, the CJEU held that this is not 
affected. Not the personal liability of the judge who held the decision is at stake, it is the 
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liability of the state. On the argument that accepting state liability might have an influence on 
the way judges will make decisions, the CJEU held that accepting state liability will enhance 
the  quality  of  decisions  and  on  the  long-term  the  authority  of  decisions.29 As  an  additional  
comment, it has to be said that it is up to the Member States to make a precise legislation on 
state liability for judicial breaches and therefore Member States can create safeguards for the 
independence of judges. They only should take the comments of the CJEU into account by 
doing so. 
On the third argument, the impartiality of the judiciary, the CJEU looked mostly at the issue 
raised that there are no special courts for reparation in the Member States. The CJEU held that 
the absence of such a court cannot be a reason for not adopting state liability. The designation 
of a competent court and establishing procedural rules must be done by the Member States.30 
On the one hand it is reasonable that the Court refused to give precise indications. This is 
technically complicated and would perhaps interfere too much with the sovereignty of the 
Member States. However, Cabral and Chaves held that the CJEU could have given more 
indications on how it would like to see the protection of impartiality to be filled in. Hereby the 
CJEU could have taken a look at article 6 ECHR and the interpretation of that article by the 
European Court of Human Rights. By not doing so Cabral and Chaves think the CJEU missed 
an opportunity.31 
The CJEU held on the final argument, the parallel between national law and Union law, that 
there already is a parallel for reparation between the European Court of Human Rights and 
national courts.32 From this it can be derived that the Member States have accepted the idea 
that an external court that can make binding decisions on reparation for national courts. The 
concept of state liability for judicial breaches of law that is not national law is thus not that 
strange as Member States were claiming in Köbler.  
 
 
4. A Critical View on the Köbler Criteria 
 
4.1 Positive Critique on Köbler 
 
The first thing that has to be said is that Member States were reluctant in adopting the concept 
of state liability. It is because of that the CJEU could not go too far in establishing liability for 
judicial breaches of Union law – it would interfere with national interests. However, a concept 
of liability was necessary to prevent that Union law would lose its value. The CJEU thus had 
to create a balance between national interests and Union law. According to Drake, this 
balance is very hard to make, especially since Member States are not willing to hand in more 
‘sovereignty’. The CJEU cannot create a full and complete remedy, but only an effective one 
as long as the Member States are unwilling to cooperate.33 Thus,  Drake  implies  that  the  
system as it is now is not perfect. However, creating criteria that would loosen Köbler would 
interfere with national interests, something Member States are very reluctant about.   
Second, Breuer holds the balance between Union law and legal certainty as laid down in 
Köbler is preserved. Breuer believes that Union law does need protection. However, such 
protection should not be unlimited since this would create legal uncertainty. Breuer disagrees 
with the CJEU and believes legal certainty plays a role in the field of state liability. He thinks 
that the current test is in conformity with the other remedies individuals may seek for 
                                                             
29 Ibid, paragraphs 42-43.  
30 Ibid, paragraphs 44-47.  
31 Cabral & Chaves, 13 Maastricht Journal for European and Comparative Law, 1 (2006), p. 118. 
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reparation for judicial breaches. Such remedies are the national laws on state liability and the 
European Court of Human Rights.34 Therefore the current Köbler criteria preserve legal 
certainty: the outcome of a claim for state liability under Union law will normally be the same 
as under other fields of law. 
As already stated in the previous argument, the Köbler criteria are in line with the national 
standards on state liability for judicial breaches. Most Member States do not have a system for 
state liability or allow it only under very strict circumstances.35 The CJEU held that state 
liability for judicial breaches should be very exceptional and thus strict criteria are needed as 
well.36 Loosening the criteria would be in opposite of what most Member States are doing via 
their national laws.37 
Anagnostaras adds in favour of the current set of criteria that these serve the principle of 
effectiveness, the practical implications such as costs of legal proceedings. The reason for this 
is that creating protection for individuals against judicial breaches of national supreme courts 
is necessary. The remedy of starting a new procedure for reparation as is favoured by the 
CJEU is the most effective since other alternatives could involve the change of the national 
judicial procedural system.38 However,  Anagnostaras  adds  a  critical  note  to  his  opinion.  He  
believes that the principle of effectiveness is only served when state liability when solely 
courts of final instance can be hold liable. For poor decisions of ordinary courts the appeal 
procedure will be much more effective.39 
According to Dougan, the Köbler criteria can create more supremacy for the CJEU over 
national courts. This is because these criteria will force national courts, at least national 
supreme courts, to think twice before deciding not to fulfil their obligation to disapply 
national law in favour of Union law. A serious infringement of this obligation can now lead to 
non-contractual liability. It is to be expected that national courts are willing to avoid this 
consequence and therefore are more willing to comply with the CJEU’s case law as well.40  
The final aspect scholars hold to be in favour of Köbler is that it forces national supreme 
courts to send preliminary questions when the pending case cannot be resolved via CILFIT.41 
In this case, the CJEU held that the obligation to refer preliminary questions does not exist 
when the acte clair doctrine comes in play. Before Köbler national courts were much more 
likely to state that this doctrine was applicable, even without giving thorough reasons for 
that.42 National courts now have two options, otherwise it becomes likely that a manifest 
infringement is created. The first option is to send a preliminary question to the ECJ. The 
second option is to make such a thorough reasoning that the fact that the court did not send a 
preliminary question cannot create a manifest infringement of the claimant’s rights. One way 
or another, the quality of the national judiciary will be guaranteed.43 
 
4.2 Negative Critique on Köbler 
 
Apart from the positive aspects of Köbler, there were also serious points of critique. First, it is 
held that the Köbler criteria are too complex and therefore can weaken the individual’s 
                                                             
34 Breuer, ‘State liability for judicial wrongs and Community law: the case of Gerhard Köbler v Austria’, 29 
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35 Breuer, 29 European Law Review 2 (2004), p. 250. 
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37 Cabral & Chaves, 13 Maastricht Journal for European and Comparative Law, 1 (2006), p. 115-116. 
38 Anagnostaras, ‘Erroneous judgments and the prospect of damages: the scope of the principle of governmental 
liability for judicial breaches’, 31 European Law Review 5 (2006), p. 740. 
39 Anagnostaras, 31 European Law Review 5 (2006), p. 742-743. 
40 M. Dougan, National remedies before the Court of Justice (Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 250-251. 
41 Case 283/81 CILFIT v. Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 341. 
42 Dougan, National remedies before the Court of Justice, p. 250-251. 
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effective protection. Second, it is held that the current set of criteria and factors that have to be 
taken into account are too unclear, especially when is referred to the consequences of not 
sending preliminary questions. Finally, it could be stated that although the CJEU created state 
liability de jure, it can be challenged if such liability has really been created de facto. Some 
believe that the current criteria are too strict and that the CJEU has set the bar too low for the 
national courts.  
Drake believes that the current system of state liability of judicial breaches is too complex. 
Hereby  is  referred  to  the  fact  that  the  CJEU did  not  create  a  complete  and  uniform system.  
Although being aware of the fact that the position of the Member States withholds the CJEU 
from creating such a system, Drake still feels that it would have been better if the CJEU 
would have mentioned more rules that would harmonize state liability across the Member 
States.44 Harmonization would have created more clarity. This will make it much likelier that 
national courts will be able to protect the right of reparation for claimants effectively. 
A point of criticism is that the current set of criteria is quite unclear. Hereby most criticism is 
given on the second criterion, the sufficiently serious breach. The CJEU has given an entire 
list  of factors that  should be taken into account.  It  is  unclear though what weight should be 
given to each criterion. Advocate General Léger holds in Traghetti that  the  factor  of  the  
(in)excusable error should be given the most weight, next to the obligation of sending 
preliminary questions to the CJEU by supreme courts.45 However, the CJEU itself says 
nothing  about  this.  This  is  also  the  case  on  the  factor  of  the  preliminary  question.  The  
Advocate-General held that not referring a question to the CJEU alone is insufficient to create 
state liability.46 The CJEU again did not give a direct response on this and referred to CILFIT. 
Murphy however believes that CILFIT itself needs clarification to make it unlikelier that state 
liability will be created on that aspect.47 Cabral and Chaves on the other hand hold that the 
CJEU should give more clarity on what it holds to be the relationship between not referring a 
preliminary question and the existence of a manifest breach.48  
It can be stated that the CJEU has set the bar too high for claimants to be awarded damages 
for state liability. The criteria are very strict and claimants have had little to no success in 
proceedings for damages across the Member States in the past.49 In combination with the 
criteria being unclear it could be relatively easy for national courts to dismiss a claimant’s 
arguments on the basis of a not very thorough decision. Furthermore, when national courts 
refer a preliminary question to the CJEU, it is likely that the CJEU will agree with the 
national court. This might sound as a bold statement, but Beutler believes that the CJEU 
indeed has set the bar for courts very low. Only complete breaches of Union law will be 
considered to be a manifest infringement.50 According to Cabral and Chaves, the CJEU goes 
even so far that on that point the interests of the claimant will of necessity come on the second 
place.51 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
44 Drake, 31 European Law Review 6 (2006), p. 862. 
45 Opinion A-G Léger, Case 173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo v. Italy [2006] ECR I-5177, paragraph 70-72. 
46 Opinion A-G Léger, Case 224/01 Köbler v. Austria [2003] ECR I-10239, paragraph 147. 
47 Murphy, ‘An effective right to cross-border healthcare? On patients, primacy and procedural autonomy: 
comment on Elchinov’, 36 European Law Review 4 (2011), p. 549. 
48 Cabral & Chaves, 13 Maastricht Journal for European and Comparative Law, 1 (2006), p. 121-122. 
49 Beutler, ‘State liability for breaches of community law by national courts: Is the requirement of a manifest 
infringement of the applicable law an insurmountable obstacle?’, 46 Common Market Law Review 3 (2009), p. 
787-793. 
50 Beutler, 46 Common Market Law Review 3 (2009), p. 781. 
51 Cabral & Chaves, 13 Maastricht Journal for European and Comparative Law, 1 (2006), p. 123-124. 
Mayke Knoben 
150 
5. Loosening the Köbler Criteria? 
 
The current criteria have got both positive and negative aspects. The current system is far 
from  perfect  considering  the  serious  negative  criticisms  on  it.  In  my  opinion  the  Köbler 
criteria should be loosened. Hereby I believe that a new second criterion must be established. 
This will be, following Advocate General Léger in his opinion on Köbler, that a sufficiently 
serious breach will be established when the error made by the supreme court is inexcusable.52 
The main reason that this criterion should be adopted is that it has got the merit of 
simplicity.53 Many problems with the current test are based on the fact that the current criteria 
are so unclear. That will make it more likely that national courts send more preliminary 
questions to the CJEU. This has got as consequences that it will create a bigger workload for 
the CJEU and makes the time a case will be pending on a national level much longer. This 
would decrease the effectiveness of the national judiciary. On the other hand, if national 
courts decide not to send a preliminary question, it is very unlikely that these courts will give 
decisions that are thorough and clear in a way that the judgment will be accepted by the 
claimant. 
The second reason is that national courts are very strict in applying the criteria. Therefore it is 
extremely unlikely that claimants will have success in proceedings for damages. This implies 
that state liability for judicial breaches would no longer be a real effective remedy. Supreme 
courts will namely not be stimulated to enhance the thoroughness and the quality of their 
decisions when they know that lower courts tend to set aside Union law in favour of the case 
law of the national supreme court. 
The third reason is that the CJEU at this very moment has set the bar too low for national 
courts. Even when national supreme courts have made very serious mistakes, the CJEU still 
tends to state that there has not been a manifest infringement. This is what, according to 
Cabral and Chaves,54 happened in Köbler. This should be taken very seriously. The CJEU 
held in Köbler that state liability was meant to enhance the quality of decision-making by the 
national judiciary as well.55 However, the CJEU does not show this at the moment by the way 
it is acting. 
It should be stated that the CJEU is right on the issue that state liability should only be in play 
for decisions of national supreme courts. This is mainly based on the principle of 
effectiveness.  For  lower  courts  the  most  effective  way  to  challenge  a  decision  is  to  appeal.  
Since such an option is not available for a decision of a supreme court, an alternative remedy 
has to be created. This alternative remedy  should be state liability. It will relatively spoken be 
the most efficient remedy in both costs and time. 
Of course it is important that the Köbler criteria should not be too loosened too much. That is 
because there is a fine balance between the national interests and Union law. National 
interests will however not be inflicted too much when a new criterion is created. What the 
CJEU needs to do to prevent that national interests will be inflicted too much is to give a strict 
– although not that strict as it is nowadays- interpretation of when an error will be 
inexcusable. The CJEU should be held capable of doing so since making a balance between 
Union law and national interests is something it has done for quite some time. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
As was shown by the second part of this paper, there is a delicate balance between national 
interests  and  Union  law.  The  CJEU therefore  should  be  very  careful  in  not  going  too  far  in  
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creating state liability. However, the fine balance will still be preserved when the new 
criterion would be adapted since the CJEU can give a restrictive – yet not too restrictive – 
view on what it considers to be inexcusable. 
On the other points of critique stated by the Member States, it can be held that the CJEU for 
the most part has given a sufficient answer on these concerns. For the concern of impartiality 
the CJEU has given a too simplistic answer. It would have been better if the CJEU complied 
with the rules on impartiality as laid down by the European Court of Human Rights. 
In  the  third  part  it  was  shown  that  there  are  both  positive  and  negative  aspects  on  Köbler. 
Positive aspects were that the delicate balance between the national interests and Union law 
has been preserved and that this is also applicable for the relationship between Union law and 
legal certainty. Furthermore, the system is in line with Member States’ legislation on state 
liability for judicial breaches and it is an effective system. The Köbler criteria create more 
supremacy for the CJEU over national courts and more willingness on the hand of national 
courts to comply with Union law. 
Negative aspects on the Köbler criteria  were  the  system  is  too  complex  and  therefore  can  
weaken the individual’s effective protection. Furthermore, the criteria are too unclear to create 
proper rulings on a national level on liability. Finally, the CJEU did not create an actual 
remedy to challenge state liability de facto. 
To tackle these concerns, the Köbler criteria must be loosened somewhat. A good way of 
doing so is by creating the criterion that a breach is sufficiently serious when a national 
supreme court has made an inexcusable error. Reasons for that are that this test gives more 
clarity and therefore in the end will enhance the effectiveness of the national judiciary. 
Furthermore it will enhance the legal quality of decisions since national courts now shall act 
more carefully and thoroughly on proceedings. If they do not, the chance that their decisions 
will create liability will be greater. 
The new approach does not mean that the ‘old’ approach should be thrown overboard. The 
CJEU still must be careful on keeping a balance between national interests and Union law. 
Therefore the new test must be interpreted in a relatively strict manner. Furthermore, state 
liability should only be possible for decisions of supreme courts since only then it is effective 
to have such a concept in play. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 1957 Treaty that established the European Economic Community was silent on the 
protection of fundamental rights and had as the main purpose economic integration and a 
common market.1 Forty-three years after the establishment of the Community, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union was solemnly proclaimed by the Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council of the EU at Nice on 7 December 2000.2 Ten years after 
the proclamation by EU institutions, the Charter has been incorporated into European law and 
given legal force by the Treaty of Lisbon, and is now a catalogue of social, political and civil 
rights with legally binding force.3 The process of drafting the Charter as well as the proposed 
incorporation of it by the Lisbon Treaty has been marked by dissenting opinions expressed by 
some of the Member States. The UK insisted upon a Protocol to the Lisbon Treaty in order to 
clarify certain aspects of the application of the Charter. This idea attracted Poland and 
eventually resulted in a Protocol4 being attached to the Lisbon Treaties5. The Czech Republic 
signed a last-minute agreement in October 2009 to join the Protocol at the conclusion of the 
next Accession Treaty.6  
In this essay the role and importance of the Protocol will be discussed. The topic of the paper 
is formulated as a question and hence directed my research: ‘Do EU Fundamental Rights 
Have a Different Meaning in the UK, Poland and the Czech Republic?’  
In this paper I am going to examine if and (if answered affirmative) to what extent the 
application of the Charter is different in the UK and Poland than in the other Member States 
due  to  the  existence  of  the  Protocol.  In  my  attempt  to  answer  the  question,  I  will  use  both  
primary and secondary legislation, and look not only at the legal but also historical and 
political perspective. 
Firstly,  I  will  discuss  the  origins  and  content  of  the  Charter  and  its  effect  after  the  Lisbon  
Treaty. Next, the scope of fundamental rights will be discussed. Then, I will provide an 
assessment of the origins, content and effect of the Protocol No 30. The paper will end with a 
conclusion answering my research question. 
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2. Origins of the Charter 
 
As early as 1969, the fundamental rights were held by the European Court of Justice to be 
enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court7. From that 
year onwards, the Court had regularly interpreted the EC measures in the light of fundamental 
rights8 and often drew its inspiration from the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).9 However, there was still no codified 
declaration of rights of the Community. Some argued that the Union should accede the ECHR 
but the ECJ held in its 2/94 Opinion in 1996 that such a change would have to involve a 
revision of the founding Treaties.10 As unanimity for such an amendment of the Treaties did 
not exist, the German Presidency of the EU proposed, in June 1999, a Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.11 Through decisions taken during a meeting in Cologne in 1999, the European Council 
set a process of drafting the Charter and a Convention was set up for that purpose. It was not 
decided however, what the legal status of the Charter would be, and that was supposed to be 
agreed on at a later date.12  
Reasons to set up the Charter varied from considering it a political statement to hopes of its 
incorporation into the Treaties.13 The European Commission and the Parliament opted for 
greater significance of the document whereas the Member States were rather in favour of a 
declaratory act. In the end, the Charter appeared in a form of mere ‘solemn proclamation’ that 
took  place  at  Nice  on  7  December  2000.  This  meant  that  the  Charter,  at  least  for  the  time  
being, took form of political declaration and was deprived of legally binding force.14 
 
 
3. Change of Status 
 
Although not legally binding, the Charter was found by the Court’s judges to be a useful point 
of reference in explaining legal interpretations15. It hence acted as a form of soft law and was 
‘a material legal source, shedding light on the fundamental rights which are protected by the 
Community’.16 The attempts to change the legal status of the Charter started in 2004, and the 
Laeken Declaration provided that a Convention on the Future of Europe should consider 
whether the Charter ought to be included in the basic treaty.17 As a result, a Convention 
Working Group II (that consisted of the same members as those who worked on the drafting 
of the Charter) was assigned a task to consider how such incorporation could take place and 
what its implications would be.18 The Convention’s report proposed incorporation of the 
Charter in such a way that would make it legally binging and give it a constitutional status. As 
a result of the report, the Charter became Part II of the 2004 Constitutional Treaty.19 
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However, the Dutch and French rejection of the Constitutional Treaty brought to an end any 
hopes of its ratification and hence also the incorporation of the Charter. The Treaty had to be 
modified  and,  as  part  of  the  process,  the  Charter  was  removed  from  the  text  of  the  Treaty.  
Instead of incorporation, cross-reference was applied in Article 6(1) of the revised Treaty. The 
reference was made to the text of re-proclaimed Charter as signed by the Presidents of the 
Council, the Commission and the European Parliament on 12 December 2007 in Strasbourg, 
on the eve of the signing of the Lisbon Treaty.20  
With a successful ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter became a part of the Union’s 
‘primary’ rules by virtue of the aforementioned Article 6(1) TEU declaring that the Charter 
‘shall have the same legal value as the Treaties’. Therefore, the fact that the Charter did not 
become incorporated into the substantive text of the Treaties had no legal significance.21 
 
 
4. The Charter- Structure and Content 
 
The Charter is clearly structured and consists of seven Chapters dedicated to following 
themes: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizens’ rights, and Justice. Chapter VI 
contains general provisions. It seems that the Charter follows distinctions familiar from many 
legal doctrines: between procedural and substantive, economic and cultural, individual and 
citizens’ rights, etc. However, issues have been raised regarding nature of the Charter as a 
human rights document since some of the provisions, e.g. Article 36, are not clearly related to 
human rights and have purely economic nature. Another example could be Article 43, which 
provides the right to refer to the European Ombudsman, a right that traditionally is not 
considered to be within the scope human rights provision and is moreover already included in 
the text of the Treaties.22 
 
 
5. Fundamental Rights 
 
Fundamental  rights,  in  the  meaning  of  the  Charter,  are  contained  in  Articles  1-50  of  the  
document and, in the Charter’s preamble, are referred to as ‘rights, freedoms and principles’. 
The sources of fundamental rights can be tracked in the ‘explanations’23 and include, inter 
alia, national constitutions, the ECHR, the European Social Charter, the Community Charter 
on the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and the EC and EU Treaties but also the New 
York Convention on the Rights of the Child.24 
The term ‘fundamental rights’ was intended to be all-encompassing and includes not only the 
classic protection from the State’s interference but also some rights specific for economic, 
social and political life of the Union’s citizens. The origins of the term ‘fundamental rights’ as 
                                                             
20 Anderson et al, European University Institute, EUI Working Papers 8 (2011), p. 3. 
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in the case law of the Court, seems to be the German Grundrechte,  which  is  also  an  all-
catching term.25 
The Charter does not provide a clear distinction between rights, freedoms and principles.26 
When  it  comes  to  rights  and  freedoms,  no  legally  relevant  distinction  between  the  two  
concepts is drawn in the Charter. Some of the Articles are said to be rights (as can be seen 
from Article titles), e.g. Article 3 and 6, while others, e.g. Article 10 and 15, are entitled as 
freedoms. Moreover, the two concepts are merged in Article 11 with gives protection to ‘the 
right to freedom of expression’. 
The second distinction, which attracted more attention, is between rights (freedoms) and 
principles. Article 51(1) of the Charter provides that the Union should ‘respect the rights, 
observe the principles’. This provision implies that the rights are enforceable while the 
principles are less clearly defined and may turn out to be unenforceable.27 
This distinction was highly important to the UK. They were concerned that social, economic, 
political and civil rights were all included in the same document, potentially enforceable in 
the national courts when Union law issues are involved, and before the Court of Justice. The 
UK  reasoned  that  political  and  civil  rights  are  in  general  negative  ad  hence  do  not  require  
state resources while social and economic rights with their positive nature, do require state 
resources. With that in mind, the UK preferred the term ‘principles’ when it comes to social 
and economic issues. Following their policy and in order to make their point, the UK set in 
motion  the  amendment  of  ‘horizontal  provision’  and  as  a  result  a  new  Article  52(5)  was  
introduced. The Article states that principles will not be directly effective in national courts28. 
The problem with the distinction remained however, as the Charter still does not clearly 
identify which Articles contain principles and which contain rights. Examples of the two 
categories were provided in the ‘explanations’ to the Charter29. The two Articles causing 
concern for the UK were Article 28 on collective actions and agreements and Article 30 on 
unfair dismissal. According to the ‘explanations’ however, they appear to be rights rather than 
principles and are hence potentially justiciable.30 Therefore, the UK did not achieve their 
purpose of obtaining a non-justiciable nature of Articles 28 and 30 of by the introduction of 
Article 52(5). This led to the drafting of the Protocol 30, which will be discussed below. 
 
 
6. Application and Effect of the Charter 
 
The scope of application of the Charter and its effect can be found in the document itself as 
well as in the aforementioned explanations and the attached Protocol. The two relevant 
provisions are Article 6(1) TEU and Article 51 of the Charter. 
Article 6(1) TEU was discussed already as the provision that brought about the change of the 
legal  status  of  the  Charter  as  it  provides  that  EU:  “recognises  the  rights,  freedoms  and  
principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 
2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal effect 
as the Treaties”. 
Article 51 of the Charter provides that the Charter applies to the institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Union with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity. It also applies to 
                                                             
25 Ibid. 
26 European Union Committee, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment’, 10th Report of Session 2007-08, 
para. 5.15. 
27 Heringa et al, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 1 (2001), p. 13. 
28 C.  Barnard,  ‘The  ‘Opt-Out’  for  the  UK  and  Poland  from  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights:  Triumph  of  
Rhetoric over Reality?’(2010), Trinity College Cambridge Resources, available at www.law.cam.ac.uk/faculty-
resources/10007309.pdf, p. 4. 
29 OJ 2007 C 303/17, Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
30 C. Barnard, Trinity College Cambridge Resources (2010), p. 4. 
Protocol 30: Do EU Fundamental Rights Have a Different Meaning in the UK, Poland and the Czech Republic? 
157 
the Member States but only when they are implementing Union law. Although this implies 
narrow scope of application, it has been pointed out by some Advocate Generals, e.g. 
Kokott,31 that the precise scope of the Charter’s application to Member States has not yet been 
established. It might be possible that in the future the Court will start to apply the Charter also 
when fundamental rights are invoked in case of provisions taken by the Member States that 
derogate from the EU rules, and hence are not implementing but within the scope of Union 
law. This would result in a significant increase in the scope of the Charter. There are already 
some early indications that the court might be encouraged to broaden the view on the 
applicability of the Charter in relation to the Member States.32 
Article 51(2) of the Charter builds on Article 6(1) TEU and provides that “the Charter does 
not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish 
any new power or task of the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties”. 
This is in fact a repetition of what is already included in Article 6(2) TEU. The importance of 
this provision is also stressed in the ‘Explanations’.33  
 
‘Paragraph 2, together with the second sentence of paragraph 1, confirms that the Charter 
may not have the effect of extending the competences and tasks which the Treaties confer on 
the Union. Explicit mention is made here of the logical consequences of the principle of 
subsidiarity and of the fact that the Union only has those powers which have been conferred 
upon it. The fundamental rights as guaranteed in the Union do not have any effect other than 
in the context of the powers determined by the Treaties.’  
 
This ‘horizontal provision’ was indented to reassure the Member States that the Charter would 
not expand the Court’s competence to legislate. Nevertheless, some countries expressed that 
point again in their declarations to the Charter. Poland’s Declaration focuses on the Member 
States’ right to legislate: 
 
‘The Charter does not affect in any way the right of Member States to legislate in the sphere 
of public morality, family law, as well as the protection of human dignity and respect for 
human physical and moral integrity.’34 
 
The Czech’s Declaration stresses again the importance of Article 51 of the Charter: 
 
‘The Czech Republic recalls that the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the European Union with due 
regard for the principle of subsidiarity and division of competences between the European 
Union and its Member States, as reaffirmed in Declaration (No 18) in relation to the 
delimitation of competences. The Czech Republic stresses that its provisions are addressed to 
the Member States only when they are implementing Union law, and not when they are 
adopting and implementing national law independently from Union law.’35 
 
The apparent abundance of clarifying documents raises the question of the reason why two, or 
in fact in due course three, of the Member States (Poland, the United Kingdom and the Czech 
                                                             
31 Joint Cases C-483/09 and C1-/10, para.77. 
32 Anderson et al, European University Institute, EUI Working Papers 8 (2011), p. 13, basing opinion on Case 
C-34/09 Zambrano, paras 156-177. 
33 OJ 2007 C 303/17, Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
34 (2007/C  306/02),  61.  Declaration  by  the  Republic  of  Poland  on  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  
European Union. 
35 (2007/C 306/02), 53. Declaration by the Czech Republic on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. 
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Republic) decided to sign an additional Protocol on the application of the Charter. This issue, 
together with the nature of the document, will be examined in the next part of my paper. 
 
 
7. Protocol No 30 
 
Protocol on the Application of the Charter to Poland and United Kingdom (No 30) has been 
devised when the leaders of the EU had to agree on a successor to the failed Constitutional 
Treaty. It was intended to note “the wish of Poland and the United Kingdom to clarify certain 
aspects of the application of the Charter”. In order to achieve their goal, the two Member 
States agreed upon two provisions, which were annexed to the Treaties. Also, it was agreed in 
October 2009 at a European Council meeting, that the Czech Republic will join the Protocol 
when the next Accession Treaty will be concluded.36 
The Protocol contains two provisions. Article 1(1) states: 
 
‘The Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the European Union, or any 
court or tribunal of Poland or of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions, practices or actions of Poland or of the United Kingdom are 
inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms.’ 
 
The key phrase in this provision seems to be ‘does not extend’. The Article 1(1) merely 
restates what is already contained in the Charter and hence is of no legal relevance.37 The 
Article does not prohibit the Court from ruling on disputes occurring in those Member States. 
It stresses that no new competences can follow from the application of the Charter to the 
courts of Poland, the UK or the European Union. It  does not however,  limit  in any way the 
already existing competences. Hence, Article 1(1) of the Protocol does not give Poland and 
the  UK  ‘opt-out’  statuses  from  the  Charter.  From  this  part  one  can  hence  conclude  that  no  
special treatment applies for the two (three in the future) Member Sates. 
Having discussed Article 1(1), I will follow with Article 1(2): 
 
‘In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in the Title IV of the Charter creates 
justiciable rights applicable to Poland or to the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or 
the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.’ 
 
This provision focuses o Title IV of the Charter, which is entitled ‘Solidarity’. The Title 
contains twelve Articles, six of which include a reference to being ‘in accordance with 
national laws and practices’. From that one can assume that Article 1(2) of the Protocol does 
not  provide  any  further  limitation  and  was  added,  as  states  in  the  provision  itself,  ‘for  the  
avoidance of doubt’. The purpose of Article 1(2) seems to be to stress that the ‘national laws 
and practices’, when it comes to Poland and the United Kingdom, are the ‘national laws and 
practices’ of Poland and the United Kingdom accordingly, and not of other Member Sates.  
As I  have discussed before,  the UK thought that  the content of this Title includes principles 
and hence opted for the introduction of a ‘horizontal provision’, Article 52(5) of the Charter, 
which states that principles will not be directly effective in national courts. However, 
unfortunately  for  the  UK,  not  all  of  the  six  remaining  Articles  of  Title  IV  were  drafted  in  
terms of principles but are regarded instead to have the nature of rights. By the introduction of 
Article  1(2)  of  the  Protocol,  those  provisions  are  not  justiciable  in  respect  of  the  UK  and  
Poland. If this analysis is correct, then this Article of the Protocol might be of legal 
                                                             
36 D. Chalmers, European Union Law, (Cambridge, 2010), p. 257. 
37 Groussot et al, 173 Foundation Robert Schuman, European Issue 6 (2010), p. 8. 
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significance.38 The  two  provisions  of  the  Charter  that  the  UK  was  sensitive  about  were  
Articles 28 and 30. The first one provides inter alia for a right to strike. In the UK there is in 
general no ‘right to strike’ but the trade unions enjoy immunity from being sued for it in tort 
providing  that  certain  conditions  are  satisfied.  The  UK  was  worried  that  the  differences  in  
conceptual  approaches  would  result  in  the  Court  of  Justice  being  a  foe  rather  than  an  ally  
when it comes to strike cases in the UK. 
The other provision in question was Article 30, which provides that every worker has the right 
to protection against unjustified dismissal in accordance with Union law and national laws 
and practices. This right has not been previously recognised by the Court of Justice while the 
UK have already had a system and case law tackling the problem of dismissal. Article 2 of the 
Protocol ensures that: 
 
‘To the extent that a provision of the Charter refers to national laws and practices, it shall 
only apply to Poland or the United Kingdom to the extent that the rights or principles that it 
contains are recognised in the law or practices of Poland or of the United Kingdom.’ 
 
By virtue of this Article, the national rules that govern the dismissal continue to apply. This is 
not however a special limitation, but a clarification of what is already included in the Charter: 
those provisions of the Charter that contain reference to the national laws and practices act as 
limits on the Charter.39 Again, this provision does not seem to have any legal significance. 
While analysing the Protocol, one cannot help but wonder about the reasons why Poland 
decided to join the Protocol as it seems that it was designed only to satisfy the UK’s need for 
clarification. From the analysis above, it seems that only Article 1(2) of the Protocol has legal 
significance and only when it comes to some of the provisions of one of the six relevant Titles 
of the Charter. To add confusion, Poland decided to include a Declaration that in fact 
undermines any potential use of Article 1(2) of the Protocol: 
 
‘Poland declares that, having regard to the tradition of social movement of ‘Solidarity’ and 
its significant contribution to the struggle for social and labour rights, it fully respects social 
and labour rights, as established by European Union law, and in particular those reaffirmed 
in Title IV of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.’40 
 
The question remains, what was then the reason to join the Protocol. It seems that the Polish 
President at the time, Lech Kaczynski, decided to sign the Protocol to once again underline 
what has been also included in another Polish Declaration added to the Charter: 
 
‘The Charter does not affect in any way the right of Member States to legislate in the sphere 
of public morality, family law, as well as the protection of human dignity and respect for 
human physical and moral integrity.’ 
 
It has been argued that, as can be seen from the Declarations, Poland did not have special 
interest  in  the  rights  of  workers  but  rather  expressed  fears  of  laws  relating  to  moral  values,  
e.g. abortion. The Protocol however is not of legal relevance when it comes to those fields.41 
One  can  assume  that  the  Polish  (and  in  due  course  Czech)  reason  to  join  the  Protocol  was  
rather to ‘clarify certain aspects of the application of the Charter’  as written in the Protocol 
itself.  
                                                             
38 Anderson et al, European University Institute, EUI Working Papers 8 (2011), p. 12. 
39 Ibid. 
40 (2007/C 306/02), 62. Declaration by the Republic of Poland concerning the Protocol on the application of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in relation to Poland and the United Kingdom 
41 C. Barnard, Trinity College Cambridge Resources (2010), p. 15 
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From the analysis of the Protocol it appears clearly that Poland and the UK are not ‘opt-outs’ 
from the Charter. The European Union Committee stated, “Protocol is not an opt-out from the 
Charter. The Charter will apply in the UK, even if its interpretation may be affected by the 
terms of the Protocol”.42 The  Protocol  has  been  criticised  for  its  lack  of  clarity  and  a  
possibility of variety of interpretations.43 Currently, there is a reference pending before the 
Court of Justice in a UK/EU case Saeedi. The key point is whether it is allowed for the UK to 
transfer an asylum seeker to Greece under the Dublin Regulation notwithstanding the 
likelihood of ill-treatment and disrespect for the Charter there (as argued by the claimant and 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). Mr Justice Cranston held that “ Given 
the Polish and United Kingdom Protocol,  the Charter cannot be directly relied on as against  
the United Kingdom although it is an indirect influence as an aid to interpretation.44” As this 
contradicts the conclusions of the House of Lords’ European Union Committee, the Court of 
Justice was asked by the UK Court of Appeal to provide a definite answer on the status of the 
Protocol in the EU law. The decision of the Court will hopefully clarify the issue and most 
likely the Court will disagree with Mr Justice Cranston’s words. 
Professor Barnard argued45 that it was the aim of the UK government that the less-informed, 
Eurosceptic audience believes that the Protocol creates an ’opt-out’ while for the more-
informed  audience  the  UK  government  insisted  that  the  Protocol  was  just  a  clarification.  It  
seems that the Protocol was introduced for political reasons in order to convince the British 
voters that the new Lisbon Treaty was different than the Constitutional Treaty. Similar aim 
might have been served in Poland, where a right-wing President, Lech Kaczynski, wished to 
confirm  to  his  Eurosceptic  voters  that  the  national  moral  values,  as  ensured  in  national  
legislation, are not in danger due to the change of the Charter’s legal status. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
In this essay, I have looked at the origins, content and effect of the Charter. These steps were 
necessary  in  order  to  fully  understand  the  relation  between  the  Protocol  No  30  and  the  
Charter.  
The Charter has now the same legal value as the Treaties and can be hence regarded to be the 
Union’s bill of rights. The Charter in fact codified general principles and fundamental rights 
that have been already available and used. The ‘horizontal provision’ and the Protocol No 30 
are  measures  aimed  at  ensuring  that  the  Charter  will  not  be  used  as  a  tool  to  extend  the  
Union’s powers or as a legislative basis.  
The Protocol does not provide for ‘opt-out’ status of Poland and the UK. It also does not 
introduce a distinction between the meaning of fundamental rights in the two (in the future 
three) countries and other Member States. From my analysis I can conclude, that fundamental 
rights within the meaning of EU law, are not different in the UK, Poland and Czech Republic. 
Undoubtedly, differences in the legal systems of the Member States do exist but are 
permissible only as long as in conformity with the provisions of the Treaties and the Charter. 
 
                                                             
42 European Union Committee [2007-8], 5.87. 
43 Ibid. 
44 [2010] EWHC 705, MR JUSTICE CRANSTON, para 155. 
45 C. Barnard, Trinity College Cambridge Resources (2010), p. 15. 
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WHO SHOULD HAVE THE LAST WORD ON FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS IN THE EU: THE ECTHR, NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS OR THE CJEU?  
 
Emma Carpenter 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The title question of this paper appears at first to be primarily a question of right. Which 
jurisdiction should, legally, prevail? However, there are immediate problems with such an 
approach, for each of the three courts discussed here - the ECtHR, the CJEU, and the national 
constitutional courts, along with their defining legal sources - all persistently and, sometimes, 
uncompromisingly claim supremacy over one another. There is similarly little help to be 
found in a structural analysis of the court systems of Europe: variations in national systems, 
and the indeterminate and, for now, informal relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR 
make it impossible to find a clear hierarchy. 
Instead, a solution must be found in a more pragmatic manner. I ask not which court has the 
right to the last word, but which court is best equipped to give the last word in a manner 
which provides effective protection for fundamental rights. 
This paper examines the three courts in turn, focusing on the ideology and purpose of their 
fundamental rights interest, the substantive norms they apply, the practical influence of their 
judgements, and their procedural strengths and weaknesses, particularly regarding access for 
the archetypal victim of fundamental rights breaches - individuals. The relationships and 
interactions between the courts are then examined, with a (very) short consideration of how 
those relationships might change if the EU accedes to the ECHR. Finally, a model is proposed 
by which fundamental rights protection can be assured in as effective a manner as is 
realistically possible. 
 
 
2. The European Court of Human Rights 
 
The ECtHR is unique in Europe as being the only court whose sole and, more importantly, 
overriding interest is in the protection of fundamental rights. It is inseparable from the ECHR 
and, as such, some of the constitutional qualities sometimes conferred on the ECHR1 may be 
inferred to its court. Similarly, the goals of the ECtHR are inseparable from those of the 
ECHR. Historically, the goals of the ECHR and those of the EU's predecessors are similar: a 
desire to promote and ensure peace, convergence, a distinct identity, and respect for 
democracy and the rule of law within Europe.2 In  the  case  of  the  ECHR,  this  is  achieved  
through the protection of fundamental rights. 
Although treaty-based and, therefore, typically interested in movements on the nation state 
level alone; the ECtHR has distinguished itself by allowing and, indeed, focusing upon issues 
at the level of individuals.3 
The primary source of law applied by the ECtHR, and its only official authority, is of course 
the ECHR. The special characteristics of the ECHR could warrant a paper in and of 
                                                             
1 Notably by the Court itself in Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v Ireland (2006) 42 EHRR 1. See also the 
penultimate section, on relationships between the courts, for further examples. 
2 Steven Greer & Andrew Williams, 'Human Rights in the Council of Europe and the EU: Towards 'Individual', 
'Constitutional' or 'Institutional' Justice?', 15 European Law Journal 4 (2009), p. 462. 
3 Ibid. 
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themselves: certainly, it is sterner than most treaties, having been described in Bosphorus4 as 
a ‘constitutional instrument of European public order’ and being thus far immune to normal 
rules such as lex posteriori.5 Substantively, it may well be considered the benchmark of 
fundamental rights in Europe, having been a significant inspiration for the EU's Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, and holding sway in every national legal system in Europe. 
However, it would be short-sighted to presume that the ECtHR restricts itself to recourse to 
the  ECHR  alone.  The  ECtHR  has  often  discussed  the  jurisprudence  of  the  CJEU,  but  has  
never considered it to be more than persuasive. More significant are the state-level principles 
of ‘margin of appreciation’ and ‘evolutionary interpretation’, and their impact on the 
substance of the ECHR. 
The principle of ‘margin of appreciation’, combined with the ability of high contracting 
parties to make reservations, in some cases under controversial circumstances (albeit in a 
restricted manner),6 has led to criticism of the legal certainty of the ECtHR's regime. The issue 
of flexibility in international law, its necessity, and whether or not it is desirable, is one which 
has been discussed extensively, and is beyond the scope of this paper. It is sufficient, here, to 
simply state that the fundamental rights as guaranteed in the framework of the ECHR are the 
least theoretically rigid of the three European models discussed. National interests, and the 
discretion  afforded  to  parties,  have  a  strong  influence  on  the  effects  of  the  ECHR's  
fundamental rights in the field. 
The doctrine of ‘evolutionary interpretation’7 is particularly interesting, and offers an 
arguably more significant opening for external influence on the ECtHR order. Evolutionary 
interpretation has its roots in the concept of fundamental rights being an aspect of a common 
European social conscience, and is used by the ECtHR to justify developments in the 
substance of ECHR rights on the grounds of ‘consensus among signatories’, as for example in 
the cases Fretté v France8 and E. B. v France9, in which the court reversed its position 
apparently due to a change in such accord. Although it is not clear how ‘consensus among 
signatories’ is judged, it is clear that there is consideration of national developments, 
presumably including those of a legal character, inherent in the court's application of the 
ECHR. 
The legal power of the ECtHR’s rulings is clear: they are binding.10 In practise, this is mostly 
borne out: the ECHR has one of the strongest enforcement strategies in international law,11 
with mechanisms laid out in Article 46 ECHR for oversight of compliance, and a further 
reference to the ECHR should a state party fail to fulfil its obligations. Furthermore, the 
ECHR and the ECtHR jurisprudence has traditionally been applied rigorously in other courts, 
                                                             
4 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v Ireland [2006] 42 EHRR 1. 
5 Iris  Canor,  'Primus  inter  pares.  Who  is  the  ultimate  guardian  of  fundamental  rights  law  in  Europe?',  25  
European Law Review 1 (2000), 3. See, on the special status of human rights treaties generally, Alexandre Kiss, 
'International human rights treaties: A special category of international treaty?' in Venice Commission (ed.), The 
status of international treaties on human rights, (Council of Europe Publishing, 2006), p. 11. 
6 Exemplified by the case Brannigan and McBride v UK  ECHR Series A (1993) No. 258-B, in which the UK 
adopted a reservation ex post, following rulings that the relevant provisions of national law were in breach of the 
ECHR. Restrictions on the creation of reservations may be found in Art. 56 ECHR, and are detailed in Kiss, The 
status of international treaties on human rights, p. 11. 
7 Established in Hirst v. United Kingdom, no. 74025/01, judgement [GC] October 6, 2005. cf Eirik Bjorge, 
'National supreme courts and the development of ECHR rights', 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 
(2011), 5; and Bernhard Hofstötter, 'European Court of Human Rights: Positive obligations in E. and others v 
United Kingdom', 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 3 (2004), p. 525. 
8 Fretté v. France  [2002] 38 EHRR 438. 
9 E. B. v. France [2008] ECHR 55. 
10 Art. 46 ECHR 
11 Martin Dixon, International Law (6th edition, OUP, 2007), p. 353. 
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both national courts and the CJEU.12 
Politically, the ECtHR exhibits a detachment which may improve its credentials as a court of 
fundamental rights. While national courts and the CJEU (generally) strive sincerely to apply 
the law without bias, it is inevitable that they cannot remain uninfluenced by either politics or 
common practise in their own systems, and they certainly have an interest in minimising 
interruptions to the functioning of their respective legal systems: this may not be appropriate 
in fundamental rights law.13 However,  that  same detachment  may work  against  the  ECtHR,  
placing it too far distant from the carrying on of actual violations for its formidable 
enforcement mechanisms to be effective. This perhaps plays a role in the weakness of the 
ECtHR as regards repeated violations, which are often not resolved even after findings against 
the violators.14 
A significant challenge is posed to the influence of the ECtHR by the position of the EU and 
its  acts,  especially  in  light  of  the  long-term  pie  in  the  sky  status  of  the  prospect  of  EU  
accession to the ECHR. This question, however, will be addressed later. 
Formally,  access  to  the  ECtHR  is  very  much  open.  Despite  its  origins  as  an  inter-state  
organisation, it has moved almost entirely away from inter-state disputes, with the individual 
application procedure under Article 34 ECHR being by far the most commonly used.15 
Systems of filtration of claims exist, with admissibility criteria given in Article 35 ECHR, 
which are non-restrictive, and unremarkable in the general scheme of judicial limitations. The 
ECtHR should be very easily accessible. 
However, the ECtHR is also sufferer of the most staggering workload problems of the three 
courts discussed. At the end of 2011, 139 650 cases were pending, with the Court receiving 20 
100 applications more than the number of cases it completed during that year.16 This overload 
necessarily results in huge delays for litigants, and has been characterised17 as  an  
unsustainable crisis within the ECHR framework: certainly, it makes complaints about delays 
in the work of the CJEU appear laughable. 
 
 
3. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
In sharp contrast with the ECtHR, the CJEU’s primary concern is not fundamental rights. The 
court’s formal raison d’être may be found in Article 19 TEU: furthermore, it is subject to the 
goals set out in Article 2 TEU, notably that of developing EU law in a manner which 
‘[ensures] the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of the Community’. This 
context in which the CJEU functions may raise concerns18 of conflicts of interest: when the 
CJEU is faced with a choice between protecting the stability of the EU, and protecting 
fundamental rights, might it not be tempted to prioritise the former at the expense of the 
latter? It is, however, worth noting that the same is true of national constitutional courts: the 
CJEU's Union priorities make it no more callous of fundamental rights than the national 
                                                             
12 Examples might include In re G (Adoption: Unmarried Couple) [2008] U.K.H.L. 38; and Joined Cases C-402 
& C-415/05P, Kadi v. Council of the European Union, and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council of the European 
Union, 2008 E.C.R. 299. cf Mehrdad Payandeh & Heiko Sauer, 'European Union: UN sanctions and EU 
fundamental rights', 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 2 (2009), p. 306. 
13 Canor, 25 European Law Review 1 (2000), p. 3. 
14 Greer & Williams, 15 European Law Journal 4 (2009), p. 462. 
15 Tobias Lock, 'EU accession to the ECHR: implications for the judicial review in Strasbourg', 35 European 
Law Review 6 (2010), p. 777. 
16  European Court of Human Rights, Analysis of Statistics 2010, (2011). Available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/0A35997B-B907-4A38-85F4-
A93113A78F10/0/Analysis_of_statistics_2010.pdf (Last accessed 25/4/2012). 
17 In a striking criticism of the individual focus of the ECtHR as cause of these problems, Greer & Williams, 15 
European Law Journal 4 (2009), p. 462. 
18 Such as those noted in Canor, 25 European Law Review 1 (2000), p. 3. 
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priorities of constitutional courts, who do not generally make it their business to upset the 
domestic legal order either. It is also worth noting that the Kadi19 judgement and the new legal 
status of the Charter of Fundamental rights, as per Article 6 TEU, have afforded 
‘constitutional’ status to human rights. 
Given that fundamental rights are not the primary concern of the CJEU, the question arises as 
to how they fit into its remit. Their introduction has been described variously as a tool of 
integration, an attempt to create a distinct EU identity, and a measure intended to lend 
legitimacy to a growing EU regulator.20 In any case, the ad hoc development  of  EU  
fundamental  rights  law  has  left  it  with  many  lacunae:21 the most significant being those 
created by the limits of EU competence, which leave breaches in reserved matters, such as 
family law, without remedy before the CJEU. Although the CJEU has shown itself willing to 
use creative interpretation to broaden its jurisdiction significantly,22 it is nonetheless not yet 
omnipotent. 
The sources of fundamental rights law applied by the CJEU are various, most obvious among 
them EU primary and secondary legislation. However, the lack of any general fundamental 
rights competence of the EU transports the substance of fundamental rights law outside of the 
Treaties. ‘Principles common to the member states’23 are mentioned, but rarely is national law 
deferred to by the CJEU. The two monoliths are the ECHR and the Charter on Fundamental 
Rights, both of which have questionable legal status. 
The ECHR has long had significant influence in the CJEU,24 even before its formal 
recognition  in  Article  6  TEU,  despite  the  EU not  being  party  to  it.  Meanwhile,  the  Charter  
remains in legal and political limbo. Substantively there are few significant differences 
between the  rights  guaranteed  by  the  ECHR and those  by  the  Charter,  although the  Charter  
considers its own protections to be broader in scope in some cases.25 This raises the question 
of whether the CJEU may, in future, require a higher standard of protection of certain rights 
than would be ordered by the ECtHR: critics might say that the issue is unlikely to arise. 
The many obstructions to the CJEU’s development of fundamental rights law have resulted in 
its application being weaker than in many other areas of EU law.26 There are no specific 
proceedings or remedies in place for dealing with fundamental rights violations aside from the 
anathematic Article 7 TEU, but more importantly, the EU has no effective fundamental rights 
monitoring. While it is common for the Commission to initiate infringement proceedings 
against member states in breach of other obligations; the EU body responsible for monitoring 
fundamental rights compliance both within the institutions and in the member states, the 
Fundamental Rights Agency, has greatly limited influence, and is often bypassed or ignored 
altogether.27 
To add to the problems created by the FRA’s lack of efficaciousness, access to the CJEU for 
victims of fundamental rights violations is notoriously obfuscated. The predominant 
procedure used before the CJEU, that of the preliminary ruling, is perhaps the most 
                                                             
19 Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05P, Kadi v. Council of the European Union, and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. 
Council of the European Union, 2008 E.C.R., p. 299. 
20 For an overview of these positions, see Greer & Williams, 15 European Law Journal 4 (2009), p. 462. 
21 cf Guy Harpaz, 'The European Court of Justice and its relations with the European Court of Human Rights: 
The quest for enhanced reliance, coherence and legitimacy', 46 Common Market Law Review (2009), p. 105. 
22 Such as in the cases C-260/89, ERT v DUP [1991] ECR I-2925, and C-159/90, SPUC v Grogan [1991] ECR I-
04685. 
23 Art. 6 TEU. 
24 See for example C-13/94, P v S & Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143, as per Cathryn Costello, 'The 
Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in 
Europe', 6 Human Rights Law Review 1 (2006), p. 87. 
25 Explanatory note to Art. 52 Charter; Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] O.J. 
C 303/02. 
26 Greer & Williams, 15 European Law Journal 4 (2009), p. 462. 
27 Ibid. 
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‘individual-friendly’ procedure, as it relies on national courts which are generally accessible. 
However, the procedure is still focused on interactions between the national court and the 
CJEU, with the individual litigants having very little part in the proceedings.28 Although other 
procedures are available, notably the infringement procedure under Article 263 TFEU, all are 
best suited for litigation among institutions and member states: locus standi is consistently 
difficult to achieve for non-privileged parties, and factors such as the short time limits for 
applications, and length and expense of proceedings, are prohibitive.29 
Another significant problem is that of the CJEU’s workload. Despite the comparative speed of 
the CJEU’s work as against that of the ECtHR,30 the CJEU nonetheless had 799 cases pending 
at the end of 2010, with an average waiting time of 12.3 months before resolution.31 Although 
this is a significant improvement over 2004's figures,32 it is a significant problem; and there is 
notable scepticism about how long the improvement will last, as the numbers of cases referred 
from the newer member states increase33 - although it is equally notable that the feared 
floodgates have not yet shown signs of being opened. 
Even as the CJEU succeeds in reducing waiting times for cases heard before it, this is not 
necessarily a good thing for fundamental rights protection. In 2010, the CJEU completed 574 
cases.34 This indicates a very brief handling of cases, which has been demonstrated elsewhere 
to be likely to lead to an increase in contradictory jurisprudence.35 It may also indicate that 
insufficient time is allocated to serious questions of fundamental rights, resulting in rushed 
and flawed decision-making:36 this is a suspicion which the CJEU's opaque style of reporting 
does little to dispel. 
 
 
4. National Constitutional Courts 
 
Any analysis of the fitness of national constitutional (or supreme) courts to assess 
fundamental rights issues is hampered by the wide variations between these courts and the 
law they apply. This is, indeed, one of the strongest arguments against leaving fundamental 
rights to the sole care of national courts. However, national courts are nonetheless significant 
actors  in  the  development  of  fundamental  rights  law,  and  so  a  general  overview  of  their  
characteristics within Europe will be attempted. 
National courts, alongside the CJEU, do not have fundamental rights as their primary interest. 
They, too, exist to - depending on the view taken of the judiciary in general - protect, 
preserve, and develop the law of their nation. However, fundamental rights are perhaps closer 
to the core of a national court’s vocation: fundamental rights are commonly found embedded 
in national constitutions not by chance, but because they are a defining element of a state’s 
                                                             
28 Jan Komárek, 'In the court(s) we trust? On the need for hierarchy and differentiation in the preliminary ruling 
procedure', 32 European Law Review 4 (2007), p. 467. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See above, section on the ECtHR. At the end of 2011, 139650 cases were pending before the ECtHR, with a 
deficit of 20100 cases. ECtHR, Analysis of Statistics, (2011). 
31 Court of Justice of the European Union, Annual Report 2010, (Publications Office of the European Union, 
2011). 
32 840 pending, average waiting time of 23.5 months. The Court of Justice of the European Communities, Annual 
Report 2004, (Luxembourg, 2005). 
33 Damian Chalmers, European Union Public Law, (OUP 2010), p. 182; Bo Vesterdorf, 'A constitutional court 
for the EU?', 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 4 (2006), p. 607. 
34 CJEU, Annual Report 2010. 
35 Komárek, 32 European Law Review 4 (2007), p. 467. 
36 Vesterdorf, 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 4 (2006), p. 607. 
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vertical relationship with its citizens.37 In that sense, national constitutional courts protect the 
state's ‘constitutional identity’ by way of remedying fundamental rights violations: the 
traditional description of the courts as a check on the other arms of government (which, 
nowadays, may well be considered to include the EU)38 is apt. 
In terms of sources of fundamental rights law, national constitutional courts make use of, and 
are bound by, the greatest diversity of sources. The binding nature of these sources suggests 
that national courts may offer the highest level of protection available, as they would 
generally apply the highest of the various norms: however, no system is entirely consistent, 
and the existence of successful CJEU and ECtHR appeals against national judgements 
demonstrates that this is often not the case. 
In determining fundamental rights issues, national courts have recourse to national law, often 
in the form of fundamental rights enshrined in the national constitution; EU law or, more to 
the point in cases of fundamental rights, CJEU jurisprudence; and the ECHR. However, in the 
case of national courts, the meaningful question is not which norms apply, but how these 
norms interact. 
This is a question which is answered very differently around the EU. The binding nature of 
CJEU jurisprudence is well-established, and generally respected. In Austria, the ECHR, as an 
international treaty, has constitutional status, giving it great sway over other norms.39 
Germany, on the other hand, uses the ECHR to interpret the fundamental rights given in the 
Basic Law;40 while in the Solange case41 the German constitutional court effectively handed 
over the reins of interpretation of EU fundamental rights law to the CJEU - albeit under 
conditions. The ECHR is fully incorporated into monist Dutch law;42 and while the UK House 
of Lords and Supreme Court have often been criticised for their limited formal ability to 
protect fundamental rights, reliance on stare decisis and the Human Rights Act 1998 provide 
a reasonably robust system.43 
Although it is difficult to draw general conclusions from such variety, it is at least true that, in 
all cases, the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the CJEU may be relied upon with reasonable 
certainty  of  success.  It  is  also  the  case  that  the  rights  provided  by  constitutions  do  not  vary  
drastically - although they are also far from uniform. Substantively, at least, the fundamental 
rights protection under national constitutional courts is roughly equivalent. 
The influence of national constitutional courts also varies significantly, but thankfully is 
easier to categorise. On the one hand, traditional constitutional courts, such as that of 
Germany, tend to have extensive unilateral powers: something which is missing in the CJEU 
and, particularly, ECtHR regimes, which rely on the co-operation of national authorities. 
Courts may annul national acts or legislation,44 or disapply them:45 such powers are arguably 
the epitome of fundamental rights enforcement. 
On the other hand, there are various constitutional courts with much more limited powers. 
                                                             
37 cf José Manuel M Cardoso Da Costa, 'Constitutional supremacy of human rights treaties' in Venice 
Commission (ed.), The status of international treaties on human rights, (Council of Europe Publishing, 2006), p. 
77. 
38 As evidenced by the multitude of examples of national courts reviewing EU measures, e.g. the German and 
Czech rulings on the Lisbon treaty. Czech Constitutional Court rulings Pl. ÚS 19/08 [2008] and Pl. ÚS 29/09 
[2009]; German Constitutional Court ruling BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 [2009]. 
39 M Cardoso Da Costa, in Venice Commission (ed.), Status of international treaties, p. 77. 
40 Bjorge, 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2011), p. 5. 
41 BVerfGE 37, 271 2 BvL 52/71. 
42 Art. 120 Dutch Constitution. 
43 Greer & Williams, 15 European Law Journal 4 (2009), p. 462. 
44 Aalt Willem Heringa & Philipp Kiiver, Constitutions Compared, (2nd edition, Intersentia, 2009). 
45 Interestingly, the UK Supreme Court appears, following In re G (Adoption: Unmarried Couple) [2008] 
U.K.H.L. 38, to have this power on a limited basis, despite its otherwise not fitting into this first category of 
courts. 
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Examples include the Dutch and Swiss supreme courts, which are both unable to review 
national legislation in light of the constitution - but nevertheless protect fundamental rights by 
reviewing in light of international norms.46 The UK Supreme Court would also generally be 
considered part of this category, as the Human Rights Act affords it only the ability to issue 
non-binding ‘declarations of incompatibility’ when reviewing legislation, although this is 
subject to the exception found In re G.47 
These courts necessarily have a significantly weaker influence than those with greater 
unilateral powers - although this distinction may be relegated to the theoretical, in light of the 
political realities of the relationships between courts and governments. Furthermore, as can be 
seen above, even weaker constitutional courts will generally have greater than usual powers in 
the area of fundamental rights, due to the weight afforded to international and supranational 
fundamental rights norms. 
It  is  also worth noting that national constitutional courts act  as a check not only on national 
authorities, but also, in extreme cases, on the EU. The clearest example of this is the notorious 
Solange case48, in which the German Constitutional Court made it clear that it considers itself 
competent to disapply EU legislation, should a pattern of fundamental rights abuses at the EU 
level emerge. Other examples, not specifically connected to human rights, would include the 
German and Czech courts' rulings on the Lisbon49 treaty. 
National constitutional courts represent the most accessible arena for individuals to bring 
claims regarding fundamental  rights.  As a general  rule,  the requirements for access to lower 
levels of national court systems are minimal. Higher courts, including constitutional courts, 
have heavier requirements; these range from requiring leave to appeal to the UK Supreme 
Court,50 to the admissibility of constitutional complaints in Germany, without exhaustion of 
other remedies, only in cases of general importance.51 The Italian Corte di Cassazione is 
exceptional, in that it answers all applications it receives.52 
National constitutional courts’ workload and delay problems may be less notorious than those 
of European courts, but they are not necessarily less significant. The UK Supreme Court 
emerges victorious, with its largest number of pending cases at any point during 2009 having 
been 21.53 The German constitutional court fares less well, with its pending cases at the end of 
2009 numbering 2905, and the average wait for a resolution being around 16 months.54 The 
Italian Corte di Cassazione, with its exceptional obligation to entertain all applications, 
averaged a 40 month delay for cases completed in 2010.55 These statistics may suggest - 
mostly - a more deliberative approach than that taken by the CJEU, but they also highlight 
that, at any level of the judicial system in Europe, fundamental rights violations are unlikely 
to be resolved in a particularly rapid manner. 
 
 
 
                                                             
46 M Cardoso Da Costa, in Venice Commission (ed.), Status of international treaties, p. 77. 
47 In re G (Adoption: Unmarried Couple) [2008] U.K.H.L. 38. 
48 BVerfGE 37, 271 2 BvL 52/71. 
49 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08; Pl. ÚS 19/08; Pl. ÚS 29/09. 
50 Access to Justice Act 1999 and related acts. 
51 Mauro Cappelletti, 'Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation: Comparative Constitutional, 
International and Social Trends', 25 Stanford Law Review (1973), p. 651. 
52 Komárek, 32 European Law Review 4 (2007), p. 467. 
53 Website  of  the  UK  Supreme  Court,  http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/statistics.html (Last accessed 
25/4/21012). 
54 Inferred from the somewhat unclear statistics on the website of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/organization/gb2009/A-IV-3.html (Last accessed 25/4/2012). 
55 Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Innaugurazione Anno Guidiziario 2011. Available at: 
http://www.cortedicassazione.it/Documenti/2_indice_TABELLE_CIVILE_CASSAZIONE.pdf (Last accessed 
25/4/2012). 
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5. Relationships between the Courts 
 
For the most part, the CJEU’s relationship with national constitutional courts is fixed by the 
seminal rulings on direct effect, and related issues. On those rare occasions when a national 
court does challenge the CJEU, it is almost always on constitutional grounds, and 
fundamental  rights  often  play  a  role;  as  exemplified  by  Solange.56 It is worth noting that 
preliminary rulings are used to excess:57 in this sense, there is a high level of integration, and 
co-operation, between these two elements of Europe's judicial system. 
The relationship between national courts and the ECtHR is defined by the principle of 
evolutionary interpretation: both in terms of allowing the ECtHR to develop novel solutions 
based on national opinion, and of allowing - and, in the cases of Van Kück58 and Goodwin,59 
requiring - national courts to do so themselves.60 The influence of this latter part should not be 
overestimated, however: despite the UK Home Office explicitly encouraging judges to make 
use of this discretion,61 they have been reluctant to do so, especially if considering a 
conclusion which conflicts with existing ECtHR jurisprudence.62  
The doctrine of margin of appreciation is also significant, though not evidently controversial: 
it has been used, in particular, to assign a wider scope to ECHR rights than is apparent from 
ECtHR jurisprudence.63 The combination of these two factors suggests a system whereby the 
ECtHR and national courts develop the substance of fundamental rights law jointly and co-
operatively, in a flexible and pragmatic manner, but with the risk of distortion and 
variability.64 
By far the most fraught relationship in the European fundamental rights constellation is that of 
the CJEU and the ECtHR. The CJEU has developed a deferential attitude towards the ECtHR, 
and now considers itself bound to some extent by ECtHR jurisprudence.65 Indeed, in 
Roquette,66 the CJEU reversed its position in order to align with the ECtHR's judgement. The 
Commission, on the other hand, predicted the EU's Armageddon should the ECtHR have 
binding jurisdiction over it, in its submissions on the Bosphorus case.67 The ECtHR, in return, 
has adopted a modified version of the Solange position; although unlike the German 
constitutional court, it reserves the right to review the question of whether or not the EU 
provides ‘equivalent protection’ of fundamental rights on a case-by-case basis. 
The exception to this ceasefire regards review of primary EU legislation. It was decided in 
Matthews68 that, as the CJEU has no jurisdiction to review primary EU instruments, the 
ECtHR would continue to review such instruments. The CJEU, in return, has refused to 
accept any binding authority on the interpretation of the Treaties.69 
                                                             
56 BVerfGE 37, 271 2 BvL 52/71. 
57 Well-criticised in Komárek, 32 European Law Review 4 (2007), p. 467. 
58 Van Kück v. Germany [2003] 37 E.H.R.R. 51. 
59 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, [2002] 35 EHRR 447. 
60 cf Bjorge, 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2011), p. 5. 
61 Rights brought home: the Human Rights Bill, 1997, Cm 3782. 
62 R v. Horncastle & Others  [2009] U.K.S.C. 14; however made unclear by Cadder v. Her Majesty’s Advocate 
[2010] U.K.S.C. 43. 
63 In re G (Adoption: Unmarried Couple)  [2008] U.K.H.L. 38; Kloeckner, Cour de cassation, 14 June, 1996. 
64 cf M Cardoso Da Costa, in Venice Commission (ed.), Status of international treaties, p. 77. 
65 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, 'A tale of two courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the growing European human 
rights acquis', 43 Common Market Law Review (2006), p. 629. 
66 C-94/00, Roquette Freres [2002] ECR I-9011. 
67 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v Ireland  [2006] 42 EHRR 1, as explored by Costello, 6 Human Rights Law 
Review 1 (2006), p. 87. 
68 Matthews v. United Kingdom [1999] 28 EHRR 361. 
69 Opinion 1/91, [1991] ECR I-6079; Opinion 1/92, [1992] ECR I-2821; Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, Kadi 
v. Council of the European Union, and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council of the European Union, 2008 E.C.R. 
299. 
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It is this issue which may prove contentious if the EU moves forwards with its plans to accede 
to  the  ECHR.  There  is  extensive  analysis  available  on  the  question  of  how  a  hierarchy  
between the CJEU and the ECtHR should function within the framework of the ECHR: it 
seems highly unlikely that accession will succeed without a similar authority over the CJEU 
being  granted  to  the  ECtHR as  it  now holds  over  national  courts.  Regardless  of  procedural  
questions, the issue of Treaty interpretation is significant: should the CJEU remain intractable, 
the formal relationship between it and the ECtHR would remain awkward, with the greatest 
development being the ability of the ECtHR to review acts of EU institutions.70  
The  doctrine  of  Matthews is  reminiscent  of  Article  35  ECHR’s  provisions  on  exhaustion  of  
domestic remedies, perhaps providing for the possibility of the ECtHR acting as a limited 
appeal court against fundamental rights decisions of the CJEU. However, the limited 
fundamental rights work of the CJEU restricts the impact of this prospect. 
Perhaps the most significant advantage of EU accession would be the removal of remaining 
confusion over whether or not national acts may be ‘shielded’ from ECtHR jurisdiction by the 
involvement of EU law. Given the ever-growing reach of EU law, this is a highly desirable 
outcome.71 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
None  of  the  courts  in  Europe  are  individually  suited  to  be  the  sole  or  primary  arbitrator  of  
fundamental rights disputes. 
The ECtHR has a substantive advantage, with the ECHR and its flexibility providing the 
opportunity for strong and consistently up-to-date fundamental rights protection, despite the 
detraction of reservations. It is also the only court which is necessarily fully detached from the 
acts being reviewed. However, there are flaws in its enforcement, and its caseload problems 
are staggering: it is clearly not capable of bearing the full burden of fundamental rights 
adjudication throughout Europe. 
The CJEU is effective in terms of compliance. However, its large caseload both delays 
proceedings and distracts from thorough examination of fundamental rights issues. Its limited 
competences  and  the  lack  of  clarity  as  regards  the  substance  of  EU fundamental  rights  law 
negatively effect the robustness of its fundamental rights regime, and the limited access 
available to individuals is unsuitable in the area of fundamental rights law. 
National constitutional courts are often effective in adjudicating fundamental rights issues, 
and they tend to be relatively efficient, in the context of the generally inefficient systems 
discussed here. However, there are well-established and long-standing arguments against 
allowing national courts the last word on fundamental rights issues: I need not repeat them all 
here, but prime among them are the lack of consistency between different states’ 
constitutional courts, and the necessity of external oversight of national activities. 
The best solution is co-operation. Fundamental rights has long been a more universal area of 
law than most - certainly, co-operation within it is easier to procure than co-operation in many 
of the EU’s policy areas. At the moment, the proliferation of variations on Solange has 
created a reasonably stable and consistent fundamental rights system. The various elements of 
this system complement each other. 
The national constitutional courts are best suited to deal with the bulk of fundamental rights 
issues: if not simply by virtue of spreading the load, then because there is a certain legal 
coherence evident in resolving issues of vertical relationships between the state and the 
                                                             
70 cf Lock, 35 European Law Review 6 (2010), 777, who also argues that attribution of EU acts to particular 
bodies by the ECtHR would be rendered near-impossible, as interpretation of the Treaties would be required. 
71 cf Tim Eicke, 'The European Charter of Fundamental Rights - unique opportunity or unwelcome distraction', 3 
European Human Rights Law Review (2000), p. 280. 
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citizenry at the domestic level.72 The vast majority of cases are settled satisfactorily at the 
domestic level, and elevating them further would be counterproductive. The same is, to some 
degree, true of the CJEU, although it is not as effective as national constitutional courts may 
be in reviewing acts of its own legal order. 
Happily, fundamental rights are, for the most part, substantively aligned throughout Europe. 
Therefore, an irreconcilable conflict between courts is unlikely to arise. Were such a thing to 
occur, however, the substantive strength and independence of the ECtHR makes it best placed 
to have the last word. Its imperfect enforcement would then be compensated for by the 
function of national courts and the CJEU in applying its judgement. Its style of judgement is 
no disadvantage to it, as such a question would likely be of a magnitude warranting a careful 
and detailed published legal analysis by the court involved. This does not, however, mean that 
the  ECtHR  should  be  the  dominant  court  of  fundamental  rights:  the  ‘bread  and  butter’  of  
European fundamental rights law belongs where it originates, with national courts and the 
CJEU. 
                                                             
72 cf Canor, 25 European Law Review 1 (2000), p. 3. 
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THE INDIRECT REVIEW OF EU ACTS BY THE ECtHR: A PRE—AND 
POST-ACCESSION ANALYSIS  
 
Tom N. Dopstadt 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the beginning of the European integration process there have been two major 
institutions developed side by side. On the one hand the European Union (EU) and on the 
other hand the Council of Europe. Although there are fundamental differences between these 
two institutions, they emerged out of the same idea.1 
With the appearance of these institutions, two different judiciary systems came into being. 
The European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction is based on the Treaty of the European Union2 
(TEU) and primarily concerned with the enforcement and interpretation thereof,3 the 
European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) deduces its power from the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and is the last instance of safeguarding human rights 
in Europe.4 
Whilst former has not been involved in Human rights initially, through case law and the 
adoption of the Declaration of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,5 and the Charter 
of Fundamental  Rights of the European Union (the Charter)  it  has entered into the field of 
Human and Fundamental Rights. 
Therewith  the  possibility  of  divergent  interpretation  of  the  ECHR  was  created  and  the  
ECtHR had to established a mechanism governing these potential conflicts. This is to say 
when they deem it necessary to rule on the compatibility of EU acts with the ECHR. 
However  since  the  EU  is  about  to  accede  to  the  ECHR,  this  mechanism  will  soon  be  
superseded and replaced by a new mechanism as provided by the Draft Accession 
Agreement. This paper will therefore give a short summary of how both European Courts 
have  dealt  with  this  matter  until  now  and  pinpoint  its  pitfalls.  The  second  part  will  be  
devoted to the solutions of these pitfalls as proposed by the Draft Accession Agreement 
(DAA). The final part will evaluate these proposed solutions and assess whether this leads to 
an improved mechanism for the review of EU acts, both from the EU’s and the applicant’s 
perspective. 
 
 
2. The Mechanism for the ECtHR’s Indirect Review of EU acts  
 
2.1 The ECJ’s Affirmation and Extension of Fundamental Rights Protection in the EU 
 
There used to exist no institutional link between the two courts,6 in particular because the 
protection of fundamental rights within the European Union does not stem from the Treaty 
                                                             
1 Junker, ‘Council of Europe – European Union: A sole ambition for the European continent’, Report to the 
attention of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the Council of Europe, (2006). 
2 And likewise the Treaty of the functioning of the European Union. 
3 This is already enshrined in Art. 19 TFEU. 
4 P. Craig, G. de Burca, EU Law. Texts, Cases and Materials, (Oxford University Press, 4th edition, 2008), p. 
419; For a discussion about the different roles of the court see Case 118/75 Watson. 
5 This adoption was mainly a result of the Solange I case of the German Constitutional Court (MaVerfGE 37, 
271), for further information see e.g. Jacqué, ‘The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, Common Market Law Review (2011), p. 998.  
6 Junker, ‘Council of Europe – European Union: A sole ambition for the European continent’, Report to the 
attention of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the Council of Europe, (2006), p. 8. 
Tom N. Dopstadt 
172 
itself.7 Fundamental rights received its foothold instead in the EU for the first time by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ)8 in the case of Stauder vs. City of Ulm.9 Shortly thereafter 
the Court reaffirmed the guarantee of fundamental rights as inherent in Community law.10 
Yet the court did no dwell at this stage for long, but soon after that stipulated in the Nold vs. 
Commission case11 that  international  treaties  to  which  the  Member  States  have  become  a  
party to can be used as a source for the protection of fundamental right within the European 
Union. It went on by emphasizing the importance of these “external” sources of fundamental 
rights in the Rutili case.12 Therein the ECJ for the first time directly referred to an Article of 
the ECHR.13 Followed by the Johnston case,14 the  ECJ  indicated  the  pre-eminence  of  the  
ECHR as regards EU’s fundamental rights and even stated in Roquette Freres15 that it “must 
take into account” the ECtHR’s judgements. 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the Charter obtained “the same value as the 
Treaties”,16 the TEU in Article 6 (1) now even refers to the ECHR as one of the sources of 
the EU’s fundamental rights.17  
Therefore it can be said that the European Union and in particular the ECJ have done the 
first step towards a ‘vertical relationship between EJEU and the ECtHR’.18 Especially by the 
introduction of the protection of fundamental rights into EU law and the frequent references 
to the ECHR by the ECJ since 1986.19 The ECJ has thereby opened the possibility for a 
different interpretation of the ECHR between the two European Courts.20 Consequently the 
ECtHR had to deal with the question when it will rule on a breach of the ECHR by the EU or 
to say the scope of its review.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
7 Margaritis, ‘European Union accession to the European Convention on Human Rights: an institutional 
“marriage”’, Working paper no. 65, (2011) p. 3; Jacobs, The European Constitution. How it was created. What 
will change., (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2005), p. 119. 
8 It should however be noted that the Court in its judgements of the 50’s and 60’s, refused to consider 
fundamental rights, see case C-1/58 Stork vs. High Authority [1958-9] ECR 41 and joint cases C-16/59, C-
17/59, C- 18/59 Ruhr vs. High Authority [1960] ECR 47. 
9 Case C-29/69 Stauder vs. City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419; This became especially clear in Stauder, supra note 5, 
Grounds of judgment, para. 7. “...fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of community 
law and protected by the court”. 
10 Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, Grounds, para. 4. 
11 Case C-4/73 Nold vs. Commission [1974] ECR 49 at para. 13. 
12 Case C-36/75 Rutili vs. French Minister of the Interior [1975] ECR 1219. 
13 Jacqué, Common Market Law Review 48 (2011), p. 999. 
14Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651. 
15Case C-94/00 Roquette Freres [2002] ECR I-901. 
16Jacqué, Common Market Law Review 48 (2011), p. 998. 
17 Art.  6(1)  &  (3)  TEU,  has  however  been  subject  to  much  controversy  as  the  fundamental  rights  within  the  
European Union are sill based on a paradox. This is because external instruments, are the sources for the EU 
fundamental rights (Art. 6 TEU), yet not the “constitutive” thereof. See Chalmers p. 229 This paradox has been 
established in Joined Cases C-402/05 and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat Inernational Foundation v Council 
[2008] ECR I-6352; For a discussion why accession to the ECHR is still necessary after the adoption of the 
Charter of fundamental rights see Memorandum of 4 April 1979, Bulletin of the European Communities supp. 
2/79, para. 8. 
18 Andreangeli, EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights, (Edward Elgar, 2008), p. 11. 
19 Peers, ‘Limited responsibility of European Union member states for actions within the scope of Community 
law’, European Constitutional Law Review 2 (2006), p. 443. 
20  P. Craig, G. de Burca, EU Law. Texts, Cases and Materials, p. 410; Jacqué, Common Market Law Review 
(2011), p. 1001. 
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2.2 The Mechanism for Indirect Review as Introduced by the ECtHR 
 
Since the European Union was not a party to the ECHR, it was neither bound to it in any 
way.21 Therefore the ECtHR could not “officially” review the conformity of EU law with the 
ECHR.22 
The question of indirect review of EU acts by the ECtHR has been addressed in several 
cases. Form the judgment of the ECtHR in M  &  Co23 and Matthews24, it can be concluded 
that  the  ECtHR  has  only  principally  accepted  to  review  EU  acts  in  certain  cases.  This  
however meant in fact that it agreed to rule on the EU’s law conformity with the ECHR.25 
In  M  &  Co,26 it was held that only because states implement EU measures, they are not 
excluded ipso facto from ECtHR’s  jurisdiction.  It  was  further  stipulated  that  the  ECJ  in  its  
judgments protect human rights satisfyingly. Furthermore the EU legal order, as based on the 
rule of law, offers a level of protection that was considered to be sufficient.27 
The judgement of Metthews followed thereafter. This was one of the landmark cases where 
the ECtHR ruled on a Member State’s liability by implementing EU law.28 The Court made 
an important distinction, while secondary law can be reviewed by the ECJ, primary law (the 
treaty articles) cannot. Hence, the ECtHR deemed it appropriate to have jurisdiction in order 
to monitor primary law, as the ECJ was not able to do so.29 As a result one can conclude that 
the ECtHR could therefore review EU acts, if the individual was left without a remedy.30 
This rationale was also confirmed in31 Cantoni32, Senator Lines33 and Guerin34. 
In the famous Bosphorus case35, the ECtHR not only confirmed the rationale established in 
Metthews but  also  qualified  it  further.  The  case  was  about  an  alleged  infringement  of  
Bosphorus’ property right. The Irish authorities confiscated an aircraft leased to Bosphorus. 
                                                             
21 Waagstein, ‘Human Rights Protection in Europe’, SPICE Digests, Freeman Spogli Institute for International 
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(2006), p. 253. 
28 Ibid, p. 254; Margaritis, Working paper No. 65 (2011), p. 11. 
29 Parga, 31 European Law Review 2 (2006), p. 254 
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Union as an Actor in International Relations, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, (2002), p.190; Canor, 
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31 For an analysis of the following cases see P. Craig, G. de Burca, EU Law. Texts, Cases and Materials, p. 420-
422; S. Douglas-Scott, ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human 
Rights Acquis’, Common Market Law Review, 43 (2006), n. 41; European Foreign Affairs Review 11: 471–490, 
(2006), p. 478-480. 
32 ECtHR, Cantoni v. France, judgement of 15.11.1996. 
33 ECtHR, Senator Lines v. 15 EU Member States, judgement of 10.3.2004. 
34 ECtHR, Guérin Automobiles v les 15 Etats de l’Union Européenne, judgement of 4.7.2008.  
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They did so because of the EC Regulation 990/93 that was based on UNSC Resolution 820 
(1993). At the bottom of the Bosphorus case lies an attempt to balance on the one hand side 
Member States’ freedom and to give power to international organisations, on the other hand 
the necessity to secure the rights protected under the ECHR.36 
The test, also called ‘equivalence test’, applied by the ECtHR in order to determine whether 
there was a violation of the ECHR37 can be summarised by the formula: 
O +  E =  P;  ‘where  O stands  for  “obligation”,  E  stands  for  “equivalence”,  and  P  stands  for  
“presumption”’.38 In  other  words,  if  a  Member  State  is  obliged  under  EU  law  to  act  in  a  
certain way, and the human right protection are equivalent to those by the ECHR, then there 
is  a  presumption  that  the  Member  State  has  acted  in  accordance  with  the  ECHR.  This  
however can be rebutted if there is a ‘manifest deficit’39 in the protection of human rights.40 
The human rights protection shall be deemed equivalent if the protection is in fact 
‘comparable’ as defined in the case.41 
The test therefore permits a conditional rather than an unlimited review of Member State acts 
under  the  scope  of  EU  law  but  nevertheless  opens  the  door  for  indirect  review  of  EU  
actions.42 
Overall the ECtHR held in its case law, that there are two instances were they will review EU 
law; firstly, if the issue arises out of EC primary law (Metthews) and secondly if the issue 
arises out of the Member States’ implementation, given that they had no discretion in the 
matter (Bosphorus).43 In cases where the Member State has discretion, they have to bear all 
responsibilities for the act.44 Thus review is depending on whether the alleged infringement 
of fundamental rights can be tried by the ECJ or not.  
 
2.3 The Critique About the “Equivalence test” and its Pitfalls  
 
The equivalence test was not without critique. Already in the concurring opinion of Judge 
Ress the test was critically assessed, particularly in the light of a double standard as regards 
fundamental rights.45 However, Judge Ress concluded that the test would in the end not lead 
to such double standard, primarily because the ECJ will need to take into consideration the 
ECHR case law in future cases.46  
Legal scholars have revealed that there are nevertheless several pitfalls or at least 
ambiguities as regards the test. Especially cases, where the ECJ has not been involved in, 
trigger great difficulties for the ECtHR. In a similar vein, the degree of discretion left to the 
                                                             
36 Peers, European Constitutional Law Review 2 (2006), p. 451. 
37 Before the Court established the test it firstly considered the admissibility of claim, the Applicability and 
Proportionality of the EU act, for a summary of the judgment see O'Meara, 12 German Law Journal 10 (2011), 
p. 1255 – 1264. 
38 Peers, European Constitutional Law Review 2, (2006), p. 452.  
39 Bosphorus, para. 156. 
40 Peers, European Constitutional Law Review 2 (2006), p. 452; Parga, 31 European Law Review 2 (2006), p. 
255. 
41 Bosphorus, para. 155.  
42 Peers, 2 European Constitutional Law Review (2006), p. 452; Parga, 31 European Law Review 2 (2006,) p. 
259. 
43 Parga, 31 European Law Review 2 (2006), p.257. 
44 Bosphorus, para. 157: “It remains the case that a State would be fully responsible under the Convention for all 
acts falling outside its strict international legal obligations.”; The Court relied on abundant case law on this 
point: inter alia, Van de Hurk v Netherlands (A/288): (1994) 18 E.H.R.R. 481; Procola v Luxembourg (A/326): 
(1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 193; Cantoni v France, R.J.D., 1996-V 1614; Hornsby v Greece (1997) 24 E.H.R.R. 250. It 
also pointed out that the ECJ's judgment in Kondova is consistent with this view: Case C-235/99, R. v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department Ex p. Kondova [2001] E.C.R. I-6427. 
45 See Concurring Opinion of Judge Ress in Bosphorus at §3; O'Meara, 12 German Law Journal 10 (2011) p. 
1263. 
46 Bosphorus, at para. 3. 
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State that would negate the presumption of compliance has not been clearly determined. This 
could in the end lead to a need for interpretation of EU law, which is pursuant to Foto-
Frost,47 exclusively left to the ECJ. Thus any interpretation of EU law by the ECtHR would 
infringe the EU’s legal autonomy “– the very thing which the Bosphorus Airways judgment 
apparently seeks to avoid“.48 It  was  furthermore  criticised  that  the  EU  could  under  the  
“equivalence test” be held liable for breaches of Human Rights without an adequate 
possibility to defend itself.49 Additionally, the “equivalence test” puts the EU currently into a 
privileged position as regards the ECHR;50 one that the ECtHR will arguably no longer be 
able to uphold once the EU has become a party to the ECHR.51  
Finally, if alleged violations of fundamental right occurred outside any Member State’s 
jurisdiction no responsibility can arise, even though the violation falls within Community 
law.52 This lacuna has already caused problems in the case of Connolly.53 
 
 
3. Review of EU acts under the Draft Accession Agreement  
 
Once  the  EU  has  become  a  party  to  the  ECHR,  the  current  state  of  affairs  as  regards  the  
review of EU acts by the ECtHR will change. From this moment onwards, direct claims can 
be brought against the EU before the Human Rights Court for violations of the ECHR.54 This 
might imply on face value that the current indirect review mechanism will no longer be 
needed, however due to many technical as well as methodical obstacles, this conclusion must 
be drawn carefully. 
Although the current state of affairs changes the obstacles that accompany EU accession to 
the ECHR are in fact still similar to the pitfalls found in the “equivalence test”. They can be 
structured into procedural and substantive topics. While former includes matters of co-
respondent mechanism and prior involvement of the ECJ, latter primarily deals with the 
attempt to uphold the EU’s legal autonomy. These matters are nevertheless overlapping and 
have consequences for both topics.  
 
3.1. The Procedural Issues that Accompany ECtHR Review of EU acts  
 
Both the co-respondent mechanism and internal review procedure have already been subject 
to major scholarly writing, especially former has been analysed in great detail and very 
complex as well as sophisticated mechanisms have been proposed. 
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53 Connolly v 15 Member states of the European Union, judgement of 9 December 2008; Lock,‘EU Accession to 
the ECHR: Consequences for the European Court of Justice’, Paper for EUSA Conference, (2011), p. 6, 
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The need to introduce devices such as the co-respondent mechanism is already enshrined in 
Article  1  (b)  of  Protocol  No.  8.55 Yet the ultimate rationale for its introduction lies in the 
attempt to start proceedings against the party, which was responsible for the (alleged) 
violation of fundamental right.56 The current procedural remedies, in particular Article 36 (2) 
ECHR,57 were deemed insufficient for this purpose, due to the fact that the “EU and its 
Member States are not totally autonomous from each other”,58 and that such involvement has 
no binding effect for the joining party.59 It should however not be neglected that the co-
respondent mechanism is also an important tool to avoid interpretation of EU law by the 
ECtHR.60 The introduction of this mechanism has been labelled as the “most important 
modification to the Convention“.61 
It can be said that both adequate judicial protection and effective means of defence trigger 
the need for such mechanism.62 As of now, cases lodged against the EU directly have been 
declared inadmissible ratio personae,63 a lacuna that can no longer be unsolved. Although 
direct claims against the EU can be brought before the ECHR post accession, this lacuna is 
closed, yet only unsatisfying. Particularly where a complaint is brought against a Member 
State, but it turns out that it was in fact the EU that caused the alleged violation, the 
individual should not be forced to start proceedings against the EU all over again. 
The mechanism currently included in Article 3 of the Draft Accession Agreement is limited 
to cases that involve the Member States and the EU.64 It should be born in mind that it was 
made very clear that the co-respondent mechanism is not a “procedural privilege” for the EU 
or its Member States.65 The mechanism is one, which implies that the EU and its Member 
States share responsibilities before the ECHR,66 for the purpose of a fair administration of 
justice.67 
There are in fact two different scenarios where the co-respondent mechanism could be used. 
Either the EU, or the Member State(s) become co-respondent to the case.68 Both scenarios 
are addressed in Article 3 (2) and Article 3 (3) DAA, respectively.69 One important feature 
of the co-respondent mechanism is its voluntary nature. This is to say that neither the EU nor 
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para. 35 states: “The introduction of the co-respondent mechanism is also fully in line with Article 1.b of 
Protocol No. 8 to the Treaty of Lisbon.” 
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779; CDDH-UE (2011)16fin para. 37. 
64 Groussot et. al., Foundation Robert Schuman Policy Paper (2011),  p. 11 
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the Member States are forced to join the proceedings.70 In fact it can be said that the whole 
procedure from a substantial viewpoint is dependent upon the EU or the Member States and 
the ECtHR only decides whether the requirements to join the case are met, thereby staying 
officially in control of the proceedings.71 The reason for the voluntary nature of this 
mechanism is to prevent the ECtHR to assess whether a Member State has to join, since this 
would involve interpretation of EU law.72 
Apart from the co-respondent mechanism, prior involvement of the ECJ has been considered 
to be inevitable for a proper functioning of the judicial protection after the accession of the 
EU to the ECHR.73 Although these two topics have first been considered individually, they 
are intrinsically connected,74 as the issue only arises if the EU becomes a co-respondent 
under Article 3 (2) Draft Accession Agreement. Whilst this will be no issue if the individual 
has started proceedings against the EU directly,75 the situation looks different if the issue has 
been raised before a national court. In those cases the ECJ can only be involved through the 
preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, a procedure that is not necessarily used in every 
case. It could be argued that without the prior involvement of the ECJ, any case brought 
before the ECtHR by the individual shall be declared in inadmissible since not all national 
remedies are exhausted pursuant to Article 35(2) ECHR. However based on the fact that the 
preliminary ruling is not a remedy for the individual but only a suggestion to the court,76 it 
would be unjust to require an individual to exhaust this procedure before the case shall be 
declared admissible for the ECHR.77 Consequential, cases could be brought before the 
ECHR without the ECJ having ruled on the matter. It should be noted that this would be rare 
as it is unlikely that a national court will not make such preliminary ruling.78 
Nevertheless, Article 3 (6) DAA has introduced a mechanism to ensure that the ECJ has the 
opportunity of prior involvement. The exact procedure for such ‘prior involvement is still not 
clear’,79 however  the  possibility  only  arises  if  the  EU has  become a  co-respondent.80 As a 
result, if the EU refuses to do so, it has arguably waived its right of “prior involvement”.81 In 
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any event, the ruling of the ECJ will not be binding upon the ECtHR,82 but only assess 
whether the individual has used the right legal basis for his or her contestation.83 
 
3.2 The Substantive Issues that Accompany EU Accession to the ECHR  
 
Having scrutinized the procedural issues as regards ECtHR post-accession review of EU acts, 
it has become clear that they are all in the end linked to the maintenance of the EU legal 
autonomy or the compliance with Additional Protocol No. 8.84  
First and foremost the ECJ’s monopoly in interpreting EU law has been much attention 
devoted to. Both the co-respondent and prior involvement mechanism have been established 
in such a way that the ECJ’s competences remain untouched.85 
However the interpretative autonomy of the ECJ has not only been protected in the 
procedural issues. The Draft Accession Agreement clearly states that the ECtHR has no 
power in invalidating EU law but can only judge on the compliance with the ECHR.86 
Additionally Art. 5 of the Draft Accession Agreement ensures that Art. 344 TFEU and Art. 
55 ECHR do not come into conflict by stating that proceedings before the ECJ are: “neither 
procedures of international investigation [...], nor means of dispute settlement [...]“. Thereby 
the autonomy of the ECJ and the ECtHR are protected.87 
Another issue that has received much attention is the accession to the ECHR Protocols. As of 
today, only Protocol No. 1 and 6 have been acceded by all Member States,88 and thus the EU 
will only accede these two pursuant to Art. 1 (1) DDA. The accession to other protocols is 
currently very unlikely, considering the resistance of England.89 
As regards the continuation of the “equivalence test”, the Draft Accession Agreement is 
silent. It is up to the ECtHR therefore to rule on its application.90 The likelihood of its 
continuation is debateable while some legal scholars suggest that in light of the caseload the 
test should be applied post-accession91 others are of the opinion that the privileged position of 
the EU will be unjust to maintain.92 
Finally,  the  ECJ  has  used  at  its  starting  point  the  Charter  in  about  30  cases  since  the  entry  
into force of Lisbon. Thus both the ECJ and the ECtHR have stressed the importance of 
coherence between the Charter and the Convention.93 
Therefore on the one hand side the gaps found in the “equivalence test” were addressed while 
simultaneously compliance with Additional Protocol No 8 was paid utmost attention to. In 
particular the necessity to uphold the EU’s legal autonomy and the preservation of EU 
competences, gives little room for the negotiators in finding solutions to these issues. As a 
result the solutions proposed are not all homogenous. The danger exists that these are largely 
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influenced by political compromises and therefore do not lead to an improved protection of 
fundamental rights, the very purpose of EU accession.94 
 
 
4. The Consequences for Post-Accession Review of EU acts 
 
4.1 The Pitfalls of the Proposed Solutions in the Draft Accession Agreement 
 
As stated already the ambiguities of the “equivalence test” have to a large extend been 
addressed in the Draft Accession Agreement. In particular the possibility for the EU to 
defend itself before the ECHR has significantly improved through the co-respondent 
mechanism. The same is valid for the prior involvement of the ECJ in cases pending before 
the ECtHR. Also the lacunae as found in Connolly will  be  closed  since  EU  can  post-
accession be directly reviewed by the ECtHR.95 
Although one might conclude that the accession leads to an enhanced mechanism for the 
review of EU acts and consequently to an improvement of fundamental rights protection, this 
conclusion requires scrutiny. 
There are many factors that currently influence the negotiations between the EU and the 
ECHR, most of the times technical problems that were created by Protocol No 8. It is fair and 
just  to  state  that  the  ultimate  aim  behind  each  proposed  solution  is  the  maintenance  of  the  
EU’s legal autonomy in order to comply with Additional Protocol No 8, yet even this has not 
been accomplished by now. 
In particular the prior involvement of the EU still left the specific mechanism to be used open 
to debate.96 Whilst this seems to be a minor obstacle, it leads in fact to major problems if one 
wants to incorporate such mechanism into existing EU law in order to prevent Treaty 
amendments.97 Numerous  mechanisms have  been  thought  of,  yet  most  of  them seem either  
infringe the legal autonomy of the EU or appear unable to be incorporated into the current 
procedural mechanism of the EU. Nevertheless some solutions appear to be more appropriate 
than  others.  The  first  would  be  to  use  the  Commission  as  the  connector  between  ECJ  and  
ECtHR.98 The Commission could then through Art. 263 TFEU initiate the ECJ to rule on the 
matter.99 The other possible solution would be to entrust this function to the advocate 
general.100 Furthermore the ECtHR could also ask for a preliminary ruling, this however 
means that the ECJ’s answer needs to be binding.101 A final and maybe the most elegant 
solution would be to “strengthen the disciple of the preliminary reference procedure and 
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supplement the Foto-Frost case law”.102 It should be born in mind that all these procedures 
must take place before the ECtHR rules on the admissibility of the complaint, as this might 
already involve interpretation of EU law.103 However as it is currently stated in the 
commentaries to the Draft Accession Agreement, such procedure would only take place 
before the merits of the application are decided,104 this implies that the ECJ would only get 
involved after the complaint has been declared admissible.105 
In  a  similar  vein,  the  co-respondent  mechanism  also  lacks  one  major  drawback.  This  is  its  
voluntary nature. It is uncontested that if the applicant addresses his or her complaint to both 
the EU and the Member States, the respondent has no choice but to become co-
respondents.106 The situation however looks different if the complaint is only addressed to the 
EU and later on it is desired that one or more Member States join as co-respondent, and vice 
versa. In these circumstances it is up to the EU or its Member State whether they will join or 
not.107 
 
4.2 The Impacts on Review of EU Acts and Concluding Remarks  
 
Thus the review EU acts by the ECtHR became from a theoretical viewpoint easier, since 
claims against the EU can be directly addressed. The mechanisms that are currently proposed 
in the Draft Accession Agreement have to a large extend solved the pitfalls of the 
“equivalence test”. These solutions however require very complex and partly ambiguous 
procedures, particular due to Additional Protocol No 8 that only left little room for 
manoeuvre to the negotiator of the Draft Accession Agreement. 
Therefore it seems that the applicant’s interests are left out of the equation. Whilst the issue 
as revealed in Connolly108 no longer exists, the new procedures are often not beneficial for 
the applicant. In particular, the already troublesome position of the applicant before the 
ECtHR is not improved with the introduction of the prior involvement mechanism; rather the 
opposite seems to be true.109 It  still  remains  unclear  what  happens  if  the  ECJ  finds  the  
complaint to breach of EU law. Can the applicant after such finding still be considered to be a 
victim under the ECHR? It would look most reasonable to consider the applicant as a victim 
as long as the national authorities have not annulled the decision that affected him or her.110 
In addition such mechanism will also not speed up the already lengthy proceedings, but result 
more likely than not in the opposite. Although this has been addressed in the commentaries to 
the Draft Accession Agreement, it remains an unsolved issue, even more so since the exact 
procedure has not yet been decided upon. 
The second major drawback lies within the co-respondent mechanism. Issues might arise 
where the EU refuses to become a co-respondent to the case and the Member States refuse to 
accept responsibility because it actually lies with EU. Consequentially it has been suggested 
that in these circumstances such kind of reasoning should be denied. The future will tell 
whether this suggestion is followed. Nevertheless this issue implies that the rationale in 
                                                             
102 Jacqué, Common Market Law Review 48, (2011), p. 1019, however the ECJ does not merely want to trust its 
power of persuasion and has thus also opt for an introduction of such mechanism in Discussion document 
between both European Courts, see supra note 72. 
103 Jacqué, Common Market Law Review 48, (2011), p. 1021. 
104 CDDH-UE (2011)16fin, para. 58. 
105 Lock, Common Market Law Review 48, (2011), p. 28. 
106 Lock, Common Market Law Review 48, (2011), p. 18; see also Art. 3 (4) Draft Accession Agreement and 
CDDH-UE (2011)16fin para. 58 para. 49 – 52.  
107 see supra note 73. 
108 see supra note 53. 
109 European  Trade  Union  Confederation. 
110 Lock, Common Market Law Review 48, (2011), p. 35. 
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Matthews would need to be upheld,111 and therefore the current mechanism would post-
accession still exist as a fallback. 
Hence it can be concluded that although the review of EU acts by the ECtHR will, from a 
theoretical viewpoint, become less problematic, the accession of the EU to the ECHR is not 
necessarily advantageous for the applicant. This is mainly because the new mechanism as a 
result of Protocol No 8 ought to be complex in order to safeguard the EU legal autonomy on 
the one side and the practical usefulness on the other. Thereby little room is left to the 
negotiators so that applicant’s interest was largely neglected. What can be seen by the new 
mechanism is that the proposed procedures solve the currently unsettled position of the EU 
and its Member States in proceedings before the ECHR. The new procedures have, however, 
created new problems for the applicant, as outlined above. 
It can thus be stated that review of EU acts by the ECtHR will change post-accession. These 
changes  appear  to  be  advantageous  for  the  EU  and  its  Member  States,  but  not  for  the  
applicant.112 This is particular worrying since both EU institutions “advertise” the accession 
as an improvement for fundamental right protection. Whether this is true seems currently to 
be more than questionable. One can therefore only hope that in future negotiations, the 
Council of Europe and the EU will be more focused on the applicant’s interest, if both intend 
not only to advertise an improved protection of fundamental rights in Europe but also to act 
upon it. 
 
 
                                                             
111 Ibid, p. 19. 
112 It should be noted that the impacts of the these changes for the ECtHR are not considered in this paper, but it 
can be shortly said that they currently do not seem to be entirely advantageous either, for further information see 
also Foundation Robert Schuman Policy Paper (2011). 
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